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The Ph»D, dissertation titled "Political Development 
in U.P,/ 1950-75", is an attempt to study the politics of 
Uttar Pradesh/ an in^iortant 3tate of India * politically and 
otherwise» Political events that took place in U.P, have 
had a great irtpact not only on its politics but have alvcays 
inj^luenced the national politics. 
Traditionally U.P. has been a Congress stronghold. 
The Coi^ress government at the Centre has alv?oys kept one 
of its confidantes as the Chief Minister in U.P, The only 
period of time v/hen the Congre^as had to concede defeat and 
lose face was during the Janata phase (1977-80), BKD Alliance 
government (1970) and the aVD Governments in 1967 and 
1970-71. It is eviaent that the State had a smooth sail since 
the First General Elections in 1952 till 1967 i.e. during 
the Congre-s regime under the Chief Ministership of C.B, Gupta 
Mrs. ^uch&ta Kripalani, Dr ^npurnanand and G.B. Pant. 
Interestingly this period was devoid of any political upheaval 
and the existing situation offered no challenges for the state 
as well a^ the Central Congress leadership. It was a trouble 
free phase in the U.P. politics. 
It was only in 1967 that the firtit signs of political 
turmoil started to surface in U.P. The era of alliances and 
coalitiona started which resulted in the establishment of 
SVD and BKD governments in the state. It was a period of 
intense political activity on the part of the Opposition 
parties whose only aim was to oust the Congress government. 
The Opposition succeeded in its mission though for a short 
while* 
It was a case of variation on the same theme when 
the Opposition parties a^ain dealt a severe blow to the 
Congress in x977 when the Janata came to power in U.P. All 
theae developments and events have been fully discussed in 
the thesis. An attempt has been made to highlight the Oppo-
sition governments and their efforts to rout the Congress 
from the seat of power in U.P, There have been tiroes when 
high political drama was enacted in the state - both by the 
Con<^ reiLis and the Opposition parties. References to such 
events and the rei>ultant consequencei:;> are to be found in the 
theisis. 
The study is divided into seven chapters, conclusion 
and bibliography. As pointed out in the preface it has been 
an uphill task to collect material for this study. In view 
of non-availability of source material, the available 
material waa Cv^nsulted. Newspaper reports, editorials and 
political cornmentaries have been o£ ininiense help* 
The first chapter deals with the political situation 
in U.P, from 1952 to 1967# a period of continuous Congress 
rule for fifteen years. "Hie formation of the firat non-
Congress Samyukta Vidhayak Dal government in the state^ the 
reasons for and the circumstances under which the SVD 
government was replaced by the BKD goverranent have been 
discussed in this chapter. Charan Singh's inportant role 
in the U,p. politics, his defection from the Congress in 
1967 and forming of the BKD have been highlighted. 
• Porro«-tion of the BKD government is the subject matter 
of the second chapter. The politics of BKD-Congress(N) merger 
and the efforts of BKD to stay on in power have been analysed. 
The events leoding to the end of coalition and che in^josition 
of President's rule in the atate form a major part of this 
chapter. Important decisions taken by the BKD have been 
covered* 
The third chapter relates the post-BKD developments 
(1970-77)« the four party alliance and the formation of SVD 
(Samyukta Vidhayak Dal) government in U.P. Collapse of 
this aVD government headed by T.N. Singh, Kaira^ ipati Tripathi's 
tenure till 1974 and then installation of Bahugana's ministry 
have been fully discussed in this chapter. 
Ram Nareeh Yadav'e Chief Ministership during the 
Janata phase in U.P., crisis and dissidence in the U.P. 
Janata Party and related issues and events have been discus-
sed in the fourth chapter. 
To highlight the crisis in the Central Janata 
« 
leadership has become very necesaary since it had a direct 
intact on the U,p. politics which also had a Janata govern-
ment under Banarsi Das, This« Janata government's perforioance 
in U.P., crisis in the Janata and its downfall have been 
analysed in the detail in the fifth chapter. Major policy 
decisions taken by the Janata government in U.P. have also 
been included. It may be noted from this chapter that events 
upto 1980 Elections have been covered. 
The sixth chapter deals with problems of leadership 
in U.p. Issues concerning rival leadership and Muslim 
politics in the state have been dealt with in this chapter. 
Political defections are the bane of state politics 
in India and U.p. is no exception to this. Analysis of all 
elections in the State, formation of various governments, 
their fall, politics of alliances, coalitions, and defections 
which had a great in5>act on state politics have been included 
in the seventh chapter. 
The conclusion focuses on the most iii5>ortant political 
developments in U«P., and analysis thereof* the author's 
in^ressions and findings* The findings and observations 
are based mainly on the hypotheses drawn by the author out 
of the entire stu<i^ of the topic. The author has taken the 
liberty of making some observations and comments in his 
personal capacity some of which may apparently deviate faroin 
the main study but have a bearing on the general issues refer-
red to in the dissertation. 
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PREFACE 
The American Political Science Association (APSA) 
defined the purpose of Political Science as service to the 
poor, oppressed and underdeveloped people to tight at home 
and abroad in their struygle against hierarchies, elites 
and institutional forms of manipulc-tion. Iteivid Easton, a 
Political Scientist of Chicago, President of A P ^ in 1969, 
drew emphasiis on human needs, human values, problem oriented 
research and protection of Civilization. 
If Almond and Powel opine that attitude, belief and 
orientation of individuals tov.ards political process or a 
political system is called political culture, then certainly 
structural differentiation and cultural secularization is 
called pdilitical development. 
There are different approaches as to what political 
development constitutes. I feel that the bcale to measure 
development in a society is che interest articulation and as 
a result interest aggregation of a political system. Of all# 
economic development is the basi© criterian. It people are 
financially satisfied, they cooperate with the Government, 
otherwise they or their leaders in a aystem where more than 
one party system operates, are busy in opposition just to 
overthrow the Government and to bring another one which can 
meet their demands and keeps them satisfied. 
India being an underdeveloped countxy* and the state of 
Uttar Pradesh, the bigge.»t state ot India and thickly populated 
where still majority o£ the people live in rural areas, with 
low rate ot literacy and poor income alongwith beiny divided 
on caste or religious lines are completely in the strong grip 
of their leaders, as is revealed in this study. 
Keeping in view the above mentioned factors, the present 
study mainly deals with struggle for power, non-Conyress movements 
and non-Congress Governments in U.P,, their failure and 
re-instatement of traditional monolith Congress Government in 
the state. The Congress had come under severe criticism due 
to the excesses oi Emergency (197-) and the people had developed 
an aversion for the Congress. The rejection of Janata Government 
by the masses in 1980 goes to prove the level of political 
awareness and consciousness among the people of U«P« 
Though the political situation in U.P. has been covered 
since 19I:-2, the main focus oj- this study is on 1967 and post 
1967 developments which had brought a great charge in the state 
politics of U.P. I have discussed the formation of non-Congress 
and Coalition Goverranents, opposition moves to come together 
to give Congress a straight fight. From ly67 to 1971» the 
state witnessed many non-Congress Governments and declaration 
of President's rule. 
Political situation during and after Emergency in U*P. 
has been covered in this study. An attempt has been made to 
prove the hypothesis that though ti^ Congrest. hos been 
re-established in the state* the people ot the state are 
capable of replacing it if it again crosses its limits ae far 
as Constitutional provisions are concerned/ leading to Emergency 
like excesses* In the 1960s Governments are likely to fall 
for lessor reasons. 
Attempts-have also been macie in this study, to highlight 
the features of rural leadership in U.P., ano the role and 
involvement ot village level leaders in state politics. i:Tie 
frustration among Muslims o^ the state* their feeling of 
deprivation and o^ . beiny ignored by the Government in various 
aspects, their efforts t o come to a common platform, their 
involvement and role in the state politics — all have been 
discussed in this study. The problem of political defections 
in U.P. and its contributior. to instability and failure of 
Coalition Governments also forms part of this thesis. 
The conclusion is based on what I have read* learned and 
obseirved. Being a student of Political Science* I might have 
been vocal and made some overstatements* for which I am open to 
correction and criticism. No motives have been attributed to 
any one. This is the study of a research student and uhould 
be accepted as such. 
Collecting material for my thesis, I had to face 
many problems. In the absence of any major work on any Congress 
or non-Conyress Government in Uttar Pradesh, collection of 
material was a difficult and tiresome job. Thus I have based 
my work on Journals and election reports, but mainly on newspapers, 
Much has been written on the Emergency period, the fall of 
Congress and tlie fornation of Janata Government, but no work 
has been done on the Janata Government in U.P,, its problems, 
functioning, achievements and reasons for its lall. I earnestly 
hope that this study will help those students who might be 
working on state politics in India, specially che politics of 
Uttar Pradesh. 
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PROLOGUE 
cgfl^rtsi M. X^^^rPl 
Th« State of Uttar Pradesh has been a stronghold 
o£ Congress ever since independence« even though the 
Congress Party was divided within its ranks* In fact 
the Congress excercised enormous influence in the State 
of Uttcir Pradesh even before independence* After 
independence G,B* Pant became the Chief Minister as the 
Congress had an overwhelming majority ih the first General 
Elections* Out of a total of 430 seats/ it won 390 seats* 
At that time the socialists and Independents were the 
principal opposition parties with a strength of 19 and 14 
respectively in the Assembly. 
In 1955# G.B, Pant was invited to join the Union 
Council of Ministers. After Pant's resignation Dr» 
irwl 
sarapurhand took over as Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh* 
In the Second General Elections the Congress maintained 
its overwhelming majority but the strength of opposition 
in uhe Assembly had increased axu^  PSP# Jana Sanyh and 
Communists became the principal opposition parties* No 
threat was posed to the claijn of s«napurnand because of 
his eminence and his senior position in the cabinet of 
G.B* Pant. Even C.B. Gupta who was a strong candidate for I 
the Chief Ministership conceded Dr. sanqpurnanllnd*s claim. 
Dr Satnpurnanand continued to lead the governrnent till 19^0. 
Though . he enjoyed majority support in the i>tate Legislature, 
he failed to control the Party organiization. Dr San^urnanand'a 
candidate for the PCC Presidentship/ Munishvjar Dutt Upadhyaya, 
was defeated by the rival group and San^jurnanfind tendered his 
resignation. 
After the exit of San^jurtianand, C.B. Gupta became the 
leader of the Congress Legislature Party and there was no open 
contest fot the Chief Ministership. It was felt that with the 
assunption of Chief Miniistership by C.B. Gupta, there will be 
no factionalism at the State level and the State would have 
a stable government. It may be noted that C.B, Gupta became 
the leader of the government by virtue of his unanimous election 
by Party and not due to intervention of the Party High Command. 
In the Third General Elections there were many more 
Political Parties on the scene to contei^t the elections in 
The efforts of apposition Parties reduced the strength 
of Congress in the Third General Elections ju^ st to 249 as 
against 286 in 1957 and 390 in 1952. The Socialists secured 
24 seat®, Jana Sangh - 49, Independents 31 and PSP 38.^ But 
this election too did not pose any threat to the continuing 
1. Poplai, tiL., i?6.2 Ggpgyaj, EX^y^^yp^ iR^ gi^ * Allied 
Publishers, New Delhi, 1962,|=. ai 
stronghold of Congress in the State. 
C.B. Gupta who took over as Chief Minister of Uttar 
Pradesh in I960 continued to be in chair till August 1963, 
when he quit oifice under the Katnaj^ aj Plan. Mrs. Sucheta 
Kriplani became the new Chief Minister and earned the distinc-
tion of being the first woman Chief Minister of a State in 
India. It may be noted that the election of Mrs. Sucheta 
Kriplani was not unopposed? she had to face a rival in Kamlapati 
Tripathi. Though there were factions within the Congress 
ranks the Congress Party continued to head the Government till 
1967. 
In the Fourth General Elections the Congress failed 
to secure a clearcut majority in the State Lfc;gislature# although 
it emerged as the single largest Party. In March 1967 the 
Congreos formed a Ministry under C.B. Gupta with the support 
of Independent members. However/ this Ministry could not 
suirvive because of frequent defections. In the meanwhile* 
the non-Congress political parties at the initiative of Jana 
Sangh formed the Sanyukta Viflhayak Dal (SVD) with Ram Chandra 
Vikal* an independent MLA, as its leader. Subsequently« 
Charan S-ingh, a prominent member of the Congress left th» 
Party and Joined Jana Congress. This Party also merged itself 
with the SVD an<d Charan Singh was elected as its new leader. 
Thus the ground was clear for the formation of the fixst 
non«-Congress Government in Uttar Pradesh under Charan Singh, 
The establishment of a non-Congress Government in UP can be 
attributed to the efforts of opposition parties» 
Kerala was the first State where an alliance «as made 
to oust the Congress# and a non-^Congress government was formed. 
But immediately President's rule was imposed and then in 
February 1961, mid term elections took place where the Congress 
got some more seats coirqpared to its performance in 1957. The 
same thing was repeated v.hen the Government of India declared 
that the elected administration having collapsed a replacement 
was made by the direct rule of President. Kerala did not 
have a stable government in the State for years. In 1963 
there v-as a mid term poll v-.hich returned the Communist Party 
in near majority to the Assembly. Some of the Communists 
elected had been in detention under the Defence of India Rules. 
The Communist Party made an announcement that with the help of 
some non-Comminiat members• who had promised support* it was 
in a position to form a Government, and claimed that it should 
not be deprived of the constitutional right to form a ministry 
as a majority Coalition Party. The Centre did not respond; 
on the contrary it dissolved the newly elected Assen4>ly and 
continued the President's rule. 
The February (1967) General Elections were held 
against this l>ackground* Most of the people yrew sore over 
what they regarded as abuse by the Congress Party of the 
constitutional provision intant for emergencies. All opposition 
parties were distressed and annoyed* From this arose a bitter 
feeling« and many of those who had been voting for the Congress 
became its opponents. The opposition Parties of the State 
grew more conscious and stood solidly against the Congress. 
They formed an United Left Front to give Congress a straight 
fight in every constituency. 
The Fourth General Elections can be considered as a 
major watershed in the political development of India as well 
as that of Uttar Pradesh. Apart from proving the ba^iic soundness 
of Indian democracy• it cor^letely altered the pattern of poli-
tical power which emerged after the Fourth General Elections.it 
was qualitatively different from the situation that had so far 
prevailed. Hitherto^ the Indian National Congress exercised 
virtually unchallenged monopoly of power at the Centre as well 
aa in the States. The Fourth General Elections ended the 
era of one Party domination. Though the Congress retained 
power at the Centre* its majority in the Lok iiabha was drasti-
cally reduced. In eight of the Seventeen States the Congress 
lost its majority (as shown in the table on the next page) 
and non-Congress coalition governments came into power. 
In the state of Uttar Pradesh, (one out of the eight 
non-Cox^ress states) the biggest State of India* the Congress 
could secure only 198 seats (Total seats ~ 4 2 5 ) T h e opposi-
tion in U«P. which moved into the treasury benches on April 1# 
1967, after the fall of Congress government, consisted of 
eight parties* The Jana Sangh had 97 seats, SSP - 44, Comnru-
nist (R) - 14, Swatantra - 12, PSP - 11, Repviblican - 9, and 
2 the Communist (L) one seat only. 
Formation of ,S.VD Government, in U.p^ 
In a dramatic move to oust the Congress from power all 
the opposition parties came together and formed a SVD government 
(Saa^ukta Vidhayak Dal) in U.P. in 1967. Their confined 
strength was 188 in a Mouse of 42b. The 37 independents held 
the balance but later on they lent their support to the 
3 
Congress. At that time there were two canoidqtes for leadership • 
Charan Singh and C.B. Gupta. But the Central leadership 
chose C.B, Gupta in the belief that Hhe commanded the support 
1. Ram Gopal, apotliaht on Democracv in IndjLa. Pustak Kendra, 
Lucknow, 1970, p. 99; Also seet Shastri, KN. Ramnath. Ap Ay^ a-
ivtical Studv of 1967 General Elections in India. 
V.B. Prakashan, Agra, 1968. 
2. Gopal, Ram, pp.cit., p. 112 
3. IbMzx p. 102 
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of the raajority. But Charan Singh staked his claim ana offered 
himself as a candidate for the leadership* The Central leaders 
sent an observer to Lucjcnow to pursuade Charan Singh to withdraw 
his candi<feture. The agreement leading to Charan Singh's 
withdrawal v«a3 said to have made it incumbent upon C.B* Gupta 
to consult Charan S.ingh in the choice of the personnel for 
the ministry* Charan Singh made some proposals and Gupta 
turned them down. The former therefore refused to join the 
ministry. But on the day when the Aasembly was in session, 
some 30 members of the Congress met at Charan Singh's house 
and discussed the possibility of their leaving Congress Party. 
On April 1, 1967, 17 of the Congress members crossed the floor 
in the Assembly with their leader Charan Singh, announcing 
that "Gupta's intransigence had compelled them to take the 
painful decision.^ 
The Assembly was that day to accept ur to reject the 
Governor's address, a policy statement of the Government. The 
opposition moved an amendment and carried it through with the 
support of defectors from the Congress. The Congress government 
had to bow out and Charan Singh, the leader of SVD took over 
as the Chief Minister of U.P. For the first time in U.P. a 
1. Dutt, Brahm, Five Hcade^ Monstey. Surge Publications, 
New Delhi, 1978, p. 1 
10 
Coalition government of assorted parties was thus formed* 
3. Formation of BKD 
Prof. Humar^un Kabir was the first to take an initiative 
to form an all-India political party to fight the reactionary 
forces and to replace the Congress in course of time. He had 
invited all the inportant non-Congress leaders from different 
States to meet at Delhi on December 6-7* 1966 to review the 
situation and take a decision. About 75 leaders representing 
all the Staves met and decided to form an All India party, 
namely Kranti Dal,^ 
The alternate party was launched with an aim "to promote 
the ideal of nationalism and democratic socialism, with en$>hasis 
on democracy than Socialism." The new party felt that the 
Congress had profestied the old ideas but it lost the spirit, 
initiative and capacity to enforce them. Besides this the 
Congress started losing its members day by day who either were 
to form a new political party or to join the newly formed anti 
Congress parties. 
1. Kashyap, Subhash, C., Indian Politiciil Parties. Institute 
of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, New Delhi, 
1971, p.283. 
11 
Since the elections were due in 1967, and the time 
being short, the party could not be officially formed and 
therefore could not content the 1967 elections. 
On April 9t 1967 Muinarqfun Kabir called a meeting of all 
the then Chief Ministers of non-Congress State governments 
and other in^ortant leaders,^ This meeting was held at Delhi 
where all the leaders who were present agreed in principle 
that an All India Party be formed but decided to discuss the 
matter further. Maharoaya Prasad S.inha, the then Chief Minister 
of Bihar, invited all Chief Ministers of non-Congress govern-
ments, presidents and secretaries of like minded parties and 
some other important leaders from different States to meet on 
May 14-16, 1967 at Patna. The Convention lasted for three 
days and had finally decided to form the Bhariiiya Kranti Dal 
(BKD) . 
According to the Steering Committee ot the BKD the main 
aim and objective of the Party was "to work according to the 
philosophy of Mahatama fiandhi to create a democratic society, 
free from economic, political and social eaqploitation." During 
the party convention on November 11 & 12, 1967 the draft of 
the Constitution of the Party was approved and adopted. 
1. Kashyap, Subhash, C,, ^ndian Po;Litical Parties, Institute 
of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, New Delhi, 
1971, p.283. 
12 
The BKD did not contest the elections of 1967* But 
it started to take an active part in political activity* 
it of syp lU Vtl*.! 
In U,P. where the aVD government was formed in 1967 
Charan Singh was tirged to resign from the leadership of the 
ave government and to join the BKP, A teyi months after the 
formation of SVP government in U.p. an atmosphere of uncertainty 
was created by some constituents of the Coalition government. 
The BKD in a unanimous resolution said* "the party executive 
considered ^he political situation in the state and sorrowfully 
noted that the activities of some constituents of the aVD 
were increasingly creating difficulties for the government, Which 
not only prevented it from giving the necessary attention to 
public affairs^ but were undermining the administrotion.' h1 
The BKD Executive was of the opinion that such an 
atmosphere of uncertainty could not be permitted to continue 
for long, and it therefore authorised its leader Charan Singh 
to take any action he considered appropriate in the public 
interest. On December 16« 1967 Charan aingh mooted his resig-
nation from the leadership of the &VD Coalition at a Joint 
meeting of legislators and the State Executive of his party* 
2 the Bhartiya Krantl Dal. On the resignation of Charan Singh# 
1* atatcsman. Mew Delhi« December 17, 1967 
2. mSLL 
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there allegations and counter allegations. The S>SJ? leader 
Raj Karain accused Charan &ingh of violating all the agreements. 
While Charan Singh kept on forcing his resignation for 
the second time in three months, the ruling coalition parties 
requested hiro to continue as Chief Minister and promised to 
devise a machinery to ensure proper conduct of the coalition 
and the government. Theue promises were made in an unanimous 
resolution of the General Body of SVD-while this resolution was 
passed on by the Chief Minister to a high power Committee of 
his own party for consideration, the BKD had unanimously decided 
that Charan Sinyh should certainly resign. A committee of nine 
was constituted on December 17# 1967 to take a decision on 
Charan Singh's ov,n proposal that he be allowed to resaign.^ 
After the Chief Minister had resigned, Jhar Khande Rai 
(CPI), a forn^r Food and Civil Supplies Minister suggested 
that the whole issue ot resignation be taken up by the coordina-
tden committee. Charan Singh rejected the proposal and said 
that "when he had to resign in August, 1967, he had sent his 
resignation to the Coordination Committee but that body cared 
little to carry out the promises it had made, when it pursxiaded 
him to withdraw the resignation." Therefore* he said, he did 
not give his resignation directly to the general body, but 
was prepared to send the same to the Governor instead. Ugra Sen 
1. XM. St^Vfi^TOR* Delhi, Dec 17, 1967 
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had confessed that the Coordination Ctomroittee of which he was 
the Secretary and Convenor, had failed to fulfill the assurance 
made in August, but this time they would give a better account. 
Raro Chandra Vikal (Ind) Minister of Forests, who was the leader 
of the aVD before Charan Singh joined it, had declared that 
the coalition could not exist without Charan Singh and that his 
continuing as Chief Minister was also a popular wish. On 
I>ecember 19, 1967 the Congress dewended the resignation of 
Charan Singh since there was a serious crisis in the Coalition 
government,^ On voting the SVD government was defeated on a snap 
vote but the Congress opposition failed to take advantage of 
this to bring a vote of no Confidence a^-ainst Charan Singh. 
The third national conference of the SSP which was held 
on January 1, 1968 adopted a resolution directing the party's 
five ministers in UP to resign £roro the SVD Ministry imniediately 
in protest against the non iinplementation of accepted minimum 
programmes, particularly land revenue abolition, release of 
2 detenus and discontinuing of use of English in administration. 
1. The Statesman. Delhi, Dec 20, 1967 
2. T^^ Ti-iig^  ^ n m * Delhi, Jan 2, 1968 
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On the other side the national executive of PSP, in 
a resolution directed its legislators in U.P and Bihar to 
insist on the government for the abolition of land revenue and 
introduction of graded sales tax. On January 5, 1968 the 
Governor accepted the resignation of three SSP ministers in 
U,P» and two deputy ministers from the State Cabinet.^ Charan 
Singh alleged that the SSP tactics were aimed at the coming 
elections. He said* "due to coming General Elections these 
leaders are making ground to win the favour of cultivators* 
2 State government en^jloyee and the people in general*" 
As a result of the resignation of Ministers and Deputy 
Ministers from the S^p, two Ministers, one Deputy Minister and 
one Parliamentary Secretary sworn in on January 8, 1968 
raising the strength of the Council of Ministers of U*P. to 
22, all being independents,^ Inspite of the rise in Charan 
S.ingh's Ministry, a great threat to the Ministry developed as 
the Working Committee of the U.P. Unit of J^na Sangh warned 
the Chief Minister that if he did not change his arbitrary 
ways the SVD might be left with no alternative but to elect 
a new leader in his place. 
1. yhs TiM^ gl Delhi, Jan 6, 1968 
2. Ib^d, Jan 7, 1968 
3* Xbid. Jan 9, 1968 
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The ministerial crisis deepened fxirther more on the 
decision of Chief Minister Charan Singh to boycott the meetlna 
of the Coordination Coronsittee and the general body of the SVD 
being held in Lucknow to take stock of the latest developments 
in the State. Charan Singh's complaint v^ as that since he had 
not been consulted about the holdings of these roeetings, he 
and other members of his party did not propose to attend them. 
He felt that the Jana Sangh and other constituent units of the 
Dal should have sounded him before Calling these meeting because 
he was still the leader of the SVD. 
On February 11, 1968 Charan Singh had resigned and 
advised the Governor vo dissolve the Asaembly and to order 
mid term elections unless another leader elected by the SVD 
was thought capable of forming the government. After Charan 
Singh*s resignation accepted by the Governor, the SVD reques-
ted and tried to pursuade Chaisn Singh to continue aa its 
leader. But Cha an Singh was not aggeeable to accept the 
leadership anymore. On the confusion created by the SVD and 
its obvious failure to elect a leader acceptable tc all its 
constituents after Charan Singh's resignation* the Governor of 
U.P, sent a report to the Centre recommending takeover of the 
State administration by the President. 
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On February 25» 1968 President's rule wa® declared in 
U.P. and the Aaserably had been dissolved in view of the poli-
tical stalemate there.^ After his resignation from the SVD 
Ciovernraent and the dissolution of Assembly, Chaian aingh 
formally launched the Bhartiya Kranti Dal in Septeitiber 1968, 
which, however had coroe into being earlier in November 1967. 
After the dissolution of the U.P, Assembly, elections 
were declared to be held in U.P,,Bihar, Punjab, Haryana and 
West Bengal. In U.P, the elections aimed to secure a atable 
government. Preparations were made by all political parties! 
the Congress, Jana Sangh, the leftist parties ana the BKD, to 
contest the mid term elections. The Jana Sangh which v/on 98 
seats in the 1969 elections and emerged a& the second largest 
2 
party in U.P., decided to contest all the 425 seats. There 
was a revolt of large number oi SSP workers in U.P. and some 
of them left the Party, some joining the Congress and others 
joining the BKD, Those members of the Party who belonged to 
Scheduled Castes joined the Republican Party, Among the 
leftist Parties, uhe PijP and the Coratnuniat Parties were very 
weak. The P ^ objected to Marxiot Communists, and the 
Communists were opposed u> the Jana This made the 
1. I?elhi, Feb 26, 1968 
2. Mathur,R.N., 'Mid Term Elections in U.P.', Indian Political 
Science Review, Delhi, Volume IV, 1969-70, p.192 
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pattern of disunity in the anti-Congress rank conplete.^ 
The Party which offered formidable challenge to the 
Congress Party vvas the BKD. It commanded solid support of the 
underprivileged and backv^ard classes, whereas in the Congress 
list for elections Caste Hinous predominated. The BKD list 
contained 51 Rajputs, 36 Muslims, 17 Banias, 48 Ahirs, 88 
Harijans, 10 Jc.ts, 5 from backward communities and 26 others. 
The Congress list contained 115 Brahmins alone besides 
representatives of other castes. 
Following table shows the Party position in the 1969 
Mid-term Poll in U.P.s 
Party Seats won Percentage of 
votes polled 
Congress 211 33.69 
Jana Sangh 49 17.93 
•Swatantra 5 1.25 
BKD 98 21.29 
CP! 4 3.08 
CPM 1 0.19 
&SP 33 7.82 
contd... 
1. Mathur R.N., 'Mid Term Elections in U.p.' Indian Political 
$Gi9me Review, Delhi, volume IV, 1969-70 p.193. 
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Party Seats won Percentage of 
votes polled 
psp 3 1.72 
Republican Party 1 3.48 
Hindu Maha Sabha 1 -
RPM 1 12.12 
Forward Block - 0.07 
Independents 18 7.09 
In the mid-term poll the Congress had secured the largest 
number of me^ts {2li out; or 425) and 33,65?^ of the votes polled 
with BKE trailing behind aa the second highest# th-areby becoming 
the biggewt opposition party in the Assenibly. The smaller 
parties were practicalli wiped out. The strength ox the 
independents was reduced to 18 from 37 in i967« The dominance 
ot the upper castes was broken. Further development that took 
place was that governnient in U«P. became very unstable. The 
Congress party headed by C.B* Gupta with the support of Indepen-
dents and Swatantra formed a Ministry on February 16# 1969.^ 
The Gupta Ministry could not last for a long time and stability 
shaken due to split in the Congress. The New Congress under 
the leadership of Kamlapati Tripathi joined hands with the BKD 
to topple the C,B, Gupta Ministry. 
1. Tp,^ Tim^g. 13ew Delhi, Feb 11, 1969 
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Jji Congress (N) and BKD 1oint roove to topple the Gupta Mlniatry 
The New Congress had joinod hands with the BKD to 
topple the Gupta Ministry but the question of leadership that 
in coalition government who will be the leader, was very con-
fusing. Both the New Congress and the BKD were interested 
in their leaders to head the government. For t-he solution of 
this issue both the leaders, Karolapati Tripathi and Charan 
Singh met on January 21, 1970 and declared that the issue of 
leadership would be resolved to the satisfaction of both; they 
had not reached any agreement as to who would head the alter-
nate government in case the Gupta Ministry fell.^ 
The New Congress Legislature Party in U.P. which met on 
February 3, 1970 passed a resolution authorising its leader 
Karolapati Tripathi to hold negotiations with other political 
parties to topple the government headed by C.B, Gupta. The 
resolution also authox ised Tripathi to enrol the party legis-
2 lators who were keen to join it. 
On February b, 1-jlO H.N. Bahuguna, the New Congress 
General Secretary sought President V.V. Giri's intervention 
tor ensuring that the minority government of C.B. Gupta in U.P. 
3 should not be allowed. According to Bahuguna the no contidence 
1. yh^ Hjn^MS^ii Tiifp^ g, New Delhi, Jan 28, 1970 
2. Ibid. Feb 4, 1970 
3. Ibid. Feb 7, 1970 
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motion should get precedence over the debate on the Governor's 
address to a joint sesaion of the legislators. Tht address 
would be the policy statement of the minority government.^ 
The fear of the New Congress legislators that the Assembly 
might be adjourned immediately after the debate on Governor's 
address without taking the no. confidence motion was also 
Conveyed by him to the President. 
On the issue of leadership, Charan Singh declared that 
"even if he were not made the leader of the combined opposition* 
the BKD would extend full support to Kamlapati Tripathi 
unconditionally in toppliny the minority government headed by 
2 C.B. Gupta and forming an alternative government." 
On February 10/ 1970 C.B, Gupta tendered his recsignation 
to the Governor advising him to invite the opposition leader 
Charan Singh to form the government. The Governor B. Gopala 
Reddy accepted the resignation of Gupta but askfcd him to 
1. A no confidence motion against the C.B. Gupta government was 
tabled by the BKD Gen. Secretary, Shiv Raj Singh. In a House 
of 425, those who had publicly voiced no confidence against 
C.B. Gupta numbered 233. They included 125 of the New 
Congress, 9t from BKD, 7 from SSP, 4 from CPI, one each from 
CPM ano Republican Party. 
2. Tht tt^dUiSt^n T^nitS. New Delhi, Feb 7, 1970 
3. m d t * Feb 6, 1970 
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continue till alternative arrangements were made. The Jana 
Sangh and SSP endorsed Gupta's recommendation that the BKD 
leader he invited to form the government. But the Governor 
said that he would consult legal opinion before he ^ v e his 
decision. 
Paying rich tributes to C,B, Gupta, Charan aingh saidt 
"when summoned I will not flinch irom shouldering the resion-
sibility of the high office."^ He said that Gupta deserved all 
the thanks of the people of state for "saving them from the 
ordeal of another mid-term poll which some of the polit.acians 
2 
seemed to be working for.*' He also thanked the Jana Sangh and 
asp for endorsing Gupta's recommendation for<..calling him to 
form the government. 
letter* 
Following is the text of C.B. Gupta's resignation 
3 
dear Shri Rajpal, 
"I have devoted more than 50 years 
of my life in the service of the country 
in persuance of my convictions. Pemocra-
tic v . a y of living has been a part of my 
life and I hold democracy a^ the achievement 
of the dream of the father of the nation. 
Unfortunately, the country has been passing 
through peril. Authoritarian trends have 
raised their ugly head, forces of disruption 
and disintegration are active. Public life 
is being polluted by horse trading elements 
with extra territorial loyaltiei> are also 
1. The Hindustan Times, New D«lhi, Feb 6,1970 
2. Ibid.. Feb 11, 1970 
3. Ibid-. Feb fi. 1970 
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trying to harm the nation to an irreparable 
extent. Discipline is the mainstay of 
democracy and vhe same has also been at 
ransom. This has very much harmed us and 
our orderly progress has been checkmated. 
It seems now that there is definite style 
to plunye che State in the whirlwind of 
another mid tt.rm poll. This is no solution 
to our problems and the State has already 
suffered a lot in the past. In the larger 
interests of the State. I have decided to 
relinquish uhe ortice that I hold and to 
ny mind the leader of opposition Mr Charan 
Sin^h may be cftlled upon to succeed roe 
to shoulder the responsibility of the 
office. He has been ity valued colleague 
for a long time. 
"It is in pursuance of authority 
given to me by the legislature party which 
held its meetinv, on 9th Feb. 1970 and 
authorised me to take such a step. As 
deem proper that I make the statement. 
But before I part I may say in fairness 
to all that I owe a sense of gratitude and 
appreciation to the Jana Sangh, the Samyukta 
Socialist Party, v.he Swatantra Party, the 
Praja Socialist Party and the Independents 
for their valuable support and coordination 
to n« on the basis of a definite programme. 
I am also thankful to my own party colleagues 
who inposed confidence in roe and whose 
unstinted loyajJty was a source of strength 
to roe all these years. I am confident 
that on the basis of same programme the 
support and confidence of the above parties 
will be available to the new government 
headed by Mr Charan S-ingh. 
"I hereby resign as Chief Minister 
of Uttar Pradesh and request you to kindly 
postpone the session of the legislature 
which was to start from tomorrow to Feb.23.* 
Yours sincerely* 
C.B. Gupta 
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The New Congress leader Bahufluna however asserted 
that the Governor must invite Karolapati Tripathi, leader of the 
largest group in the Assembly to form a tninj-styy, and only 
when he expressed his iinability to do so, could he ask the 
leader of any other party to form a government. He said 
that it was not in the con^jetence of the Chief Minister, who 
had resigned because he had been reduced to minority in the 
aasembly/ to recommend to the Governor who should be the 
next Chief Minister, 
On February 11, 1970, the New Congress Xiegislature 
Party leader Kamlapati Tripathi met Governor Gopala Reddy to 
stake his claim as leader ot the largest single party to 
form the government.^ Claiming majority support, he told the 
Governor that if he did not have it, his government could be 
voted out on the floor of the house; it would be grossly 
unfair to deny him the first opportunity to form the government, 
said Tripathi, 
The Central leaders, were still hopeful ot preventing the 
BKD - Old Congress Coalition from forming the government in 
U.P. They wanted the Governor to give Kamlapati Tripathi a 
chance to form a ministry and hoped that he would be able to 
1. The Hinf^ustan Tiroes, New Delhi, Feb 12, 1970 
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do so because mar^ MLA« from the Old Congress, the BKD as well 
as Jana Sangh and SSP were not to support Charan aingh for 
Chief Ministership,^ The New Congress President Jagjivan Ra» 
hinted that it was still possible to form government with 
BKD support. He said* "the iinal act is not yet over, the 
drama is still going on. What is the sanctity of C.B. Gupta's 
advice to the Governor when he has lost majority? If it is 
contended by anybody that he had not lost the majority then 
let the Assembly decide." He further said that h© had yet not 
2 given hope of an understanding \^ ith the BKD. 
Meanwhile the SSP legislature party in a meeting una-
nimously pledged its support to Charan S^ingh on the basis of 
a "time bound concrete socialistic programme." It felt that 
"this was necesaary to frustrate the efforts of Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi for imposing President's rule." Through another 
resolution the party reaffirmed its full confidence in its 
leader Anant Ram Jaiswal, and authorised him to take necessary 
steps in connection with the formation of government under 
3 Charan Singh's leadership. 
1. New Delhi. Feb 12, 1970 
2. IMdt 
3. Ibid.. Feb 13, 1970 
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On February 14, 1970/ the New AICC trea^jurer B.P, 
Mishra announced that "full accord had been reached between 
the two parties .•• the agreement provided for the formation of 
a single Party government headed by the BKD Party leader 
Charan Singh with the New Conyress supporting it from outside* 
The Coordination Committee of t'ne Old Congress, SSP, 
Jana Sangh and Swatantra selected former FWD Minister Girohari 
Lai for leading the alliance and sent a letter to the Governor 
withdrawing the support it had pledyed to Charan Singh following 
C.B. Gupta's resignation. After che formal announcement of 
alliance between the New Congress and BKD, the Old Congress 
informed the Governor about Girdhari Lai's election as leader 
and urged that he should be invited to form the ministry.^ 
Charan Singh said that his party never made any comment 
about forming government with Jhe help of the alliance. About 
the stability of the government by cooperation between the New 
Congress and BKD, he said that the strength of New Congress 
was 138 while hxs party had about loo members in the 42b 
member state Assembly. When asked by the Governor Gopala Reddy 
to give him the exact figure of the strength of respective 
2 alliances Charan Singh claimed 240 including 96 of his party. 
1. The Hindustan Times. Now Delhi, Feb 15, 1970 
2. 
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Girdhari Lai, leader of the four party alliancef iiainely SSP, 
Jana Sangh, Kioan Mazdoor Party (KMP) and Swatantra, claimed 
220 roeinbers. 
Charan Singh requested the Governor to summon the 
House on February 26, 1970# while Girdhari Lai wanted the 
House to be summoned on February 23, The resigning Chief 
Minister C.B, Gupta had also suggested the House to be summoned 
on Febrxiary 23, Under constitutional provisions the House 
should have met on or before February 28, 197o when the six 
months interval since the last session would have expired. 
The Assembly Speaker and the Council Chairman, accon^anied 
by their secretaries* also met the Governor and advised him 
that he was conpetent t. call the House any day he liked. 
Before Girdhari Lai met the Governor, a delegation 
consisting of old Congress legislature Party Secretary 
Krishnanand Rai, PSP leader Raj Narain, SSP Legislative Party 
leader A.R. Jaiswal and Jana Sangh leader Tripathi met Gopala 
Reddy and delivered to him a letter from C.B, Gupta informing 
hiia that Girdhari Lai had been elected leader of the alliaiKie 
and requested him that he be invited to form the government. 
The letter also withdrew support to Charan Singh. C.B. Gupta 
said in his letter that he was not defeated on the floor of 
the House. He had resigned and recommended Charan Singh's name 
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for being invited to form the government on his "solemn 
commitment to the economic programme of the alliance." But 
he said that since Charan Singh had now declined to accept 
the programme, and broken the agreement* he was free to 
suggest another name and that he was doing so in favour of 
Girdhari Lai. 
About the New Congress BKD alliance Charan &ingh had 
not agreed to give in writing that the BKD will be supporting 
the Incira Gandhi government in Parliament, Charan Singh was 
of the view that it was not necessary to put it in writing. 
The agreement was understood to cover mainly three conditions» 
(i) the BKD would form the one party government by Charan Slingh/ 
(ii) the New Congress would give full support; and (iii) after 
working together when the leaders Cc^ me closer and consider it 
timely the New Congress would join the ministry, making it a 
coalition government. 
On February 15, 1970 President V.V. Giri had asked the 
U.P. and Bihar Governors to excercise their constitutional power 
and not be guided by any political considerations in permitting 
the formation of new Ministries in their respective States.^ 
Leaders ot the Old Conyre^s felt disturi-ed that the institution 
1. !yhe H^pdustan Tiroes. New Delhi, Feb 17, 1970 
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of Governor was being abused. They felt that the sumnjoning 
of U.P. Governor to Delhi by the Prime Minister arnnounted to 
excercising undue influence on him in favour of her group 
which was reflected in the statement, issued by the Governor. 
They took strongest objection to this and urged the President 
to intervene and to "stop the subversion of the constitution." 
In a statement &.D. Mitihra, the Old Congress Secretary/ 
said that "the part played b^ Charan Singh in U.P. Politics 
would be recorded as a black deed in the history of democracy." 
He said that the BKD chief, by changing his stand all of a 
sudden and making alliance with the New Congress, had "not only 
stabbed Mr Gupta in the back but had also gone against the 
wishes of some of the members of his own party who had invited 
the move of alliance between C.B. Gupta and Charan Singh." 
On February 16, 1970 it was declared that the Charan 
Singh government v^ras likely to be sworn in the next day. The 
New Congress had agreed to give its full support to Charan 
Singh in the formation of the Ministry accordingly. 
CHAPTER » II 
BIOD GOVERNMENT IN U.P. 
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Formation of BKD Governpient in U.P. 
Charan Singh, the BKD leader returned to power for 
the second time on February 17, I'^ IO, exactly after two years 
after he resigned as the SVD Chief Minister, with his swearing 
in by the Governor Gopala Reddy as Chief Minister at tht. head 
of a 10 member Single Party Ministry*^ Six other Ministers and 
three Deputy Ministers were also administert-d the oath of office 
and secrecy* The ceremony was also attended by the New Conyress 
Party leader Kamlapati Tripathi with some of his party men and 
speaker A.G, Kher# but none from the alliance led by th,e Old 
Congress wqs present. 
On February 17, 197G Charan S^ingh met the Governor 
with the list of his supporters. An hour later the rival 
candidate Girdhexi Lai (Old Congress) i»upported by the leaders 
of Jana Sangh, iiwatantra and old Congress also met the 
Governor. The Governor invited Charan aingh to form the Ministry, 
The aame day, the oath taking cererooi:^  took place. 
In his firat meeting with the Governor Charan Singh 
claimed a strength of 23& legislatorii, including 96 of BKD, 13 
of New Congresb, five Communists and three others. On the other 
hand Girdhtri Lai claimed the support of 23b legislators inclu-
ding 129 of the Old Congress. Two New Cons^ress members also 
1. The Hindustan Tiroes, New Delhi, Feb 18, 1970 
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personally intimated to the Governor their decision to support 
Girdhari Lai, Two BKD members who met the Governor claimed 21 
other members of their Party behind them to support Girdhari Lai* 
Speaking at the oath takiny ceremony. Chief Minister 
Charan SAn^h assured the people of the btate that hio government 
would do the bet.t through hard work and clean and efficient admi-
nistration. He regretted that though the State v^ as backward and 
underdeveloped* the Congress government indulged only in slogans. 
There was need to find realistic solution to the problems howso-
ever unpopular they might be.^ 
On the formation of Charan Singh Ministry# the Old 
Congress, Jena Sangh and the ssp alliance alleged that the Gover-
nor, B. Gopala Reddy was persuaded by the Central Government 
to invite Charan Singh to form the Ministry. They criticised 
the manner in which the Charan Singh Government had been sworn 
and alleged that "democratic norms and well known constitutional 
principles had not only been ignored but violated." 
The Old Conaress President Nijalingappa, criticising 
Indira Gandhi said* "the swearing in of Charan Singh Ministry 
in U.P. is a shot in the arm of Mrs. Ganohi^s Congress." He 
1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 18, 1970 
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summed up his party's reaction by takiny exception to Governor 
Gopala Reddy's conduct. According to him the Governor had 
acted under pre&isure trom New Delhi in invxtinsj Charan &ingh 
to form a Ministry **without verifying the clAim of the SVD 
leader Girdhari Lai, particularly when nearly £>0 MLAs were 
common in the lists submitted by the two leaders," He described 
the Bia3 Chairman as the "King o± defectors" and con$>lained 
that "Politicians in India had lost honesty* integrity and 
political morality. Every Indian ought to hang his head in 
shame at what happened recently in Bihar and U.p," 
Nijalingappa thought that Charan aingh's defection had 
been brought about by Mrs Gandhi, He also declared that he 
would never like to have alliance with the BKD even if some 
opportunity comes. He further said that horse trading was 
practiced on large scale. Nijalingappa demanded that the U.p. 
legislators should meet immediately so that the strength of 
new Government could be tested. He predicted that these 
governments would not last as they had come into existence 
without ai^ moral basis.^ 
Tj^ IPeg^  «ew Delhi, Feb 19, 1970 
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The Coordimtlon Committee o± the alliance of Old 
Congress, sap, Jana Sangh, Swatantra, KMP and Independents 
expressed its "firm determination to launch an agitation if 
Charan Singh Ministry i!i$)Osed land revenue on the economic 
holdings and profession tax, and reversed other measures taken 
by the Gupta's Government under its 13 point programme to bring 
relief to the various sectors of the people." The Committee 
also decided "to put up stiff fi^ht on the floor of the legis-
lature for the retention of the programme and for its further 
implementations." Besides exen^tions ox uneconomic holdings 
from land revenue and abolition of profession taxes, the programme 
also provided for the government undertaking the responsibility 
of distribution of teachers' salaries through its agencies, 
redistribution of land to the Harijans and the landless, 45% 
recruitment for Harijans in services until the reoerv«d quota of 
l&i was filled, and conpulsory use of Hindi for all administrative 
work and facilities for proper development of Urdu language. 
The Coordination Committee accused the Governor of 
installing Charan Singh's Ministry as "part of a conspiracy 
to strengthen the Prime Minister's hands." It contended that 
"Reddy had taken a decision in favour of uhe BKD leaders without 
verifying the claim of both sides." It alleged that the 
Governor had already decided to commission Charan Singh even 
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before the rival candidate Girdhari Lai had put his case before 
him, "This was evident from the fact that the order had already 
been issued for making arrangeroents for the oath taking ceremony 
before these interviews. The whole process was carried out 
in a surruptitious and conspiratorial manner. While Gupta 
got the invitation after the oath taking ceremony over, 
the retiring Minister and leaders of various opposition groups 
forming the alliance never received it." 
The Committee turthcr pointed out that BKJD workers 
were making public announcements on loudspeakers from early 
morning that Charan Singh would be sworn in at 2.40 PM. The 
ceremony did take place at this very time, showiny that all the 
decisions had been taken much in advance. 
In a letter to the Governor former Chief Minister C.B. 
Gupta said that the BKP-New Congress alliance could not provide 
a stable government in the absence o£ agreement on such burning 
issue like exemption of uneconomic holdings from land revenue. 
It vv«8 not known what was the nature ot the reported alliance 
between the two parties nor was it known that there could be 
any reasonable likelihood of the two groups holding together 
even if they had majority support, vSiich they had not,^ It was 
1. New Delhi, Feb 19, 1970 
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further said that "the opposition will make the raotion of 
thanks for the Governor's address and the ii^sue of no confidence 
against the Charan aingh Ministry# if it did not accept the Old 
Congress alliance's economic pgograimne. The niotion will provide 
the first opportunity for a trial of strength between the two 
isides on the floor of the Assembly." 
Girdhari Lai was confident of toppling the Goverrunent. 
He said that "an opposition deputation will meet the President 
before the session to post him with the correct position and to 
protest against the Governor's arbitrary action." He said that 
the opposition has completely lost its faith in the Governor 
for his partiality and apprehended that the House might be 
adjourned to prevent government from being defeated. He alleged 
that the process of assessment started by Dr Reddy was "only 
a make believe to camouflage the decision he had already 
taken to invite the BKD leader to form the Ministry." In 
support Girdhari l^ al claimed that the party legislator had 
over heard telephonic talk between Delhi and the Government 
House in Lucknow* in which clear instructions were ^iven to 
install the BKD Ministry at 2.00 PM.^ 
1. Jii^ , n ^ n m w y^H^S*. Delhi, peb 20, 1970 
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BKD > M^y 
While on one hand the opposition alliance vas putting 
forward its claim to a majority Ca^aran Singh on the other was 
pursuading Indira Gahdiki that New Congress should join his 
Ministry soon so as to clear the atmosphere of instability in 
the State. Cliaran Singh was not personally averse to the 
merger proposal but was not finding it too easy to carry the 
majority with him in this regard. He also sought Indira Gandhi's 
help in dropping the C.B. Gupta Government's measure exenpting 
economic holdings from revenue. According to Charan Sirigh, 
one of the reasons why such a drastic step should not be taken 
wast extremely poor percapita taxation in the State, While the 
average per capita in Punjab, Mahara&htra/ Bengal/ Gujarat/ 
Haryana and Tamil Kadu v.as more than Rs. 400, it vas only Rs, 306 
in U.P», one of the lowest taxed ati.tes figuring fourth from 
bottom,^ 
Charan Singh was said to be determined to abolish the 
scheme which had the unqualified backing of New Congress and a 
section of his own party. His problem seemed to be that another 
section of his party backed by big and politically influential 
farmers was opposed to the measure. Thofae farmers were disappoin-
X. '^mSi New Delhi, Feb 23, 1970 
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ted l^ecause "the scherne not only benefited very small land 
holders but had the danger of an increased land revenue on the 
bigger ones to make up tor the loss.*'^ A proposal mooted by 
Charan Singh was that instead of abolishing land revenue on 
small holdings, the amount collected from thero should be 
ploughed back in the shape of fertiliser subsidies and irrigation 
2 
facilities, Charan fciingh promised his best efforts to secure 
a favoxirable decision from the BKD National Executive for the 
support of Indira Goverranent through the BKD parliamentary 
members. The 14 member BKD Porliamentary group was sharply 
divided on v/hether the party should reciprocate the party gesture 
in U*P* towards the BKD by giving conditional support to Indira 
Galidhi's Coverument. tSome members opposed the propo^Cil and felt 
that the cooperation should depend on the merit of each itisue. 
Ultimately it was resolved to refer the matter to the National 
Executive. As regards the merger issue/ the BKD General Secretary 
Prakash Vir Sl^stri ruled out its proppects in the forseeable 
future. In response to Bihar Chief Mihister Daroga Rai's request 
it was decided tnat Vice President Rai Kumbha Ram Arya and 
Secretary S.K. ainha should visit Patna for consultations with 
1. Hinci^stan fltnes.. New Delhi, Feb 23, 1970 
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BKD MLAs and issue appropriate directions to them. 
Kainlapati Tripathi had talks with Indira Gandhi on 
February 24, 1970 regarding the formation of Ministry in 
alliance with BKD under Charan Singh's leadership. During the 
meeting Charan Singh urged such coalition to lend stability 
to the administration instead of supporting his Government 
from outside. He, vith Tripathi and Indira Gandhi# had also 
agreed to accept nominees of the New Congress in the proposed 
Coalition*^ He was said to have favoured a 21 member team 
including himself excluding the Junior Ministers. While 
agreeing that the party should join Charan Singh's Ministry 
without unnecessary delay, the New UPCC Executive Parliamentary 
Board and the Legislature Party authorised Kamlapati Tripathi 
to take a decision about the timing, personnel and the number 
of its representatives. The New Congress had also proposed 
2 
a coordination agency between the two parties* 
On April 18, 1970 it was stated that the New Congress 
would formally enter xnto a coalition with BKD when the Charan 
Singh Ministry was to be expanded, about two months after its 
installation. As many as 27 New Congress representatives, 14 
Cabinet Ministers# 17 Ministers of State and 6 Deputy Ministers, 
1. m y^ratir New Delhi, Feb 25, 1970 
2. Ibid,. Feb 26, 1970 
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besides one BKD Minister would be sworn in by the Governor* 
which would have raised the strength of the Council of Ministers 
to 38. Originally the Council of Ministers was comprised of 
only 10 membersI 7 cabinet Ministers including the Chief Minister 
and 3 JDeputy Ministers, all belonging to the BKD. 
The Chief Minister said that the Ministry would be 
further expanded sometime later to include some BKD men. 
Representation to the two parties was being given on the basis 
of their representative strength in the Assembly going by the 
figure of fifty as the final strength of the Ministry. The 
BKD wqs to have 21 representatives and the New Congresa 29. 
Charan Singh was not in favour of having a Deputy Chief Minister. 
Kamlapati Tripathi kept himself out. The one BKD addition was 
to be Bishan Lai of Moradabad with cabinet rank. The Mew 
Congress list of 14 Cabinet Ministers headed by ChaturbhuJ 
Sharma, who would be No. 2 in the Ministry, consisted of 9 
Ministers who resigned from Gupta cabinet following the split 
in uhe party in addition to former PWD Minister J.P. Rawat# 
former Agriculture Minister Oenda aingh# former Minister Baldev 
&ingh Arya and two new comers B.S. Avasthi and Ram Lakhan, 
Harijan members from Banaras. Besides Nine Cabinet Miniscers 
including Sharroa, there were seven Ministers of state and six 
Beputy Ministers.^ 
1. Hindustan Times. New Delhi, Apr 19,1970 
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Later on in a statement Charan Singh said that three 
more men from BKD would be included in his cabinet. He indicated 
that this vfould be after the Tanda by-election on Hay XI, 1970, 
which, acting State BKD Chairman Jai Ram Verma was contesting. 
With three men coming* the number of representatives of his 
party was to rise to 11 in the 2b men cabinety fourteen Congressmen 
were already there. Charan Singh said that he had not consulted 
the New Congress leaders about the allocation of portfolios* 
which he had done on his own but generally the New Congress 
Ministers were satisfied with it.^ 
On the day of opening of the joint session of the U.P. 
Legislature on February 26,1970 a chorus of "shame shame", and 
"Governor go back" and loud thunping of desks emerged from the 
opposition benches. Ignoring Opposition leader Girdhari Lai's 
protest Governor Gopala Reddy started reading his address. 
The ssp leader A.R. Jaiswal and Jana Sangh leader Madhav Prasad 
Tripathi charged the Governor with acting in a partisan manner 
against the constitution in installing a minority wovernment 
2 
headed by Charan Singh "to retain his own job." The oppositJ 
they said "would not bear him", (the Governor). 
The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Apr 26,1970 
2. Ibid., Feb 2^,1970 
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Iinn«<3iately after when the upper House met oeparately 
the entire opposition walked out following the rejection of 
Chairman Virendra Swaroop of his contention that the Governor 
had left the Chamber without reading his address at tht, joint 
session and so that the address should not be repeated to the 
House formally• Ruling out the objection the Chairman said 
that he v,as sitting by Governor's side and he heard him. 
Quoting a Calcutta High Court ruling he said that the validity 
of Governor's perfonrance in usual conditions could not be 
questioned even if it \vas irregular* 
In a separate si^-ting of the Assembly, the opposition 
did not raise this objection when A.G, Kher repeated the 
address of the Governor and fixed four days for its discussion. 
At the fag and when the speaker announced that he had received 
a notice from Kamlapati Tripathi seeking to exprei»s regret of 
the House at the insulting behaviour meted out by some members 
to Reddy, the Old Congre-s Secretary Krishnanand Rai and some 
opposition menibers opposed it and declared that the "Governor 
deserved it because of his action." 
On February 26, 1970 the Speaker announced in the 
Assembly that a notice of breach of privilege had been received 
against Chief Minister Charan Singh "for announcing at a public 
meeting on February 25, 1970 certain inportant decisions of the 
Cabinet barely 12 hours before the Assembly session to have 
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opened." The Chief Miniater contended that this question has 
been raised many times in the House and the i%)eaker had ruled 
that this could not be considered a breach of privilege. A 
similar ruling had been given in the Parliament also. Charan 
aingh said he would produce the ruling later if the chair wanted 
it. The speaker said that as far as he could remember he had 
said that as a matter of etiquette the Governioent ahould announce 
in^ortant decisions on the floor of the House when it was in 
session and not outside. But it could not be a matter of breach 
of privilege. He said, he would* however* study the issue 
further and give the dedision later. 
Finance Minister Balbir Singh later presented in the 
Assentoly supplementary budget totalling Rs. 78.45 crores. 
Irrigations Minister Virendra Verma pre^iented supplementary 
demand to the coundil earlier in the day. There v.as a great 
tension in the air as metiers assembled for the joint session. 
In anticipation of trouble the visitors galleries ha€ been 
closed for the day and a big police force guarded the corridors 
outside. As Chief Minister Charan aingh took his seat* followAd 
by Kamlapati Trlpathi next to him* they were greeted with cheers 
from the BKD and Mew Congress benches and with shouts of 
"shame shame" from the Opposition. C.B. Gupta sat quietly in 
one of the rear rows. Tension grew up further in the Assembly 
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as the Governor entered the House» 
In his protest speech the ssp leader A.R» Jaisval said 
that "the Governor had violated his oath of allegiance to the 
Constitution by swearing in Charan Singh as Chief Minister on 
the basis of the list he had himself declared bogus." He 
alleged that Dr Reddy has eaten his words to save his job. 
Jana aangh's Madhav Prasad Tripathi saic that "Pr Reddy had 
ceased to be the Governor as he had taken a partial decision 
to get an extension or another job. Instead of using his own 
discretion he went to Delhi for consultations with Prime Minister 
and the President." The decision to install Charan Singh Ministry, 
Tripathi charged* "was guided by personal xntereat and no sense 
of fair play and justice could be expected from the high office 
he held." 
As reported in the press the noisy first day debate on 
the Governor's address in the U.P, Assembly on February 27, 1970 
was "marked by a bitter two hour indictment ©f Chief Minister 
Charan Singh by group leader Anant Ram Jaiswal." Jaiswal, 
who moved an amendment to the motion of thanks on behalf of the 
Opposition leader Girdhari Lai "regretting that no motion had 
been made of the ordinances by the Gupta Ministry for exemption 
of 6.25 acres from land revenue", accused Charan Singh of 
"conducting deceptive hoxwe trading with both sides for getting 
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Chief Ministership" ano saia« "such a leader could never give 
a clean end efficient administration to the State*** 
Moving the motion of thanks Gtnda Singh (New Congress) 
said that the address was not the last word about the Government 
policiesi There would be occasion to reconsider certain issues.^ 
The SSP leader A.R. Jaiswal charged the Chief Minister with 
constantly shifting his stand for retaining or acquiring power. 
He said that one of the main reasons given by Charan Singh for 
not 
breaking with Gupta was thut he couldj^agree to land revenue 
exenption, yet under the pressure of New Congress which was 
committed to it, he had now agreed to it for the fear of being 
2 toppled. 
On Mdrch 6, 1970 the U.p, Assembly adopted by voice 
vote the motion of thanks on the Governor's address with the 
Old Congress, SSp and Jana Sangh groups abstaining* after the 
speaker had declared** "division procedure irregular". He 
however confirmed his ruli|^g that the Opposition amendment had 
also been lost. On March 22, 1970 Charan Singh scored a 
convincing victory when a no-confidence motion againat him was 
rejected by the Assembly by a large margin of 67 votes. The 
House then was adjourned upto April 28, 1970. The Hindustan Times 
1. .Yhs Tj^ P^ eg. New Delhi, Feb 28,1970 
m^t 
wrote* "In what came to be the first lobby olvision challenged 
by Opposition against the new Ministry^ as many as 236 voted 
ageinst the motion and 169 for it."^ After declaring the motion 
lost* the Speaker announced that accordiny to the figures 
submitted by various previous groups their respective strength 
2 was as follows I 
Hew Congress 
Congreiis (0) 
BKD 
Jana Sangh 
SbP 
Comniunii^ t (R) 
Ck?romunist (M) 
Republican 
Swatantra 
Muslim League 
Independents 
Unattached 
Praja Socialist Party 
Hindu Sabha 
KMP 
Vacant 
136 
96 
94 
44 
32 
4 
1 
1 
4 
2 
4 
2 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1. 'Py Hindustan Times, F«b 26^970 
2. .B^ id... March 22,197© 
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Chief Minister Charan Singh said that the Opposition 
had probably tabled the no-confidence motion misled by certain 
rumours which did not fructify. The new announcement he made 
was that "all Hill areas of Kumaun and Uttar Khand division 
except Mainital district would be declared dry within a few 
days." He said that he was opposed to the exenption ot land 
revenue but since it had been made a political i^aue and one of 
sentiments by almost all parties, he had per force to agree to 
exempt holding upto 3,125 acres. He made it clear that he v?as 
not going to withdraw the enhanced irrigation rates. Personally 
he was opposed to ceiling as well* 
But certain defects in the existing law had to be removed 
and therefore a B i n vvas to be brought in the monsoon t>ession. 
The land to be released by the Ceiling measure would not be 
enough to solve the economic problems. Keverthless Charan Jiingh 
stood by the policy deci£»ion he had aniiounced about ceiling* 
though its details \vere to be settled in consultation with the 
BKD and the New Cor^ress and at a later stage by the agreement 
of the House itself. There was no difference of opinion about 
it in the ruling alliance* he said. He also rejected the demand 
for withdrawal of profesi>ionai tax and disbursement of salaries 
of aided schools through Government treasuries. The House 
later passed by a voice vote the Ziila Parishad and Block Commit-
tee (Emergency Provision) Act. 
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Opinion was divided in the BKD State Executive on th« 
Jcey question of the Party merger with the New Congress. It 
was clear that even those favouring the merger could not 
enviibage it in the immediate future. Some senior BKD leaders 
including Inoustrieti Minister Virendra Verma felt that in the 
absence of any formal offer from the New Congress Working 
Committee or the Prime Minister it wwould be only "sheer 
surrender" on the part of bKD to t.alk of merger. Udit Narain 
Sharma who had submitted a note to the BKD Js'ational Executive 
calling for merger read out its contents to the executive 
members and explained it at length. He and Education Minister 
P. Mishra strongly supported the merger move. Acting President 
Jai Ram Verma said that the Prime Minister had in her talk with 
BKD leader several times pressed lor merger, though it was no 
pre condition tor a coalition government nor v-at. there any 
pressure applied. He felt the merger was desirable but wanted 
the party to make up its mind either v^ ay soon. 
IP) PSffler ialAt ia TO, 
The party leadership had authorised the Chief Minister 
to settle several key issues relating to the future set up of 
the BKD, both xn government and the organization. The joint 
meeting of the Executive Committee of the organii»ational and 
legislature wings of the BKD, authorised Chief Minister Charan 
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Sdngh to take "all such steps in this connection as he nvay 
deem fit." nothing that the merger between the BKD and Congress(N) 
was a "ticklish talk more easily thought of than iit^lemented.** 
The resolution pointed out that the question would have to be 
be taken to the National Executive. The meeting decided to 
call a State Convention of the party representatives from 
districts at Lucknow on June 27 and 28, i970. The State BKD 
was seriously seized of the problem of merger. In a meeting 
held in April, 1970 the majority of its members in favour of 
merger differed a final decision for a future date. The resolution 
saidJ "In order that democracy may prosper the BKD has believed 
all along in polarisation of like minded parties and groups in 
the country. The BKD has* interalia, stood for social justice. 
The BKD finds itself nearer to the New Congress as compared 
with other political pc.rties .^nd :^.roups in the country." The 
resolution addedi "The BKD bt^lieves in the removal of poverty, 
reduction in disparities of income and elimination of unemploy-
ment. The country needs txirning more to Mahatma Gandhi tlrian to 
any other source." Saying that the accusation preferred in the 
memorandum by some New Congress members to the Prime Minister 
against the BKD ministers only served to undermine the confidence 
oi the people in the government stability, the resolution said: 
"In fact BKD ministers are extending the same treatment to the 
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Congress legislators as to their own partyinen» Nor is the 
Chief Minister acting in a partisan manner or as the leader 
of the BKD alone." As regards the distribution of portfolios, 
except in one "inevitable case" where it consisted of five 
departments, Charan aingh allotted to all the ex-minj.sters of 
the Congress those very departments they held previously, the 
resolutions added.^ 
When news about the merger appeared in the newspapers a 
spokesman of the party said* "We only read in newspapers about 
the merger move in U.p. but the point had never come before the 
National Executive. So far as the National Executive is concerned, 
it decided against the merger and that dicision stands." It 
was also explained ttiat the BKD was not merely a party of U.p, 
but speead all over the country and %\as an all India organisation. 
If a decision to merge with Congress (in U.P.) was taken it 
would not affect the party organisation at natiorjil level. The 
BKD claimed that it was the major partner in i-he coalition 
goverimient in Ori^aa as Jana Congre^is was nothing but BKD with 
a different name. In fact the Jana Congress had adopted the 
BKD Constitution and its leader Pavitra Mohan jBraahan vvas one 
of the Vice-President® of BKD. 
1. yifrff Hindustan Times. New Delhi, May 27,1970 
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In Rajasthan the BKD had eleven members in the Assewibly 
and thouyh the Swatantra Party v,as the official Opposition the 
BKD hafi turnea out to be the principal Opposition party in the 
state particularly after it lefl a mighty Kisan movement and got 
more than 30,000 people to court in^risonment. 
On the eve of the crucial BKD JJational Executive meeting 
in »7uly 1970 Charan met ffcs, Indira Gcndhi to diacuss the 
problems connected with BKD's proposed merger with tlie New 
Congress. He also met his senior party colleagues and asked them 
to sort out the differences of opinion. He said that "in the 
larger interest of the country* the party should not mind losing 
its identity? after all most Bkd membe s were former Congreosmen 
who had left the party due to bossism. They should identify 
themselves with the forces emerging in the New Congress after the 
split." This view a was not i^hared by several BKD leaders. The 
pro and anti merger groups had taKen rii»id positions and the 
party might not have been able to avoid a split if the majority 
vivw was sought to be imposed. Those opposing the merger were also 
expected to press that the National Executive was not competent 
to wind up the organisation and therefore a National Convention 
was to be called to discus® the merger issue. 
5i 
The U.P, State BKD Chairman Jai Ram Verma opened the 
debate in the Katioiial Executive meeting. In his 70 minute 
speech he explained the tvro resolutions ot the atate BKD which 
had virtually recommended merger. J.R. Verroa pointed out that 
in the circumstances of the country at that time "the task ot 
developing BKD into an All India live political force might 
take more than a decade while the need for the various democratic 
elements in the country to preaent one consolidated front to the 
grov/ing threat of extreme communism and ficciparous tendencies 
were urgent." According to J.R. Verma, the country was in a 
bad shape in 1967 but the situation had further deteriorated 
requiring a reappraisal of the whole situationi "It was in this 
context that the BKD should respond to the appeal of the Prin© 
Minister who had called upon the like minded parties, in particu-
lar the BKD to participate in national resurgence." He 
agreed that "the Congress (N) did not possess everything good 
and the reason prompting the BKD leader to have separate 
organisation had not con^letely been eliminated/ but the approach 
of both the parties to the problem of the man xn the street was 
much in coRtnon." 
On July 5/1970/ the BKD National Executive shelved the 
issue of merger with Congress indefinitely., authorising its 
Chairman Charan Singh to stud/ the situation in all its aspects 
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and report back to the party• This# according to the l^ jificifustan 
T^ jroeq^  "caused a wave of disappointment in the New Congress 
circles, but leaders were reluctant to comment.**^ The UPCC(N) 
Chief, Kamlapati Trlpathi said that it was not necessary to 
react to all the formulations of other political parties, 
though he admitted he would have been happy if the BKD had deci-
2 ded for merger. 
The anti merger lobby overwhelmingly outnumbered the 
supporters of the mergeri only three out of fourteen executive 
members present beiny in favour of merger. The merger group 
scored victory in that the executive did not reject the proposal 
outright. It v/as believed that Charan Singh, after meeting 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi would discuss the terms and conditions of 
merger with the Congress(N). If there was a firm aa^urance 
tliat the BKD members would be reasonably accommodated at the 
Centre and in the Statet; both in the government and in the 
organisation Charan Singh could have persuaded his colleagues 
to a merger. However Charan Singh orarned the executive that the 
BKD might have to pay the price for its separate existence. 
He v;as obviously su-sgeating tliat the Congress (N) might withdraw 
itself from the government in U.P. 
1. The Hindustan Timea, New DeSlhi, July 6,1970 
2. 
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On July 5/1970 the first attack was made by a.K. S-inha 
(Bihar) who had been vigorously cotnpaigning against the party 
losing its identity. He was followed by another joint secretary 
Moti Raw Shastri who was also vehemently opposed to the Icea of 
merger. PraJcash Vir Shastri was perhapa the most outspoken 
critic of the merger tr-oves. Kost of the invitees holding exe-
cutive position in their respective States disapproved the 
merger proposal characterising it as "an attempt to liquidate a 
really democratic nationalist organisation cou.mitted to follow 
the path of Mahatma Gandhi," They refused to accept the conten-
tion that any basic chanye in the country's politics had taken 
place requiring the BKD to consider such a step. On the other 
hand they felt that "it might be more desirable to wait and 
watch and keep the options open." The three advocates of the 
merger were Udit Narain Sharma^ Jai Ram Verma who opened the 
debate and M.S. Oberai. Their principal argument was that "the 
circumstances since the congress split had basically altered 
the political situation; in the larger interest of the country, 
the BKD should help the process of polarisation and the nearest 
possible organisation to the BKD was the Congress(M) An 
alt«ri>ate resolution sought to be moved by Narain Naik (Maharashtra) 
was applauded by several members but in view of the alternate 
decision giving authority to Charan S-ingh to review the vAiole 
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situation it was not pressed* 
The resolution called for "helping the formation of a 
new party ot socialism, spurning any move to join hands with 
the Old Congress and its allies." It argued that the efforts 
of certain parties to form an alliance in Parliament was "a 
Clear indication that those who vant the status quo to continue 
are getting together fast* There are also indications that 
the Congress(N) may not continue as Congresi; for long. The 
question of merger with Q^ngress(JS^) therefore does not arise." 
Referring to the circumstances in 1j«P» and Bihar the resolution 
saidJ "The BKD is prepared to work in coalition on an All India 
basis with Congress (N) and other like minded parties on the basis 
of a clear cut and time bound socialist programme. Through such 
initial cooperation these parties should com© together and 
form a new party of Socialism <Saraajwadi Dal)1 During the 
discussions Charan £>ingh saidt "I did not ^ive any decision in 
favour o£- against tha merger issue."^ 
There was a high level meeting which the Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi had with her senior cabinet colleagues Jagjivan 
Ram, y.B. Chavan and Fakhruddin Aii Ahmad, v/here it was decided 
1. yr^ e Hindust^j^ Tipves. New Delhi, July 6,1970 
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that the Congress(N) would not withdraw from the BKD coalition 
in U.P. However, the hope was still entertained in the Congress(N) 
ciicles that the last has not been heaird on the subject and 
that the Chief Minister Charan Singh might succeed in persiuading 
the BKD to a merger. The UPCC(n) president Kamlapati Tripathi 
was also present at the meeting when the U»P. situation was 
discussed. ^Oiough he was put out by the BS^ D decision, he had 
not given up the hope that Charan Singh would be able to carry 
the executive with him on the merger issue at a more opportune 
moment later* This was the iu^ression Charan Sincih gave to 
Mrs. Gandhi v;hen he met her after the BKD decision. Charan Singh 
reportedly told Mrs. eandhi that he needed some more time to 
persuade his party executive to accept the merger proposal. But 
Congress(N) sources maintained that "in view of the overtures 
made to the BKJD by Congress(0) the executive was perhaps thinking 
over this matter in an entirely different context." They 
also said t'nat "he w^s probably trying to strike a political 
bargain by delaying merger." 
The Executive Committee of the Rajasthan unit of the 
BKD strongly opposed the merger of BKD with Congress(N) . It 
said that such talk created an atmosphere of instability and 
misunderstanding, and this damaged the image of BKb. Besides 
this , oray the Rational fixecutive was capable o£ taking such 
a decision on merger. Chaixnan Ram Kiran Josbi said that most 
of the state units viere opposed to the merger and he did not 
think the National Executive would decide otherwise* 
—gxpansion ot Charan Sinah Mi|qigtjrv 
Charan aingh had proposed to expand his Ministry in the 
third week of July 1970. This had to be done mainly to include 
the BKD representatives to coi|jiplete his party quota in the 
Ministry, Th© Chief Minister was entitled to add three cabinet 
Ministers» 7 Ministers ot State and 3 Deputy Ministers. But 
he \.as not to appoint so many Ministers as t - h e total strength 
of the Ministry would have been too big.^ He v/as to appoiiit 
some Ministers for the time beiny and add a few later in the 
second phase. There v/ere 22 cabinet Ministers out of which 
15 belonged to the Congress(K). Among the 9 Deputy Ministers 
only three were from BKD, Whei> the Ministry was expanded on 
April 19/1970 to include Congress (N) repret^entatiwes only one 
BKD Minister was taken in. It given out then that the 
BKD quota would be completed later. 
The Charan &ingh Ministry was expanded on July 19,1970 
for the second time to induct two more Cabinet Ministers # 2 
Ministers of state and a Deputy Minister, all belonging to the 
1. Th« Hindustan Timea. New Delhi, July 8,1970 
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BKD« raising its strength to 46* Ram Kinkar, a Deputy Minister 
V9.a protnoted to the Cabinet rank. In the 46 roeraber Ministry 
the Congress (ISf) now had a share of 26, comprising 13 Cabinet 
Ministers, 7 Ministers of States and 6 Deputy Ministers. The 
BKD had 10 Cabinet Ministers, 2 Ministers of State and 8 Deputy 
Ministers. Originally a 10 member BKD Ministry led by Charan 
S.ingh was installed on Feb. 1 7 , 1970 to make a Coalition Ministry, 
It was expanded for the first time on April 19, 1970 to include 
Congress(N) representatives; since the BKD quota was not 
completed it was then decided that the Ministry would soon be 
expanded but the expansion was delayed due to a by-election 
and the budget session of the Assenibly.^ 
The Chief Minister Charan Singh made it very clear that 
the U,p. government would deal firmly with unlawful activities 
whether bj^  politicians, students or land grabbers. He said* 
"I would like to tell all the potential law breakers that the 
law will take its inexorable course and no intercession on 
anybody's behalf or appeals for mercy will be heard." 
1. Tt^ ^ Hindustan Times^ New Delhi, July 8,1970 
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An ordinance for preventive detention of people was 
issued on August &#1970. The iDaxiinuin period of detention vias 
fixed at an year. Under this ordinance some students were arres-
ted in Kanpur and LucJcnow. In protest and anger they burnt the 
BKD flag. 
R.K. Sinha, General Secretary of the Congress(R) parlia-
mentary party criticised the "repressive policy** of the U.P. 
government towards the students* pxiblic servants and the working 
class. He said that "u.P. should not be ruled by the promul-
gation of undemocratic ordinance such as the Preventive Detention 
Ordinance and the Universities (Amendment) Ordinance," He 
alleged that *'the BKD members of the Parliament were determined 
to oppose the policies of Mrs. Gandhi's governmenti the 
Congress party in U.P. could not therefore extend the uncondi-
tional support to Charan Singh for all times to come." He said 
that the Congress MPs resented the attitude of Charan aingh.^ 
Justifying the ordinances Charan Singh told a press 
conference that Assam* Andhra and Maharashtra governments also 
had promulgated ordinances to provide for preventive detention. 
All the governments except that of Orissa were Congress governments. 
1. „Tht New Delhi, Aug 11,1970 
In taking preventive detention measures the U.p. government 
was in very good corapany. The Chief Minister pointed out that 
"the communists had all along been opposed to preventive 
detention. They were living in the v.orld of their own fantasy, 
far removed from reality." Adding that the legislation was not 
aimed at curbing legitimate political activities of any party 
but only at intercepting and keeping under detention those about 
whose dangerous and subversive intention the government had 
no doubt, Charan Singh saidi "So far nobody had been arrested 
under preventive detention measures."^ He fuJtther added that 
"the people of U.P. are not living in darkness as slaves but in 
the light of full freedom and security; the prophets of doom 
who have forcasted a reign of terror and police shooting following 
the promulgation of the ordinance had been proved to be utterly 
wrong." Accordingto the Chief Minister no land grabbing had 
taken place in his state though aon^ political parties had 
launched an agitation. He told a press conference that arrests 
so far made in the= State for violating prohibitary orders had 
totalled 3,248 including 6 members of Parliament and 11 MLAs. 
Tfte Stateaman, New Delhi, Aug 18, 1970 
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fe. , m?, m<asg 
The BKD National Executive met on August 27#1970, wrote 
The Statesman, "draggea its feet on the merger issue as the 
idea was overwhelmingly opposed to join the Congress(R)^ The BKD 
dropped the idea of merger with the Congress(R)#thus ending the 
prolonged uncertainty about ite futuire. It took care* according 
to press reports, "not to assume a position that may appear to 
have even a slight element of hostility," It expressed the hope 
that the coalition governnrent in U.p, would continue to function 
as before. At the same time Charan Singh visualised close 
cooperation betv;een the BKD and the Congress (R) at the time of 
General Elections. The BKD, he said, "did not propose to initiate 
2 
talks for an alliance with any other party.' A resolution 
adopted by the BKD Executive on August 28,1970 announced the 
party's resolve against merger without assigning any reason. 
Presumably the party leadership did not want to create a public 
controversy on this issue and \)pset the delicate balance of the 
U.P. Coalition. 
In Parliament there would be no shift in the party's 
attitude and it would continue to function as an opposition 
group, but in particular circumstances might support the govern-
1. Ttie, New Delhi, Aug 29,1970 
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meot after consulting Ita Chairman.^ 
In his talk with Mrs. Gahdhi, Charan Singh stressed that 
'^the BKD stand on merger should not be allowed to strain the 
functioning of the coalition", and cited the cooperative 
spirit shown by the Congress <R) and BKD Ministers in taking 
ii^ortant decisions.** His party would continue to maintain 
this amity, Charan Singh said, and requested the Prime Minister 
2 to ensure reciprocity by the Cof;9ress(R) unit. 
The UPCC(R) declared after the joint meeting of its 
executive and the State Parliamentary Board that it did not want 
to wreak the coalition. A letter was sent to Charan Singh 
clearly indicating that the policies of the Congress(R) consisting 
five pointst (i) Nationalisation of Sugor factoriesi (ii) land 
reform (lowering the ceiling and quick distribution of surplus 
landi (iii) formation of a Cabinet sub committee to deal with 
transfers and postings* (iv) outlining of minimum programmes and 
the setting up of a coordination committee* (v) the meeting 
adopted a resolution promising continuity of employment to the 
staff of private sector firm acquired by the government! this had 
immediate relevance to the electricity supply firms acquired by 
the UPSSB. 
The Statf»3|man. Mew Delhi, Aug 29,1970 
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The strain of uneaay partnership between the BKD ana the 
Congress (R) had coine out into the open. The BKD General becretaty 
Shiv Swarup Sin^h openly accused the Con^dress(R) of "trying to 
nibble at the members of its coalition partners," He also 
alleged that H,N, Bahugun«., General Secretary of AICC(R) had met 
Junior Miiii£,ters e-nd legislators belonging to the BKD and 
offered them ministerships in a different government from the 
present, provided they help in forming such a government by 
quitting the BKD,^ 
Siiv Swarup Sxngh made it dear in a report that the 
BKD was opposed to "throwing the State into another mid term 
election. The party would try its level beat to avoid it even 
if other parties wanted it. But in the eventuality of the mid 
term poll, the party would be prepared to face the electorate." 
It was pointed out that "soon after the formation of the 
coalition government the Corigress(R) had allegedly started nego-
tiation® with the Congress(O). In case the coalition government 
comes to collapse, said Shiv Swarup Sinsih, all possible etforts 
would be made to work out an alternative, so the t a m^d term 
poll vvas not held. 
1. yte., New Delhi, a«p 6,1970 
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To forestall possible difficulties from ConyressCR) 
for the coalition government, Charan Singh had established 
contact with the Congress(O) central leaders through a trusted 
lieutiiant on August 7,1970.^ The Congress(0), it appeared* 
had reacted positively to Charan Si-ngh's feelers. With the 
Congress (R) disillusioned by the BKD MPs votes at^ainst the 
privy Purses Bill# the position of coalition government in U.P, 
had become untenable. Its High Command* it appeared* had 
given a free hand to the State unit to plan its strategy in the 
light of the nev^  situation. In the next few dcya it appeared 
both the Congress (R) and the BKD would be consolidating themselves 
and each one was hopeful of the sij5)port of a sizeable section 
from the other's rank. The war of words between the two parties 
had meanwhile intensified. On August 27*1970 Bahuguna denied 
the charge lebelled by U.P, BKD Secretary Shiv Swarup Singh 
that the was engineering defections from the BKD rank. Obviously 
Singh was in search of an alibi to cover up the growing frus-
tration and disappointment among well meaning people about the 
2 role of the BKD, Bahuguna said. 
The UPCC(R) President Kamlapati Tripathi sent a letter 
to Charan Singh requesting him to call a session of the Vidhan 
Sabha not later than the end of the month (Septeni^er 1970) so 
1. Th^ New Delhi, Sep 6,1970 
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that all Issues concerning in^ortant policy natters roay be 
thrashed out in the House. H© also said that after the BKD 
vote in Rajya Sablia on the Privy Purses issue it was ia^ossible 
for the Congress (R) to support the BKD government. In his 
letter to Charan Singh Tripathi stated that the Chief Minister 
had publicly accepted that the Congress(R) Bombay resolution 
on economic policy of which the abolition of the Privy Purses 
and privileges of the former rulers v.as an important item. 
Tripathi's letter said: "We depended upon your good faith. 
Voting of your party mernbers under your direction on the Privy 
Purses bill has proved to be the last straw. You have thus 
created a situation under which the support of Conyress(R) party 
to your government has become well nigh impossible."^ It was 
also pointed out that the Congress(R) had good reasons to 
believe that Charan Singh was negotiating with other parties 
including Congress (0) , the Jana Sangh and others which had 
been opposed to Chief Minister and the Congress(R) policies 
Charan Singh and his party were expected to respect the poli-
cies of Congress (R) . 
8. The Policv of CoparesaCO) and Jana Sanah Towards the 
BKp Government 
The Congress(0) and Jana Sangh leaders in U.P, were 
understood to have agreed that no talk should be initiated by 
1. T|ie Statesman. New Delhi, Sep 9,1970 
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tbeiD with che BKD until the government yma defeated on the floor 
of the House. They were of the view that a joint front would 
be formed immediately consisting of the Congress (o), the Jana 
Sangh and the t>sp "in order to counter any atten^st by the Cong-
ress (R) to form a government in the State on the basis of the 
party strength," The three parties had a combined strength of 
172 againat 146 of the Congress(R) in a HoiAse of 425 
The Jana t»angh leader Natoji Deahmukh had a meeting with 
the Congress(O) leader C.B, Gupta and later appraised Vajpayee 
on the outcome of this talk. The top leadership of the ssp 
demanded the immediate removal of Charan Singh. The demand came 
in a statement issued by the central party office signed by Ram 
Sevak Yadav, Madhu Iiimaye* Raj Karain* Arjun Singh Bhadoria and 
George Fernandes. On September 9k.l970 George Jernandes, General 
Secretary of the ssp said that "his party would neither enter 
into an alliance nor support the BKD in forming alternative 
government in U.p," Ke addedi *We would not want the Charan Singh 
government to last a single moment,*" 
^ggisi^p to ^^^ th^ CpaX jt^ igp ifi UtP,i 
The Congress(R) High Command was not conten^lating any 
rapproachement with Charan Singh* and as tar as the party was 
concerned/ the coalition with the BKD in the U.P. had virtually 
1. The Statesman, New Delhi, Sep 9,1970 
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come to an end. The High ConHnand was said to have made up 
Its mind that "coalition with Charan Sdngh was totally untenable 
It had to be broken off even 1± that led to the imposition 
of President's rule in the State." 
The Congress(R) effort now was to see Charan Singh's 
defeat on the iloor of the House which was scheduled to meet 
©n Ortober 6,1970, Charan Singh was not in a position to 
reconstitute his Cabinet by dropping the Congress(R) Ministers 
before that, since by doing so he would put his own majority 
in doubt. He was trying to secure support from the Congress(0) 
and Jana Sangh to tide over the crisis that had overtaken his 
Government. Originally it appeared that the support would be 
forthcoming since the aim of both the Congress(O) and the Sangh 
normally was to see the Congress(R) out of power in U.P. But 
as days passed the BKD appeared to be more and more disillu-
sioned with earlier promises of help from Congress (O) and Jana 
Sangh. 
The Congress (R) High Comsaand on September 18,1970 gave 
the green signal to its U.P. unit to part company with BKD in 
case the context remains unchanged.^ In the assessment given by 
Kamlapati Tripatli to Mrs. Gandhi and Jagjivan Ram, two points 
1. Tfte Statesmap. New Delhi, Sep 19,1970 
67 
stood out J first the congress (R) strength had in^irovea In the 
last few days, and second the Jana Sangh and Congress(O) may 
not come to the Ministry though they mi^ht join hands with 
him l a t e r I n case Charan S.ingh was ousted from power, 
Tripathi visualised hopeful possibilities for the Congress(R), 
A joint meeting of the BKD legislators azid Executive 
Committees of various districts and town committee which was 
held on September 23,1970 gave full authority to Charan Singh 
to take the decision he thought proper in the political situa-
tion in the State. A resolution passed by party activists 
gave a free hand to their leader, to take a decision in the 
intere>>t of the people and the party. 44 of the 96 legislators 
including MPs took part in the deliberations. Some v^anted the 
coalition with uhe Congress(R) to continue if possible, others 
were inclined to negotiate with other parties so that government 
2 could be formed a n c another mid term election avoided. 
The BKD-Congress(R) coalition finally disintegrated 
on September 24,1970. The Chief Minister Charan Singh relieved 
13 Congress(R) Ministers of their portfolios and asked them to 
resign. They did not reaign. Instead the leader of the 
yhe Stateamafi. New Delhi, Sept 19,1970 
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Congress(R) Legislative Party K. Tripathi wrote to the Governor 
requestiny him to ask Charan Singh to resign since the Congress (R) 
had withdrawn its support and that Charan Singh no longer 
co«inanded majority in the House.^ At her press conference 
Mrs* Indira Gandhi expressed the hope that it might not be 
necessary to resort to President's Rule in the State/ but 
admitted that anything could happen. Charan Singh asked several 
of his Congress(R) colleagues (but not all) in a letter addressed 
to them individually to resign from the government. Since the 
Congress(R) Ministers had precipitated a constitutional crisis 
by refusing to resign, Charan Singh might have had to tender 
his and his government's resignation to weed out the undesirables. 
But that w u l d have opened the way for Kamlapati Tripathi to 
claim as the leader of the single largest party in the Assembly^ 
2 an opportunity to prove that he can form a stable government. 
Charan tiingh had significantly excluded some iiiportant 
Congress(R) Ministers who were r»t asked to re^-igns Chaturbhuj 
Sharma, Nc.rain Dutt Tewari and Jagan Prasad Rawat and a few 
others - all were close to Charan Singh. The exclusion could 
be an atten5)t to drive a wedge in Congress (R) ranks. Those 
The Statesman. New Delhi, Sept 19,1970 
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asked by the Chief Minister to resign weret Mrs, Viayawati 
Rathore# Baldeo Singh, Laxroi ShanJcer, Dr. Slta Ram, Atiqur 
Rehnian (all Ministers); DharaiB Dutt Ved# Malunood All Khan* 
Naraln aingh Bisht/ Raj Mangal Pande, iterain Gupta, Gopi Dixit, 
Dr. Mrfa. Rajendra Kumari (all Ministers of State); Bhagv.atl Singh, 
Bir Bahadur Sin^h ano Ow Prakash Singh (all Deputy MiniJiters) . 
All except Om Prakash Singh belonged to the Conyress(R). 
Charan Singh declared that he was prepared to face a 
trial of strength in the assembly. The BKD, he said, "felt 
that the Congress (R) needed an overhaul and conplete orientation 
of its policies and programmes. That was why uhe BKD National 
Executive had decided to drop the merger proposal." He further 
added that as far as he vas concerned, he vvas in favour of 
continuing the present coalxtion. 
The leaders of Conc)ress(O) , Jana Sangh and S;iip handed 
over a letter to the Governor asking him to let Charan Si.lngh 
continue as Chief Minister, The leaders of these parties said 
in the letter that they weie against the Congress (ll) and its 
leadership, and so no action should be taken on Kamlapati 
Tripathi's request that Charan Sa.ngh be dismissed,^ 
I* The Statesman, New Delhi, Sept 26,1970 
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On the Conyress(R) side the reasoning was that the 
coalition stayed and that the opposition vas only to Charan 
Singh's leadership. 24 ot the Congress(R) Ministers (2 were 
out of station) submitted to the Governor a letter pointing 
out that the party was in majority when the coalition government 
was tormed and since Charan Singh had himself announced a 
break from the majority group* he was in Eiiix>rity and should 
resign. They requested the Governor to direct Charan Singh 
to resign if he failed to resign on his own.^ 
The opposition leaders v.ho met the Governor declared 
that the mere withdrawal of Congress support did not necessarily 
and conclusively reduce the Chief Minister and his government 
into a minority unless the same was established on the floor of 
the House. The opposition parties aavised tiie Governor in the 
same letter that he should dismiss the MiniiJters whom Charan 
Singh had asked to resign. The oppoi^ition parties rodce the 
point that the advice of the Chief Minister on this matter was 
Ifinding on the Governor. There had been much reluctance amang 
the political parties to £;traxyht a\May support Charan Singh till 
terms for a new coalition we^ -e settled between them and the 
BKC. 
I. The Statesnati. New Delhi, Sept 26,1970 
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The opposition parties submitted to the Goveriwr a 
statement of the comparative strength of the different parties 
and groups in the Assentoly. Accordinc^ to tt the Conare«s(4) 
and its allies mustered 171 against 199 members of the Cong-
ress (R) and its allies, and 9 occupying an intermediate position 
between the two. The statement gave the strength of the BKD 
as 80 and v.ith the BKD added to Congress a new leader could claim 
the support of 250 members in the House of 425* one seat being 
vacant.^ 
On September 26,1970 Kamlapati Tripathi wrote to the 
Governor and claimed that he could form a stable government to 
succeed Charan Sdngh. He requested the Governor to demand the 
resignation of Charan aingh on the ground of loss of majorit|i 
2 
in the House. But on the other hand the Coni^ressCo) « Jana Sangh 
and Swatantra parties wrote to the Governor tendixjy their support 
to Charan Singh and telling that with their support Charan Singh 3 
enjoyed majority in the House, Tripathi cautioned the Governor 
against trusting in the advice of Charan Singh. He said that 
"it once the principle of accepting the advice of Chief Minister 
who had lost his majority was agreed it would lead to several 
problems."^ Tripathi was referring to Charan Singh's advice to 
Tt^ e Statesman. New Delhi, Sept 26,1970 
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the Governor that all the Concjress(R) Ministers should be 
dismissed* 
On September 27,1970 the Governor had passed orders 
concerning with Charan Singh's action of withdrawing of portfolios 
from 13 Congress Ministers of the Cabinet rank. The Governor 
entrusted those portfolios to the Chief Minister.^ The Governor 
had not yet taken decision on Chief Minister's advice that all 
the 26 Congress(r) ministers should be removed from office* 
The Conyreas(R), in a counter move, withdrew its support 
on the same day to the six nonth old coalition government. All 
the Congress(R) Ministers, through a letter to the Goverwr, 
demanded the dismissal of Chief Minister on the ground that he 
did not enjoy the support of the majority party. Sharply 
reacting to their demand for his resignation Charan Singh 
recommended to the Governor the dismissal of all 26 Congress(R) 
Ministers on the ground oi break of discipline. The National 
Executive of the PSp was of the view that Charan Singh should 
have reiiissined from office after his announcement of the termina-^ 
tion of BKD-Congress (R) coalition, "This break up of the 
coalition," according to the PSp, "had reduced his support in 
the Assembly to a manifest minority." 
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After obtaining the opinion of the Attorney General the 
Governor B.Oopala Reddy asked Charan Singh to resign by the 
evening of September 28*1970.^ Charan Singh wrote to the Governor 
that he needed time to give a detailed reply and he also requested 
the Governor to provide him with the Attorney General is opinion 
on the basis ox which he had asked him to resign* The Governor 
2 
sent him a copy of the same. Some opposition party leaders 
had consultation with Charan Singh on the possibility of 
forming a Samyukta Vichayak Dal (SVD). The legislators of 
the BKD^ Jana Sangh and Congress (0) who were not present in the 
town were understood to have been directed to present themselves 
so that they could be mustered to appear before the Governor if 
necessary. 
In a letter to the Governor Tripathi said that in case 
Charan Singh resigns, he should be invited to form the Ministry.^ 
The UPCC(R) executive pa^s^ed a resolution saying that the 
Gwvernor should have asked the Chief Minister to resign iiranediately 
»fter the withdrawal of Congress (R) from the coalition. Harwever n 
the meeting considered the action of the Governor in deinonding 
the resignation of Chief Minister appropriate and constitutional 
1. T^e Statesman. New Delhi# Sept 29,l97o 
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and requested him that "iailiny Immediate siibroission of resig-
nation, the Governor may be pleased to withdraw his pleasure 
from the Chief Minister Charan Singh." The meeting urged the 
Governor that Tripathi was not only the leader oi the largest 
party in the Legislature but also commanded the support of 
other members in the U.P. Legislative Assembly, He v-as competent 
to form a stable govermient and hence he should be called 
upon to form the nev; Ministry. 
The resolution also saidJ "Experience oi partnership 
with Charan Singh for a few months had made it clear that the 
interests of the working class, peasants, women, students and 
political workers were not safe in his hands. This led to deep 
difference over policies and programmes between Charan Singh 
and Congress (R)". Thereafter the resolution addedi "Charan 
Singh decided to openly align himself with the rightist forces. 
The manner in which the rightist parties came to his rescue 
only confirmed that those forces of reaction could go to ar^ 
length to thwart the progressive policies of the Congress(R) 
Soon after the Governor wrote to Charan aingh, Girdhari 
Lal(C-O) who was leader of the opposition said that he should 
be invited to form an alternate government. Ram Kiran Singh, 
the PSp leader* urged uhe Governor to invite Tripathi to form 
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the governmentThe Governor in his letter to Charan ain^h told 
hlra that the matter of his having obtained the support of othar 
parties can be gone into at the time of the question of a new 
government ai.ter his resignation, 
C.B, Gupta(C-0), in a letter to the Governor, had protes-
ted against the deniand for Charan Singh's resignation. He said 
that the post of Attorr^ General being political his opinion 
was not impartial. Dr. R.C, Shukla, Secretary of the State 
PSP thought that the Governor had acted beyond the limit of 
2 
constitutional propriety in asking Charan Singh to re§ign. 
Archarya Kripalani# in a statement said that by not waiting for 
the meeting of the Assembly the Governor had made suspect the 
impartiality of his office. Ugra Sen, Qiairman of the State 
PSP said that "since a no confidence motitm against Charan Singh 
had already been tabled in the Assembly the Governor's action 
in asking Charan Singh to resign was an insult to the House*' 
C.B. Gupta wrote to the Governors 
"You will kindly consider the matter and 
not blindly accept the opinion of Attorney 
Generals whose office being political is 
in the grip of the government in power 
at the centre. And it is well known that 
the Prime Minister wants her own party 
to come in power or failing that President's 
rule. The Attorney General's opinion is 
«3 
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therefore not like the verdict of the 
Supreme Court coining from an in^rtial 
judicial body. It is to be examined in 
the light of the provision of the consti-
tution and practice of parliamentary 
democracy in other countries on whxch our 
constitutional conventions and provisions 
are so largely based ..« The Bieeting of 
the Legislative Assembly is fixed for 
October 6, 1970 where it can be constitu-
tionally and indisputably established 
whether the Chief Minister commands or 
does not command a majority. If you do 
not want to wait tor the meeting of legis-
lature on October sixth, you may call it 
at the earliest you can for a proper deter-
mine tion ot the question. That is what 
the constitution provider for, and that 
is what, I may add, is your sacred duty 
to enforce regardless ot advice from the 
centre or any one else. To do otherwise 
would be making a mockery of our consti-
tution, democratic practices and tradi-
tions. The question who is in and who 
rt-mains Chief Minister is not so important 
as the maintenance and preservation 
of our democracy, its constitutional 
conventions and traditions. I therefore 
appt-al to you to be true to yoxir oath 
as Governor, and rwt to be misled or 
pressurised by a partisan centre. The 
office oi the Governor exists to save 
and preseirwe the constitution in conditions 
of political pressure. It may involve 
some risk ond sacrifice on your part. 
But that will be worthwhile for preser-
ving our democracy ond saving it 
from dictatorship ... I write this as 
I have laboured, worked for, and am 
still working for the establishment 
and strengthening ot oeroocratic tradi-
tions, and resigned my office twice as 
Chief Minister in persuance of it. The 
consequences ot disregard evasion of • 
the constitution will be disastrous as 
it will lead the people to lost their 
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faith in democracy and democratic 
process.'* X 
19,1 BI^, t^^ JHiqti ^Qy Wy^t^ 
The Con9re{js(R) asked whe Governor to recommend to 
the Centre the in^osition of President's rule in U,P, Meanwhile 
the BKD and the opposition parties continued to fight back 
against the Governor's move asking Charan Sinyh to resign. The 
BKD moved the Lucknow bench 01 the Allahabad High Court for a 
writ of mandamus to restrain the Governor from dismissing the 
Charan Singh Ministry on the ground that such action by the 
Governor would be roalafide owing to political pressure from 
Congress(R) government at the Centre. The BKD petition v^ as 
only partly heard on September 29,1970 by the Bench and arguments 
relating to its admissibility! because of Governor's immunity 
2 under the constitution, were to be continued next day. 
The General Secretary of the UPCC(R) and Syed Ali Zaheer, 
one of the party's constitutional experts asked the Governor to 
take action under Article 356 of the Constitution since Charan 
Singh had refused to oblige the Governor vvith his resignation 
though he was asked to do so. 
1» The Statesman. New Delhi, Sept 30,1970 
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Charan Slragh's train argurocnt wau that since the Asaerobly 
was meeting only eight deys later, there seemed to be little 
point in his resigning or being disraiaaed* and an adhoc goverimient 
being installed to face the Assembly or in the Governor assessing 
through legislators parades, the respective strength o£ the 
claimants to Chief Misiisteri^hip, Charan Sin^h also reminded 
the Governor that he himself in April 1968 had enunciated 4ind 
acted upon the Speakerds Conference reconimcndc.tion that the 
question of majority or minority support should be tested on the 
floor of the House and there alone. The Governor had himself 
set a precedent vhich he v-as not followinu in the present case.^ 
Raj Bahadur Dwivedi/ Secretary of the State BKD filed a 
petitiv^n before the LucHnow Bench ot Allahabad High Court 
alleging that "the Governor's letter asking Charan Singh to 
resign w^s roalafide." "In the present instance* "aa the petition 
contended, "the Governor was acting nalafiae beinti under political 
pressure from the centre." "The Prime Minister," the petition 
alleged "had cut short her tour and rushed to the government 
houae and ><8,8 understood to have discussed the matter with the 
Governor thereby leading to the lew^l advice tendered by state 
Advocate General being ignored. The Chief Minister had asked for 
1. yha state^pan. New Delhi, Sept 30,1970 
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the resignation of 13 o£ his colleagues belonginy to the 
congress(R) which he was competent to do under article 164 of 
the constitution."^ The petition also contended that "the 
Attorney General's opinion was biased because his was a political 
office." The petition also claimed that "with the opposition of 
three opposition parties the Chief Minister comioanded a following 
of 223 in a house of 426 and was prepared to face the tbuse on 
2 October 6th or earlier." 
The following was the text of Charan Singh's letter to the 
Governor* reply to your letter of this morning asking n® to 
tender my resignation by the evening 4s as follows* 
"You rely upon the opinion of the 
Attorney General while you had 
simultaneously asked for the opinion 
of Advocate General also. It seems 
you did not wait for his opinion to 
arrive which it did this morning, 
before you reached your conclusion and 
wrote to me perhaps ... As the coali~ 
tion government is now no longer in 
existence. I cannot/ under the cons-
titution, function as the Chief 
Minister any longer. Now may I point 
out to you in all humility that the 
constitution does not speak of one 
party of multiparty government at all? 
It speaks of the state government 
whether it is marjied by one political 
party or more than one, being immate-
rial so the Attorn«y General's reasoning 
on the basis of v-he coalition government 
no longer existing is fallacious in the 
extreme. 
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"A Chief Minister's position 
canxKjt be called illegal or unconsti-
tutional simply because his party does 
not enjoy a majority in the House all 
by itself. That a majority governcaeot 
can function with the support of other 
parties is clear from the case of the 
present central goverranent headed by 
itself. That a majority government can 
function with the support of other 
parties is clear from the case of the 
present central government headed by 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi. The case of a 
purely PSP ministry led by Mr. Thanu 
Pillai, which functioned for a consi* 
oerable time in Kerala supported from 
outside as it was by Congress which 
constituted the majority is well known 
to constitutional history in our country. 
"There have been many minority 
governments in England also both in 
19th and 2oth centuries which functioned 
for years and years together. Whether 
a government a minority govern-
ment or is later reduced to a minority is 
immaterial. Ovir legislative Assembly is 
already udder summons and it is on the 
floor of the house as you yourself and 
others have said to many times that claim 
of majority and minority can and should 
be tested. 
*One of the guidelines which was 
unanimously framed by the Presiding Offi-
cers Conference in April 1968 and upon 
which you took a stand when the minority 
government of C.B, Gupta was functioning 
in the State* ran as follows* "The ques-
tion whether the Chief Minister has lost 
the confidence ot the assembly shall at 
all time be tested in the assembly." 
Governor Dharam Vira of West Bengal had 
dismissed the Chief Minister Ajoy Hookerjee 
for evading the legislature; here in case 
I fail to resign you propose to dismiss me 
while the assembly is scheduled to meet on 
8X 
Octofcrer 6th which is hardly a weeK 
avay. A monstrous situation indeed, 
the Governor askiny the Chief Minister 
to resign the government that he is in 
minority, and yet not allowing him to 
prove his majority on the floor of the 
house. I may tell you# I am prepared 
to face the assembly even earlier/ say, 
on September 30th or Octol^er 1st, only 
if you summon it as you can under rule 
4(2) of the Rules of i^siness of the 
Assembly. 
"In exactly a similar case, viz., 
when the Jana Sangh liad withdrawn itself 
from Akali Dal coalition government in 
Punjab recently, thus reducing it to a 
minority and demanded the removal of the 
Chief Minister. The Governor instead of 
calling upon the Chief Minii>ter to resign 
asked for the sommon^ng of the assembly. 
"You had sought the opinion of the 
Attorney General on September i5th,1970. 
A day after, however, viz., on September 
26th, 1970 the Jana Sangh the Swatantra 
and the Congress(O) sent y^u their letters 
of unqualified support to the government. 
According to the papers in Speaker's 
secretariat, their support amounts to 
a figure between 235 and 240. I may add, 
however, as I told you in ny previous 
letter that acceptance of my advice 
regarding removal of certain minister did 
not turn on whether I commanded a majority 
or minority in the house at the time. A« 
Jennings, a n eminent authority on cons-
titutional law )»ad pointed out, a minister 
can and ought to be removed on the advice 
of the Prime Minxster although the minister 
may enjoy majority in the House of Commons. 
For in the case, the Prime Minister could 
be thrown out by an adverse vote of the 
House, but in as much as the minister was 
appointed on the advice of the Prime 
Minister, he has to go out in any case if 
the Prime Minister so desires. Yet ano-
ther point, the Attorney General 's opinion 
is presumably bosed on the assuaqption that 
the present government began or came into 
being as coalition minxstiry whereas in 
fact it was started on February 17th as 
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a purely BIOD ministry # of course with 
Congress(R) support, A coalition 
government vas actually formed two 
months later* viz.# on April 9. The 
only chanye that has occured since .Is 
that the position of Congress (R) has 
taken up by the other parties, viz.# 
the Jana Sangh the Swatantra and the 
Congress (0) . 
"... I hope to be forgiven if 
I say that the Governor who has written 
this morning a letter to me appears to 
be a different peraon from the one whoia 
X saw on September 24th who seemed to 
be convinced of the propriety of my 
stand and wanted to consult the legal 
rememberancer simply for formality's 
sake as also from the Governor who told 
leaders of Jana Sangh and Congress (0) on 
September 26th that their support to the 
present government had materially changed 
the situation. Even after accepting my 
resignation or difi^issii^ n^ as you please 
you will obviously have a government in 
order that the business of the House is 
transacted on October 6th and the following 
days. Vihat is the method which you want 
to a<topt in order to choose a leader of 
government in my place? Ostensibly either 
by asking all the members of the asseirtbly 
to appear before you in order to express 
their wishes in this regard ot taking an 
adhoc decision without reference to any 
principle. 
"May I enquire whether any of 
these courses will be proper or consti-
tutional? Is this how we propose to 
preserve detrocracy in our country? You 
must have made up your mind either way 
by now. I hope you would not mind dis--
closing it to me. You have said that the 
correct etage of evaluating the quantum 
of my suppoirt will arrive when the ques-
tion of formation of new government comts 
up after my resignation. May I «n<^ulre 
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why it can not be gone into today? 
Should it be necessary for roe first 
to resign or to get dismissed before 
you can go into the quantum of ray 
support? If that is your stand* may 
I respectfully enquire raison d'etre 
behind it? Cannot a Chief Minister 
ch-n^e partners? If not, may I know 
v.here the prohibition is contained* 
in which Article of the constitution 
please? Is there a convention to this 
effect in any of the parliamentary 
democracies oi. the world? If so# where? 
After I have heard from you« I will let 
you know ray final reply. 1 
On September 3o,1970 Charan aingh cabled to the President 
of India V. V. Giri who was in Rusaia, requesting ham not to sign 
any order for President*s Rule in u.p, till his return to India. 
"Constitutioml propriety and natural justice require that you 
should be fully infoirroed and hear the other side before reaching 
any conclusion," Charan Singh said in his cable. 
Charan Singh told some newspaper reporters that "the 
Supreme Court in a judgement had emphasised that the President 
Must personally satisfy hiioCelf about a situation before issuing 
orders." The BKD ano the opposition parties had planned a 
legislators' march to Raj Bhawan to protest against the denial 
of an opportunity to run the adminxatration. A Coordination 
Committee formed by the Coi^ress(O) , Jana Sangh, skp, Swatantra 
« 
1* Thf atatftflnjan. New Delhi, Siept 30,1970 
2. * Oct 1,1970 
84 
and the BKD decided that MlAs belonging to these parties shoiild 
parade themselves before the Governor in prote£»t againat his 
recoininendotion for President's Rule in the State* as well as 
to show their strength. The Committee in a resolution alleged 
that "the Governor had acted in a partisan spirit so that the 
Assembly could be dissolved end the Congress(R) policy of holding 
a fresh election furthered*' 
In Hew Delhi the SSP leader Limaye demanded removal of 
the tJ»P. Governor B. Gopala Rejtdy **for his partisan conduct 
in the State constitutional crisis. No Governor or President 
can usurp the powers of legislature or remove a government or 
give it confidence." But he reiterated his party's 'hatred' for 
2 
Charan Singh's politics. The Jana Sangh leader Nanaji Deshmukh 
described the Goi&ernor's action as "a murder of the constitution 
and rape of democracy. We shall fight such dictatorial methods 3 of Mrs. Gandhi with all the power at our conHandi" he added. 
In Bombay the Swatantra Party General Secretary R.C. Koopers 
charged Mrs. Gandhi's government with "resorting to devious 
means to seek power in U.P." He said that "loss of the State 
to CongressCR) would be a shattering blow to Mrs, Gahdhi's pres-
tige and plans. 
1» The Statesman, New Delhi, Oct 1,1970 
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K.K. Bhattacharya, Vice-President of the AHahabad High 
Court Bar Association and a constitutional lav/yer said in 
Allahabad that in his opinion the Governor could not ask the 
Chief Minister to resign or to dismiss hiro in the present cir-
cumstances.^ The Convenor of the Punjab PPCC(O) Mohanlal 
accused the Governor of being a tool in the hands of the 
2 
centre. Karpoori Thakur, Chairman of Hbp saidt "The Governor 
has nakedly and unaahamedly acted in the interest of the Prime 
Minister." 
Governor B, Gopala Refidy asked Charan ^ngh to resign by 
the evening of September 28,1970 and President V.V. Giri signed 
a proclamation taking over the administration of U.P. and suspen-
ded the State Assembly on October 1#1970. 
A day before the proclamation of emergency in Uttar Pradesh, 
on September 30,1970, the principal opposition parties, the 
Congress (O), Jana Sangh, Swatantra and BKD asked for an emergency 
session of Parliament to review the political developments in 
U.P., to move a motion of no confidence against the government if 
1« Th« Stateapi^n. New Delhi, Oct 1,1970 
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such a session materialised. They also sent a cable to V.V, 
Giri in Kiev (USSR) stating that the u.p. Governor could have 
tested the strength of Charan Singh's goveriMoent on the floor 
of the Assembly which was due to meet shortly! 
The statement addedi "It was significant that the same 
Goverrwr only che day before approved of t w ordinances recommen-
ded by the Chief Minister and in fact accepted the Chief Minister's 
advice to divest 13 Ministers of their portfolios. The Chief 
Minister claimed that he enjoyed itsajority in the Assembly as 
before. The Congress(0) Jana Sangh and bwatantra had officially 
extended their support to his government in such a situation." 
The statement said that "If inspite of all known facts the U.P, 
government and the X^egislative Assembly were suspended for 
whatsoever period/ the people of the State had no forum of 
redress. It then becom s necessary to call an emergency session 
of Parliament." 
Two Congress<0) leaders M.S. Grupnada Swamy and Nawal 
Kishore called for observence of October 2,1970 as "save the 
constitution and save democracy day."^ 
The Governor in his report of a constitutioiJil breakdown 
in the state had asked only for the Assembly suspension presumably 
anticipating the possibility of an alternative government being 
1. y^e Statesman, New Delhi, Oct 1,1970 
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formed. According to constitutional procedure the President's 
rule would come into force after a notification from the Home 
Ministry, It was the first time that the President had signed 
an order in a foreign country inposina President's rule in a 
state. U.P, had gone under the President rule for the second 
time since 1967. 
On the same day in Lucknow Chart^n iiingh said that 
Mrs. Gandhi "had tried to draw him out ot U.P. Politics by 
offering him on July 3,1970 the Home Portfolio at the Centre.^ 
He had not found the offer attractive because "the Home Minis-
tership had been dov/ngraded after the June 27,1970 reshuffle 
and departments such as the CBI, end relation with States were 
taken out of its purview." 
Charan Singh further said that the imposition of President's 
rule in the state w^ -s "a denial ol the right of the Assembly to 
determine not only the queation of majority but also of stability." 
He fvirther saidt 
"If the Congress(R) could not attain 
a majority all constitutional process 
would be suspended in U.P. ^ i s had 
happened but it would be v»rth while 
to recall how the Congress(R) had 
shifted its ground. At first my remo-
val was sought because it was alleged 
1. yh? New Delhi, Oct 1,1970 
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that I ha«3 lost majority, Then 
it was contended that the majority 
in the Council of Ministers wanted 
ray removal. Later it was argued 
that I should have been dii>missed 
because I had refused to renign 
when I was asked to oo so by the 
Governor. When I had asked for the 
removal certain ministers consequent 
on their own and their leadership's 
atten^t to wean members of BKD, the 
Assembly v^ aa due to meet only about 
10 days ahead. M s o it became mani-
fest thut despite the withdrawal of 
Congress(R) support the government 
continued to enjoy a majority in the 
House. 
"So tar as the majority in the 
council of Ministers wanting my removal 
is concerned* it was not due to ai^ 
friction in the working ot the council/ 
but because of external pressure 
following the withdrawal of Congress(R) 
from the coalition. In fact once its 
leadership had decided upon withdrawal 
which it was proc.laiming from the House 
tops for weeks past. It is the Congress(R) 
ministers who should have resigned £ar 
before I had to a&k for their removal. 
I had not refused to comply with the 
Governor's letter asking me to resign. 
I had sought only some clarifications 
vital to the functioning of represen-
tative woverximent and promised to reply 
to the governor after receipt o± his 
clarification." 1 
.lU^ Nev Delhi, Oct 1,1970 
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Following were the major decieionu taken by the BKD 
Go/ernroent which was in power tor only seven months 
(Feb 17 - Sep 28,1970) 
a. Takeover of Saqor Mll^lai On Feb 21,1970 the BKD Government 
in U.P. had decided to take over the Suc^ ar Incustries and to 
set up a Committee to suygest the form and procedure for 
doing it* Chief Minxster Charan Singh who announced the deci-
sion at a press conference after the Cabinet meeting, did 
not make it clear whether it would mean nationalization, coope-
rativisation or some other form of social control. He said 
that the committee headed by the Irrigation Minister Virendra 
Verma would suggest how compensation would be paid to the owners 
and in what form ohares wrauld be given to the larroers. 
"A law should be enacted empoweing the State government 
to acquire sugar mills by the payit.ent of bonds but after this# 
the government should transfer the Units gradually to cane 
growers by selling out the shares to them but by deducting the 
money from their cane juice price," said Charan Singh. The 
government had also parsed a resolution protestinw against the 
Centre's failure t,o increase the mininium statutoi y price of cane 
and demanded that it should be raised to Rs. 10 per quintal with 
immediate effect. As recommended by the Indian Suyor Cane 
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Development Conanittee* this vas necessary to ensure the growers 
a faix return troin the cultiv.-tion of wu^ar cane, and also to 
put an end to the constant cycle of fluctuation in production. 
The resolution saidt "During the last bhree years there had 
been a considerable increase in the cost of cultivation of sugar 
cane. The cost of major agricultural ii^uts like fertilisers, 
irrigation and labour had increased substantially. The present 
prices being paid to cultivators by sugar factories as con:5)ared 
with other crops did not provide an adequate retiirn to the 
was 
grower and/likely to lead to the reduction of the area under 
cane, thereby jeopardising the iiu^ar industry." 
p. Curb on Gurh I»ift;e^  i Another important decision by the 
Cabinet to brina relief to the farmers was to lift all the 
restrictions on the movement of Burh from the State. So far 
only edible Gurh was allowed to be exported. Now the other 
typ« used for the nenufacture of alcohol was also permitted to 
be exported. 
c. Purchase of Wheat* The State government took another 
ia^portant decision to purchase 3 lakh tonnes of wheat during 
the fourth rabi crop Reason in conformity with its policy of 
not to allow the prices to fall considerably to the prejudice 
of the cultivators. 
9% 
A. Law Corotnisslon for the States To recominena measures to 
reform procedural law and to expedite justice* the BKD government 
had also decided to set up a Lav Cocranls&ion under the Chairmanship 
of J.K» Tandon, a retired High Court Judge, 
Elections to Zila Parishadfft The issue of electiona to S&ila 
Parishads was also considered where elections had not been 
held for as long as 8 or 9 years where office bearers had been 
nominated or their term extended* 
f, Decision on Land Ceiling of 3o Acres* On February 23,1970 
the EKJ3 §overnjtnent took a najor decision involving land ceiling 
limit to 3o acres per family v?ithdrawing the much abused 
exemption granted to fruit gorwers and cooperative farmers-
The fruit growers and cooperatives could posses a© much land as 
they could without limit* The limit however wos 45 acres for 
Bundelkhand# the Tarai and the Kalarour range in Mirzsapur district. 
By doing this the government wanted to release several Lakhs 
of acres o± land for distribution to the landless. Earlier 
the ceiling limit was 40 acres I^r a family of five with the 
provision that there could be an addition of 8 ocres with each 
additional unit subject to an overall maximum of 64 acres. Now 
the terra 'family' had been redefined to include an adult, his 
spouse and minor children with no number fixed, but the ceiling 
limit would remain 30 acres whatever may be the size of the unit. 
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In Bundelkhand, Tarai and KaAamur range the limit 
hitherto was 80 acres with a tnaximuin of 12b 9iith additional 
unit. Mow the uniform limit in these areas was to be 45 acres* 
Earlier the growers ano cooperative farms had no limit. But 
now the limit of 3o acres would apply to growers also. While 
in the case of cooperative farms, the total permissible area 
would be calculated on the basis of 3o acres for each member the 
remaining would have to be surrendered. It was pointed out 
that making use of these concessioi.s influential people built 
farms and acquired thousand of acres with fake entries. So far 
educational institutions were also exempted from the Selling 
Act. Now there was no limit for universities and postgraduate 
agricultural colleges. But for Degree and Intermediate Colleges 
there was a restriction of 60 acres. 
Of proprietary riuhts to the tenantst Another in^ortant deci-
sion taken by the BKD Government v.as with regard to the transfer 
of proprietary rights of the house sights in urban areas to 
tenants so that they might become owners of land also and not 
merely the building material of the house built on such land. 
This was esqpected to being relief to lakhs of poor people living 
in the suburban areas who had to get their land lease renewed 
with ever increasing rent. 
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Land Revenue Concessions* The BKD Government on February 
25,1970 had decided to exempt land holdings upt© 3.125 acres 
only from land revenue. The former government had exempted 
land holding upto 6.26 acres from land revenue through an 
C I S 
ordinance. It was said that the de<t<tAion would come into force 
from July 1970. While anxiouncing the new decision Charan 
Singh said that the benefit ox exemption from revenue would be 
available to holding upto 12.5 acres. But after cabinet meeting 
he declared that the question of 12.5 acres has been recon-
sidered and studied in all its implications/ and that a decision 
would be taken later. The decision exempting 3.12t acres from 
land revenue would cost the State Exchequer a loss of Rs. 7 crores 
per year as against Rs. 11 cxores entailed in Gupta's ordinance. 
The exemption was meant to benefit roughly half the land 
holders in the State. 
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/V3J,j.aflCfi Qt four Fart tea 
While the Congress(R) General Secretary H.N, Bahuguna 
said on October 2,1970 that his party would certainly form a 
ministry in U.P., four other parties* Congress(O) , Jana Sai.gh, 
Swatantra and BKD got together to form a United Front and 
agitated for the early convening ot the U.P. Assembly, These 
parties were not talking to form a ministry in U.P. but# 
* 
"were mobilizing lorces to demonstrate that the action taken 
to prevent Charan Singh proving his majority on the floor of 
the House and promulgation of Presicent's rule in the State 
were i:^ oth unconstitutional and morally wrong," 
The four party alliance failed to agree on their joint 
leadership, while the Congress(R) asked the Governor to invite 
it to form a government "obviously to present a fait accompli 
to Parliament when it had to meet on Novecd»er 9,1970," 
On October 7»1970 Charan Singh withdrew the contest for 
the leadership of the revived SVD in U.P, He iasued the following 
statements 
"It is being propagated in 
certain quarters, that the SVD has not 
come into friction because of nor 
insistence on being elected as its 
leader. This is not entirely correct, 
I have expressed it as my desire to 
friends ot the BKD more than once that 
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they should allow me to retire. 
But they would not, X made a last 
atteu^t today and fortunately they 
have ayreed to ray propo-al though 
much against their better judgement, 
* "This is just to declare to 
the people that I am no longer a 
candidate for leadership of the 
proposed SVD and viould extend whole-
hearted support to my friend whom 
the Parties opposed to the Priroe 
Minister may elect to this office of ' 
^re^ t responsibility. It should be 
the aim of all those who are concerned 
v/ith the future of the country, to 
ensure that the conspiracy of Prime 
Minister to become a dictator or 
handover the country to communism is 
defeated and democracy saved. She 
split her organization into two parts 
for the sake of her personal power. 
She has now decided to subvert the 
constitution itself to that end," 1 
Legislators belonging to the Conyress(O), BKD, Jana 
Sangh, Sbp and the Swatantra and some independents failed to 
arrive at a decision on the leadership issue of the proposed 
SVD at a joint meeting. The matter then was referred to the 
national leadership of the Parties. 
Welding themselves into a new Samyukta Vidhayak IDal, 
the five U.P. Parties chose T.N. Singh, a Congress(0) member 
of Rajya Sabha, as cheir leader soon after they staked a claim 
1* The Statesman, N«w Delhi, Oct 8,1970 
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to form a Ministry in the State on tlie support of 250 roerobers 
in a House of 426, The deputy leadership v«as expected to g© 
to the BKD. The Governor was immediately informed and asked 
to invite Singh to form a popular Ministry. E^he 8KD was 
asked to nominate one of its tnerabers as deputy leader who 
be 
would [the deputy Cj^ ief Minister if the svp government was 
formed. 
Kamlapati Tripathi submitted a men© to the Governor on 
October 14#1970 v/hich said that duly formed SVD of U#P. was 
"neither a recognized party in the Assembly nor was it kiKJwn 
to be functioning outside the House." He ©aid that his party 
could provide a stable and progressive government in the State. 1 
The leaders of eight opposition parties - BKD, SSp, 
Swatantra, Congress(O) , Jana Sangh* CPI(M) , Soshit Dal and 
Vishal Haryana had decided to meet the President and to ask 
hiro to urge the Governor to invite T.N. Sin^h to form the 
government in U.P, The U.P, Congress(R) leaders Kamlapati 
Tripathi and H.N. Bahugutta also asserted the claim of their 
party to form the government in U.P. The delay in callir^ 
upon T.N. Singly to form the government and delay in submitting 
his report to the President had added doubt and suspense in the 
minds of the opposition parties. 
T^e Statesman. Z^ ew Delhi. Oct 12,1970 
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Th« SVD leader T.ISl, Sin^h v«as svorn in as Chief Minister 
on October 18,1970.^ Girdhari I^ el Conyress(O) and Virendra 
Venna (BKD) were administered the oath of office as Cabinet 
Minister® by the Governor. Initially it vas a three member 
Cabinet. 
The total strength of the T,K. Singh Ministry was 
expected to be 33 (24 Ministers of cabinet rank and 9 junior 
Ministers) . The BKD and Congress (0) were supposed to have 
eight members of the Cabinet rank* Jana Sangh four* SSp three, 
Sv®tantra one# and the junior Ministers were to be moie or less 
in the saw® proportion. The Congress(O) quota included the 
Chief Minister. 
The constituents of the SVD had agreed that the Chief 
Minister T.N. Siiigh (C-o) would exchange veiws with their 
representatives later and also finalise proper shape of the 
Coordination Coiranittee for the purpose of such deliberations. 
Charan Singh told later on that in a meeting of SVD leaders 
it was decided that the Chief Minister would call leaders of 
the SVD constituents for consultations whenever found necessary. 
In the mid-term poll to the Lok Sabha in 197X, the 
BKD contested 67 seats in U.p. but won only one although the 
total percentage of valid votes it obtained there worked out 
1. Tha Tintes o^ In^ia, New Delhi, Oct 19,1970 
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to 12,7 percent i.e. next to the Congress<R). In other 
States the BKP contested 33 seats but won no seat. 
Soon after the Mid Term Poli to the Lok Sabha, the 
U.P. Chief Minister* T.K. Singh declared that he would quit 
on March 18. He said that he would be placing his resigna^ 
tion before the SVD General Body on March 16,1971 and ask 
it to elect a r^w leader.^ He also infonaed the BKD Chairman, 
Charan Singh, The SVD General Body rejected the resignation 
of T.N. Singh the same day and asked him to continue as the 
leader. 
3. Defections in SVD Gpyeynment and its Collapse 
In a surprise move many BKD mlAs defected from the 
Party and joined the Congress (K) . The first defection was 
made on March 17,1971 when P.P. Bora, MIA and Secretary of 
the S-cate BKD and Party Whip in the Assembly decided to join 
the Congress(N), He said that "the SVD government had bred 
instability and failed to deliver the goods and that is why 
the people had voted for Mrs. Indira Gandhi." 14 In<^endent 
M^Jia who had left the BKD a tew months ago also joined the 
2 
Congress (N), Tej Bahadur Ganjwar and Sattar Ahmad (both 
BKD) left their party on M^rch 22^971. They said that they 
did so because of differences with their party leader Charan 
Singh,^ 
1. ^ t 'Simti^ New Delhi, March 16,1971 
2. Ib^d.. March 18,1971 
3. Ibi^.. March 28,1971 
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With over a aozen more SVD numbers Including tvo 
Ca&inet Ministers and two Deputy Ministers defecting to 
Congress(N) the T.K, Singh Ministry lost its majority in 
U.P, 
The Congress(N) with 2l2 members urged the Governor 
to dissolve the SVD Ministry. The Congress(N) could count 
among its allies CPI-4, CPM-l,pi>P~3,Rebpublican-l and 
Muslim Majlis-1* The opposition could thus muster an ofti-
cial strength of 222 in an effective House of 416 members. 
It also claimed the support of the independents and t'wo 
sap rebels. The five partie-s constituting the svD had a 
total strength of 189, the break up beings CoT^ress(O)-64, 
BKD-.61, Jana Sangh-41, and S§P-19,^ 
Cp^aressCK) Government in U.P. and 1974 General Elections 
The five and a half months old SVD government headed 
by T.N. Sinyh which was sworn in on October 18,1970 came to 
an end on April 3,1971. Following the defections on larger 
scale anc fall of the government, the Governor B. Gopala Reddy 
inmediately invited the Congress(U) leader Kamlapati Tripathi 
2 to form a Ministry. Kamlapati Tripathi was sworn in as the 
1. T^e Hindustan Times. New Delhi, March 28,1971 
2* lipid.. March 31,1971 
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Chief Minister of U*P. on the earoe day. 
Tb© Governc^nt headed by Ksrolapati Tripathi lasted 
till the General Elections of March 1974 where the Congress 
was returned to power with a majority of 213 seats in the 
425 meniiber Assembly* The Partywise position wasi^ 
Party Seats contested Seats won 
Congress 403 213 
ConyressCO) 388 lO 
Jana ^ngh 401 61 
BKD 396 106 
SP 226 5 
CPI 40 16 
CPI(M) 36 2 
Muslijon League 51 I 
Swatantra 211 X 
liTa 63 mt 
Others 308 2 
Independents 116 5 
I. yh^ Hin<^stan Times. New Delhi, Murch 2,1974 
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On March 5,1974 after the General Elections an eleven 
member Cabinet headed by the Chief Minister H.N* Bahuguna was 
installed in u.p,^ The Governor Akbar Ali Khan administered 
the oath of oxfice ana secrecy to the new Ministers. 
Within 24 hours of its installation the Cabinet was 
expanded to include A,R. Jaiswal as Cabinet Minister and A,C, 
Grice was renominated as the member of the U.P. Aasembly to 
represent the Anglo Indian comuiunity, 
Charan Singh accused the Congress of resorting to "illegal 
and dishonest practices in secruring their election victory." In 
a statement he charged some civil servants of having done 
2 active work for the success of the Congress ageinst law and rules. 
The triple alliance consisting or the BKD, and 
Muslim Majlis had urged the Governor "not to recognize Bahuguna's 
illegal Government nor deliver his address as prepared by it 
to the joint session oi the St»^te Legislature on March 2,1974." 
The BKD had also accused the Government of "repression 
following the arrest ot thousands of Party v-orkers on false 
charges,** It further alleged cnat some BKD men had even been 
3 murdered. 
1. Tn^ lUPte^^n Wew Delhi, M«rch 6,1974 
2* Ibid., March 13,1974 
3* Ibid.* M^rch 17,1974 
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The first split in the BKD occured v«hen its National 
Executive by a majority vote, expelled its Chairman Charan S-ingh 
from the Party and elected the Party's treasurer M.iS. Oberoi 
as the new Chairman on July 23,1974, In a surprise move, seven 
of the twelve National Executive members of the Party met in 
Delhi on 23rd July 1974 resolved againt>t the merger of the party 
with 6 other opposition parties and unanimously expelled Charan 
Singht It was alleged ttet fi he had not consulted the National 
Executive before announcing the Party's merger with <>ther 
opposition parties. 
On July 26,1974 the BKD Parliamentary group expelled the 
party's newly elected Chairman and party's erstwhile treasurer, 
hotel magnate M.S. Oberoi on the charges of hie anti party 
activities. 
Charan Singh had maxntained that he continued bo be the 
elected Chairman of the Party and aoserted that the group of 
executive member^ nominated by him had no ric^ht to oust him from 
the Chairmani^hip. 
The BKD State Executive* unoer the Chairmanship of Charan 
aingh* terminated the primary memberbhlp of porty MLAs who in 
a joint statement declared that "they have shifted the area of 
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their operatioia to Delhi under the direct patronage of Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi." The Executive also terminated the 
Primary membership of Jai Ratn Verma, State Chairman of the 
BKD rival faction and Prithvi ^^ ath Sethi, Primary membership 
of iahyam Lai Yaoav* ^ainul Basher and Balwant v^ as also termi-
nated by the Executive. After these expulsions the BKD strength 
in the Asseiiibly had been reduced from lo7 to 101. 
On July 20,1974 Qiaran Singh had declared that with the 
coalition of seven opposition parties namely BKD (Cha an Sdngh 
group)/ Swatantra Party (Piloo Modi group), Lok Tantra Kisan 
Dal (a group broken from Jana Sangh)t Utkal Congress (Orissa)* 
Kiaan Mazdoor Party (Haryana) and Khetra 2araindar Sabha of 
Punjab, he was forming a new political party, the Bhartiya Lok 
Dal (BLD) A resolution in this regard Vras passed on August 
29,1974 by the coalition of opposition parties and on the same 
day Charan aincjh had declared the formation of the new political 
party. Charan Singh was unanimously elected as Chairman of the 
BLD.^ 
This newly formed Poli\:ical Party claimed to be the 
national opposition and to be an alternative to the Congress. 
1. The Hinduscan Tiroes. New Delhi, July 21,1974 
2. int, New Delhi, Aug 30,1974 
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fit iKtegqengY .t^ .n-^ i^ Mggff.B, mYSfi^M 
A Non-Congress aVD (Saroyukta Vidhayak Dal) Government 
was formed in U.P, in 1967. This vras the first success BChieve<5t 
by these Parties in capturing political power in the State 
providing an alternate to the monolith Congress, These yovern-
ments formed from time to time were founded on a negative basis# 
namely non-Congressisro. A common agreed programme had» no 
doubt# been chalked out# but soon after the formation of these 
governments, the inner contradictions among the Vorio^s consti-
tuents began to surface as a result of which none of these 
governments could last for more than two years at a time, in 
the absence of a common ideology/ these SVD governments were bound 
to meet this fate* 
The constituents of these governments included the 
Communist party on the extreme and Jana Sangh on the other. It 
was clearly an agreement baaed on political expediency. During 
this period, no atten^t to forge a united non-conyress party 
as a national alternative could succeed. The relations among 
them became very strained and there were allegations and 
counter alley<-tions. The SSP ano its leader Raj Narain accused 
Charan Singh of violating all agreements. Although later on 
they were to join hands with him in i.he formation of Bhartiya 
Lok Dal and Jar»ta Party* These allegations were o- very 
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serious nature. Charan Singh \.as accused even of accepting 
iDoney from the incustrialists and of its misuse* 
on April 1#1967 Charan Siriyh left the Congress and was 
elected leader of SVD*^ In a letter to Srnt. Indira Gandhi, 
he explained his reasons for leaving the party. In September* 
1968, Charan Sin^h formed the Bhartiya Kranti Dal. It was a 
party which tried to project an alternative to both capitalism 
and socialism. The alternative was to be within the broad 
framework of Gandhian thought. The basic principles were 
enunciated in a brochure "Aims and Principles of Bharatiya 
Kranti Dal" published in amended form in IS'73. 
It vas declared in 11 articles that "the BkD does not 
believe either in a system known as capitalism under which 
individuals enjoy unrestricted freedom to exploit the economic 
needs of others or in a system known as socialism or communism, 
under viiich the state possesses an unlimited power to curb 
or take away the economic freedom of entire people. The BKD 
believe- in the middle Gandhxan path, an economy based over-
whelmingly on self en^loyrot.nt. It believed in a system of 
private property where exploitation is reduced to minimum, if 
not eliminated altogether. In BKD's view democracy is found 
1. Dutt Braham, Five Headed Itonster. Surge Publications, 
New Delhi, 1978, p.X 
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upon the ovmership of property. Indeed a wide dispersion of 
property is the only assurance that democracy is safe. There 
can be no democracy in a system where only few individuals at 
the top# i.e. the ruler© or polit-icans own or control everything, 
where political and economic pov^ers are veisted in the same 
hands," 
The most important factor which marked off the BKD from 
other political parties was its view about the method of 
political agitations. It v-as the most significant contribution 
of Charan Singh to the political methodology of those days, 
unfortunately this was diluted later where BKD dissolved itself 
to take the form of BLD and still further when it went to form 
the Janata Party. This change was due to the influence of 
SSP a group which gave top priority to policical agitations 
of a different sort. 
The articles of BKE> (publish, d) stated* "The BKD stands 
for the preservation and strengthening of democracy and of the 
rule of law in the country and will iKJt tolerate anything that 
injures it. It does not believe in such political agitations 
and propagandas <us designed to promote breach of law. Such 
methods are bound to foster disrespect for law in the minds of 
patople and eventually pave the way for dictatorship." In fact 
the last sentence proved to be prophetic when in 1975 such 
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methods were a<3opted# and led to the kind of events which cul-
minated in the declaration of emergency. It yoes to the credit 
of Charan £»ingh that he maintained this view in the subsequent 
years also. Altitough, to accoinrnodate various policical groups 
he Irad to drop this from the declared policy of the new 
organization which he formed or of which he waa the main archi-
tech. Had he insisted on his methodology and were he to succeed 
in bringing roxjnd others to accept it^ the history of India would 
have been different and events which took place would not have 
taken place at all. 
The ELD had not joined the J*P Movement as it wanted to 
keep its identity oi a Parliamentary opposition party. The 
BLD National Executive, which met xn June 1975, decided not 
to join the <J.P. Movement but en^jhasiaed the need of Uniting 
the opposition parties and challenging the ruling the ruling 
party (the Conyress(3S)) to hold elections. It was felt that 
this course would enable the democratic opposition to captxire 
pow«r at che centre and xn the States also.^ 
On June 21,22 and 23,i97b just 3 days before the 
declaration of Emergency, the "Working Committee of the BLD, 
2 Congress(0) , Jana Sangh and Socialist Party met jointly. 
1. Brahm Dutt, On.cit., p.10 
2. msu 
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Charan Singh made a strong plea for forming a new party and 
dissolving the old ones. He said that this was the only 
course open. Morarji Desai* who had presided over the meeting, 
disagreed. He was in favour of Gujarat type Morcha. He 
claimed that the tforcha experiment had been successful in 
Gujarat could succeed elsewhere also. The Jana Sangh leaders 
were reluctant to dissolve their party but were ready to join 
a federal structure. 
The Socialist Party President George Fernandes was 
against any party merger. He pleaded that political parties 
are formed on the basis oi ideologies and the ideologies can 
not merge. He waa all for a United Struggle. The meeting 
ended without reaching an agreement. This v^-as the greatest 
tragedy that could happen to a country. Had the ©reposition 
parties agreed to form a joint front to challenge the ruling 
party to hold elections, txiings would have been different. 
Electoral ctoa lenc,e would not have resulted in the type of 
confrontation that developed. Instead o- adopting this course 
on the 2b June, 1975 a San^^harsh Saroiti was formed to launch 
a struggle for he removal ot trie Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi. 
Charan Singh did not, attend any meeting ot the opposition leaders 
after the 2nd June 197b. On June 25,1975 Jayaprakash Narain, 
Morarji Desai, Nanaji Deshmukh, Asoka Mehta and others came to 
the U.P. Niwas in Delhi where Charan Singh was staying. Th« 
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announcement for the formation of Sangharsh Samiti and launching 
a satyagraha at New Delhi was made* although, the satyagraha 
was of a very limited mture. Some ot them* particularly 
Nanaji Deshmukh and Raj Narain were of the view that the scope 
of strut,gle could be widened -nd it could take the shape of a 
national struggle to oust the Prime Minister. Deshraukh said 
that 10 Lakh RSS Swayansewaks were ready to join the struggle. 
The rallies were held in the third week of June 1975.^ 
Here a fact may be mentioned that after che failure of 
joint meeting ox the different working committees to agree on 
the formation of party, some hhD leaders, particularly Piloo 
Modi, proposed on June 23,1975 that the SLD should merge into 
Congress(O) . arahma Dutt, Lok EeH MLC of U.P., had gone to 
Lucknow to bring certain papers for Charan aingh. When he 
returned Charan Singh told him about this proposal. Brahma 
Dutt was not happy about it. It v.as felt by all BLD leaders 
tliat no useful purpose would be served by their joining the 
Congress(0). It was decided to call a meeting of the National 
Executive of tlie BLD to consider this proposal. This meeting 
could not be held as the leaders were arrested on June 26,197&. 
The propoi>al to join the Congress (0) was again discussed by the 
BLD in 1976, but it was not acceptable to the majority. 
1. Brahra Dutt, Op cit., p.12 
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Jf, thfi , Moygmgi^tg 
During the months April to August/ 1974 attempts to form 
a democratic opposition to the ruling party were continued. 
Talks were held with uhe leaders of the Coi^ressCO), Jana iiangh/ 
D.M.K, and others. These attempts met with a partial success 
and resulted in the formation of the Bharatiya Lok Dal. The 
B«Ij,D. was inaugrated on August 29,1974.^ On August 25 just 
3 days before the decision of BKD to take the form of BLD* 
Jaya Prakash Narayan visited Lxicknow, He inaugrated a Youth 
and Students Conference. Charan Singh, Raj Karain, C.B. Gupta 
and Nanaji Deshraukh met him. CTaya Prakash advised them to 
unite and lead the youth and students in a n»veraent. He told 
them that there was a lot of enthusiasm in the young men and 
if all the leaders rose above party politics, success could 
be achieved.^ 
On August 18 and 19, 1974 the Congress (O) decided to 
launch a movement against corruption and the rising prices in 
The Congress(0) also considered the formation of the BLD. 
The Congress(O) leaders were of the view that if the BLD makes 
satisfactory progress the Congress<0) should consider to join 
it* but there was no unanimity about cooperating with other 
sac — 
1, Brahm Dutt, Op.cit.. p.12 
m ^ 
I l l 
opposition parties, 
on October 12,1974 Charan Sinc^h said at Kai^ur that 
the BLD supports the J.P. Movement in Bihar, but tor the pre&ent 
the BLD will yive top priority to the orssanization,^ He wa» 
not for joining or starting a Bihar type movement in U.P, On 
October 13,1974, the Executive Committee of the U.P. BLD met 
at Lucknow. It clecided to hold demonstrations on the 
December b,1974 against the rising prices# unemploymeht and 
famine conditions in U.P, Raj Warain wanted the BliD to join 
the stru^yle of total revolution. He appealed to all opposi-
tion parties to join the BLD, but neither the opposition parties 
nor BLD itself \.as influenced by his views. Raj Narain issued 
an 11-point charter ot demands drafted by him. The demands 
2 were* 
Ci) All political, economic and moral corruption 
shojld endi 
(ii) Unemployed people should be ^iven eiiployment or 
allowance; 
Ciii) Essential commodities should oe available at 
cheaper ratesy 
(iv) The price of sugarcane should be li^. 2o per quintal 
and the price ot suc^ar should not exceed tte. 300/-
per quintal» 
(v) The price of paddy to be paid to the farmer should 
not be les£» than fs. loO/- per quintal. There should 
1. firahro Dutt, Op.^^-t., p.12 
2. T^e Times of Iqdia. New Delhi, Oct 14,1974 
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be a Juat balance In the prices of the 
agricultural produci.£> and the yoods manufac-
tured by factoriesI 
(vi) Enhanced rate of land revenue and electricity 
should be withdrawn; 
(vii) The ordimnce about the electoral es^penses should 
be v/ithdrawn; 
(vlii) All the adults attaining the age of 18 years 
should be given riyht to votei 
<lx) £ducatJon« medicine# manure and water should be 
inexpensive; 
(x) The Educational ard electoral system should be 
completely changed? and 
(xl) There slKjuld be no firing on the unarmed people. 
On November 25,1974 a Conference of opposition parties 
was held in New Delhi presided over by Charan Sin&h,^ It was 
decided to extend the J*P. t4oveffient to the whole country. 
After this Conrerence an iroprei»sion was created that BLD had 
joined the J.P. Moveinent. But it was not a fact. To remove 
this iropreasion, ahri Kriahna Bajpai* General isecretary of the 
U.P. iitate BLD ii=iaued a ciicular which expressed the views of 
the party. It was stated in the circular that the J.P. Movement 
would cause public awakening but partyless democracy of which 
J.P. was talking was riot possible in the country in the circums-
tances that prevailed at that time. J.P. has not accepted the 
1. Br&hm Duttf Op.c^t.. p.13 
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request made by Charan Singh to lead the new party« On the 
one hand he was challenging Indira Gandhi to hold elections 
and on the other he was hesitating to lead a national party. 
The Executive Coiranittee of U.p. State BLD met on January 
28,1975 and decided to celeberate "Save Democracy Day". It 
decided to warn tlte people about "the coming danger and to act 
in a manner which might save democracy in the country." In 
this prov,ramme also« the BLD decided to go alone 
On March 6#1975 the H jD participated in the demonstration 
2 
held in New Delhi under the leadership of Java Prakash Sfcrayan. 
Several opposition parties participated in this oenvDnstration. 
They submitted a memorsndwn to the President of India in v/hich 
they demanded dissolution of the Bihar Assembly. The memoranduro 
included the demands that the provisions of Emergency* HISA^ 
DIR and other such provisions as were ayainiit the freedom of 
the citizens should be repealed. Students/ teachei s and the 
non-teaching starf should be allov/ed to form their ovvn unions. 
The vorkers of public sector should be given a right to organize 
their unions. There were certain other economic demands also. 
1. SfcatiSffBian^  New Delhi, Jan 29,1976 
2. Naik, AJ. The G^eat Jap&ta Revo;iut4^ pyi. Ghana & Con^. 
New Delhi, 1977.2.? 
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After the 2<-aay roeetlng of BLD National Executive, a 
resolution was passed that Indira Gandhi had no moral right to 
continue as the Prim© Minister after the Allahabad High Court 
Judgement* 
On June 26*1975 Charan Singh was arrested under MISA 
from U.P. Niwas# New D e l h i T h i s news was not much shocking 
under the prevailing cxrcianstances. People were so democalized 
that there was no sign of any protest or agitation. People 
seemed to be quite apathetic, busxnesji was normal and people 
were going to their oitices as usual. No excitement was visible 
in the buses and taxis. 
In the fourth week of July 1975 the Legislative Council 
2 
and the Assembly of U.P. met. On July 3o#l975, Brahm Dutt 
(member of U.P. Legislative Council) wrote a letter to the 
Chairman o£ the Legislative Council informing him that the BLD 
Jana Sangh and Congress(0) had decided to boycott the session 3 because of the restriction imposed on their functioning. 
1. Naik, AJ,» The Great Janata Revolution. Chand & Conp., 
New Delhi, 1977. 3 
2. Brahro Dutt. Op.ci^t.,
115 
8. Oppasition Parties DlearraY 
In the ineantiraei, several meetings of the opposition 
parties in the U.P Legislature were called to discuss the 
steps to be taken* The le&islatora were not ready even to 
forgo their 1>.A» and they advanced the arcjument that in the 
Parliament also, the opposition memberti had decided to go to 
tiie Ibuse so that they could draw their D.A,, but would not 
participate in the proceediny^, Brahni Dutt opposed this. By 
going to the House ano drav.ing D.A., their participation would 
be on record. Majority of the BLD members, who were outside 
the jails were oi. the view that they should issue a statement 
condemning, the declaration of Emergency and the arrests clari-
fying at the same time that the BLD was functioning as a respon-
sible opposition party and had nothing to do with the alleged 
subversive activities. There v/as so much confusion among the 
leaders and legislators that no regular resolution could be 
pat>aed. 
The Jana Sangh legislators were panicky and they did 
not want to cooperate with allied parties, Itobody could 
persuade the president and the secretory of the BLD to convert 
a meeting of the State Executive. All the time the president, 
Bhanupratap Singh who was a member of the Rajya Sabha, was 
stayir^ at Delhi. He was trying to contact Congress MPs and 
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was in search of a solution. Nobody paid any attention to 
him. The meeting was fixed for August 24,1^75. In the 
raeanfltiroe# there was no organized protest against the arrest 
of Charan Singh and others. Shri Kriahna Bajpai (Party Secretary) 
offered satyagraha at Kanpxir with some of his friends and this 
was repeated at a few more places. Generally uhe response 
from the party workers was very poor. They were not ready to 
associate with these activities. It is strar^e tlriat the districts 
of Meerut and Muzaffarnagar were also without any sign of 
comitiotion. Charan tiingh publicly rebuked the people when the 
came out of jail for this apathy. During this period C.fc. Gupta 
also, who was very outspoken in his criticism of uhe Government» 
could not give any line of action. 
On August 15#1975/ Brahro Dutt addressed a few meetings 
in Dehradun district. The C.I.D. had received instructions to 
watch his activities but they did not interfere with his move-
ments. There he net important workers of the opposition parties/ 
but could not inspire them for any demonstration of proteint. 
He returned to Lucknow on 18 August. Later on he v.as told that 
if he had travelled by train on August, he would have been 
apprehended as there were instructions to arrest him at Dehradun.^ 
1. Brahro Dutt# Op.cit.« p.20; 
Also seet Kaital KL & Meyer RC, Democratic Pol3,tics in India, 
Vikas Publishing House# New Delhi* 1977 
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The saddest experience was to come on August 24*1975 
when the State Executive of U.P., BLD was to meet. The meeting 
was to be held in the Royal Hotel in the room of Kali Qiaran, 
an MLA* who was one of the secretaries of the party. The meeting 
was to contmence at. lO.CO a.m. but the Blfi President who had come 
from Delhi, did riot turn up even till 11.30 a.m. He had somehow 
received the information that he might be arrested so he was 
quietly sitting in the house of the Party treasurer. This 
gentleman also preferred to remain in hidiay in the ho^se of a 
Congress leader anc. did not dare to contact members waiting for 
meeting, police officers nd C.I.D, had arrived at the Hotel 
by 10 in the morning. Most ot the party members were so frigh-
tened that even the secretary in whose room the meeting was to 
be held/ w^s seeaa leaving the Royal Hotel through a back door. 
He was not ready for arrest. At about 12.00 noon* Jay dish 
Narain Saxena an^ MLA, Smt. Gayatri Devi (Mrs. Charan Singh) and 
Brahro Dutt were arrested. When all the three come out of the 
Hotel# a message was received that Smt. Gayatri Devi was not 
to be arrested. Both Brahro Dutt and Jagdish Narain iSaxena were 
taken to Hazrat Ganj Kotwali. But to their surprise* they found 
the BLD President and Treasurer of the party already there. In 
the afternoon* all of them were taken to the cantonment station 
where a magistrate noted their statements and served them with 
a notice. 
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On the same night they were shifted to the District Jail, 
Lucknow, Smt. Gayatri Devi v^ as released the next day probably 
on the intervention of Mr a. Indira Gandhi» There were about 
100 people in a compound known as * reformatory'. Out of them, 
60 belonged to RSS and its different front organization® the 
rest of them were from KLD, Coi^ress(O) and Socialist Party. 
A few Anand Margis and Jaroat-e~Islami people were also there. 
In the Jail the most shocking and surprising thing was 
that the relations aroong the political prisoners were very much 
strained. The prisoners, who were practically in fonfrontation 
with each other, were divided into two camps. In one can^j were 
the RSS and some HLD men, the other can^ consisted of the majority 
of BLD leaders and members of Congress(O) and the Socialist party. 
The differences were mostly personal. There were complaints 
that the RoS men were so much demoralized that most of thera had 
sent written appolO(rfie8.^ 
There were regular meetings in the jail for discussing 
different topics. The RSS. men, Anand Margis and Jamat-e-lslaroi 
people had their own gatherings. While the Anand Margis and 
Jamat-e-Islami people were more concerned with their religious 
functions* the RSS people regularly had their separate discussions. 
1. Brahm Dutt* Op.cit.* p.11 
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The general feeliny waa that they considered the Congress raj 
to be a Ravana raj. In their opinion the non-R^S oppoi^-ition 
leaders were like vithishana who belonyed to the same family. 
They thought th.t merely replacing the Ravana raj with 9ii^hishan 
raj was not enough; what v,as required was to establish Ram raj. 
This could come only through the RSS. Most of the non-RSS 
persons were of the opinion that adjustment with these elements 
was not possible.^ 
During August 1975/ prisoners detained in jails were 
becoming anxious to be released. RSS men had already made 
attempts to obtain their r&lease. It was decided to file habeas 
corpus applications in the High Court, so that the petitioners 
might have an opportunity of going out of the Jail. After the 
Supreme Court judgement that such applications could not be 
entertained and after the President's order suspending funda-
mental rights, these petitions were suspended in January and 
February, 1976. Although some of the hard core supported the 
action of Jana Sangharsh Samiti and the other groups, the majo-
rity was in favour of suspension of such activities, as theae 
activities were merely prolonging the detention period. 
On October 15,1976 the Jana Sangharsh Samiti gave a call 
2 for Satyagraha. Satya Pal Malik who offered Satyagrah in 
1. Brahni Dutt, ^.cit., p.ll 
2. The Statesman, tiew Delhi, Oct 16,1976 
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Garh Jtokteshwar fair in Meerut district was detained in Fatehgarh 
jail but later on transferred to Tihar Jail where Charan Sinyh 
was detained. But CSiaran Singh was released on March 7,1976. 
On December 1,1975 Brahm Dutt was transferred to Varanasi 
Central jail.^ Since he had to appear before the Hicjh Court, in 
January he was transferred to Lucknow. In Varanasi jail there 
were about 70 or 80 detenus, where the atmosphere was similar 
to that of Lucknow. In Model jail Lucknuw there were i|bout 
40 detenus who were divided into two groups - the RSS group and 
the non~RSS group. 
One of the close associates of Jaya Prakash and convenor 
of the Sangharsh Samiti, Mahavir Bhai was also in this jail. 
He was also not adverse to the idea of reconciliation. N.G. 
Gora and H.M, Patel# who were leaders of opposition groups in 
the Parliament were making attempts in this direction. They 
had decided not to boycott the Parliament Session and wrote 
some letters to Mrs, Indira Gandhi. On January 11,1976 N.G.Gora 
wrote to Mrs. Indira Gandhi. She asked the opposition to 
abandon the path of obstruction and violence and to create an 
atmosphere helpful cooperation for a dialogue.^ 
I* Brahm Dutt. Op.cit., p.24 
2. Ibi<i^ f t Also see Pandit, C.s., End of An Era, (The Rise and 
Fall of Indira Gandhi), Allied Publishers, New Delhi, 
1977, p.87 
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On February 15/1976 Mrs. Indira Gandhi 9ave a call at 
Bharatpur,^ She asked the opposition parties to follow the 
path of democracy so that democratic system could function 
in the country* A large majority of the people detained in 
the jails were in favour of a national reconciliation. Only 
a hard core opposed it. People started becoming disillusioned 
about J»P,*s capacity to find out a solution* This was the 
atmosphere by the end of February, 1976. 
In March 1976 elections to the Hajya Sabha were declared. 
Bhanu Pratap Singh/ an MLfi was one of the candidates of the 
BLD. After assurance from the then Chief Minister of U.P./ 
iN.D. Tewari that Bhanu Pratap Singh would not be arrested and 
Charan Singh would be provided a shadow of his choice/ they 
participated in elections* All the BLD leaaers were elected 
to the Rajjfa Sabha. Most of the opposition candidates were out 
side the jail and those who were insice the jail were allowed 
to vote by postal ballot. One Jana Sangh nominee was also 
elected. 
The Congress(O)/ although it had only 8 members in the 
Assen^ly/ did put up a canoidate. The H^B/ Jana Sangh and 
Ck)ngress(O) decided to vote together on a set pattern. Subse-
1. Brahra Dutt, pp.cit., 
Also see Pandit/ C.S., gnd of Ar^  Era, (The Rise and Fall 
of Indira Gandhi) / Allied Publishers, New Delhi/ 1977/ |0,93 
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quently it was discovered that the actual voting that took 
place was against the spirit of the agreement. But inspite 
of this* the results were as expected. Several meetings took 
place attended by the representatives of BLD/ Congress(O) and 
Jana Sangh. The Socialist Party had only 2 meraiaers in the 
Assembly and both of them were in prison. These 4 parties 
decided to form a united group inside the U.P. Legislature. 
Charan Singh was elected as the leader of that group, and Brahm 
Dutt was the leader of the united group in the U»P. Legislative 
Council, This growj) was called Lok Paksh.^ Formation of Lok 
Paksh was described as another step towards the opposition 
unity. 
On March 20 and il,1976 Jaya Prakash Narain invited 
leaders of opposition parties. It w^s decided to form a new 
party, A Steering Committee was appointed to draft the policy 
and pro'!:)raromes. The Committee drafted 'Approach Paper'. In 
fact# some talks had already started in Tihar jail. On April 
4,1976 the BLD appointed a Sub«-Coromittee to consider this draft. 
An alternate draft was sent and Charan Singh suggested that the 
Lok Sangharsh Samiti movement should be withdrawn for the forma-
tion of an alternative party. The Acting General Secretary 
forwarded the draft to the Convenor of the steering Committee, 
together with a copy of Charan Singh's reaction to 'Approach 
paper*. 
1* The Statestpan, New Delhi, 24 March, 1976 
2. Brahm Dutt, jSfttCi^/ p*33 
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When the leaders o± the four parties again n^t in 
Bombay on 22,23 May,1976/ surprisingly there was no talk 
or discussion either on the Approach Paper or the alternative 
draft prepared by the BLD. In fact no other party had in 
any manner comniunicoted its reaction to any of the two papers. 
At the last moment/ on May 23/1976 v?hen the BLD leaders were 
about to leave they were assured that their ideas had been 
or would be incorporated in the Approach Paper. It was on 
this assurarK;e that the BLD leaders agreed to the launching 
of the New Party by Jayapraicash Narain. They made it clear 
that the joining of Lok Dal in the New Party was conditional 
on merger of other parties. 
On July 8,1976 Jayaprakash Narayan announced the forma-
tion of a new party in the presence of Charan aingh, Bhanu 
Pratap Singh/ Brahm Dutt (ell BLD)/ Asoka Mehta, Manubhai 
Patel/ (Conyress(0) / N.G. Gorey (Socialist) / O.P. Tyagi and 
iiat Prakash (Bharatiya Jana Sangh) 
On November 8,1976 Charan Singh wrote a letter to 
Jayaprakash Narayan that he himself should take initiative to 
launch a new party and should ask the existing parties to join 
2 
it. On November 13 and 14*1976 representatives of BLD, 
Congress(O) , Jana Sangh and Socialist Party met Jayaprakash 
Brftl^ p Dutt/ 9p.cit.^ p,46 
2. IJaiflj, 
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Narayan at Patna. No concrete result could be achieved in 
that meeting also.^ 
In the first week of November/ 1976/ there was some 
correspondence between Asoka Mehta Congress (O) and the BLD 
leaders in which chaiirman Charan Singh wanted BLD to join 
Congress(0). The gocialist party was also approached for joi-
ning Congress(0) alongwith the BLD. Only the Jana Sanyh was 
to be kept out. O.P. Tyagi of Jana Sangh told Jayaprakash 
Narayan that the Jana Sangh would not accept Charan Singh as 
the leader of the new party. He suggested the name of Justice 
Hetfde for the chairmanship. Another important meeting of BLD 
National Executive was held on January 13 and 14/1977 to 
2 discuss the political situation. 
On January 16/1977 it was announced by Mrs. Indira 
3 
Gandhi that the Lok Sabha elections would be held in flarch. 
She advised the President to dissolve the Lok Sabha and order 
the elections. Emergency was relaxed. Mrs. Indira Gandhi in 
her broadcast on January 18,1977 assured the political parties 
that they would be able to place their point of view before 
the electorate* She told her cabinet colleagues on the same 
day that the process of democracy must have its way and that 
1. The Statesman. New Delhi, November 15/1976 
2. Brahm Dutt, Qp.cit., p.109 
3* Ibid., p.104 
125 
all parties must go back to the people who are the real roasters. 
Th« information about the Lok. Jaabha Electloris vas also given 
to the Chief Ministers who met in New Delhi* the same day. 
In her broadcast the Prime Minister told the Mation that the 
conduct of busir:^ss was possible only if people lived by codes 
and norms of behaviour. None should imperil the welfare of 
any section of the people or safety of the Nation. "If India 
is to live and prosper* there will have to be no preaching of 
hatred/ no practicing of violence* no encouragement of subversive 
activities or lowering of standards of public lite." Emphasising 
the supremacy of the people she saidi "We strongly believe 
the Parliamentary government must report back to the people . 
and seek sanctioi. from them to carry out programmes and policies 
for %tion's strength and welfare." She declared her unshakable 
faith in the power of the people. 
On January 13*1977 the AICC(O) informed the BLD leaders on 
joining move of both the parties and that it would amend its 
constitution.^ Asoka Mehta wotild resign from the chairmanship 
of Congress(O) and Charan Singh would be elected its chairman. 
For this the BLD suggested that the AICC(O) should adopt a 
resolutioi. electing Charan ^ingh its chairman and dissolving 
itself and the St. te and district units. The newly elected 
1. Brahm Dutt* 9p.cit.. p. 110 
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chairman should be authorised to noroinate a new Working 
Committee* new AICX: and new unite at state and district 
level, only then the BLD will have its proper place in 
that organi2ation otherwise the BLD peoplt- will remain merely 
ordinary members. As son® of the BLD leaders expected* the 
Congress(O) was not ready for it. 
On January 18,1977, Lok Sabha elections were declared.^ 
The President of India dissolved the Fifth Lok Sabha the 
next day. The opposition leaders v^re yet undecided about 
their future move. After the declaration of election^ and 
dissolution of lok Sabha, Leaders of the 4 non-communist parties 
began eicploring the possibility of their merger. The first 
meeting was held at Morarji Desai's house* where it was felt 
that even if regal, r merger is not posibible after dissolving 
those old parties the opposition should unite to contest the 
elections. 
On January 20,1977, the BLD, Congress (0), Jana Sangh and 
Socxalitit paity decided to set up a Committee to contest the 
elections jointly.* Morarji Desai started acting as the oppo-
sition leader and decided for opposition parties to contest 
election in the name of Janata Party. On the same day the 
1. Brahia Dutt.. p. 112 
2* ^bid. 
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GoveriHnent declared suspension of Emergency and issued ins-
tructions to the btate governments to speed up the release ot 
policical detenus, Pujjlic meetings and normal political 
activities were to be allowed. On January 22, the socialist 
party Executive met in New Delhi and decided to join the Janata 
Party. 
On January 23,1977 the Janata Paxty was launched with 
Morarji Desai c.s chairman and Charan Singh as I>aputy Chaimian.^ 
Here it may be pointed out that all through the oppo-
sition parties failed to unite into a responsible* responsive* 
credible and viable alternative to the ruling party on their 
own* the declaration of elections united them. The basis of 
the unity was not a common ideology but political expediency. 
The elections put this heterogenous group in power. The 
Congress had been assignee the role of opposition by the 
electorate. 
u The Janata Party was formally inaugtated on the May 1, 
2 
1977. Soon after the formal inaugration of the party the 
•Congre&a for Democracy* led by Jagjivan Ram also announced 
its decision to merge itself with the Janata Party. Chandra 
Shekhar was elected as the new predident of the party. 
1. Brahm Dutt.* fip.^i^.. p.114 
2. Ibid. 
128 
The Janata Party gave a remarkable performance both in 
the Lok Sabha ana Assembly elections* It secured 34b seats 
out of 53 9 seats.^ In the U.P. Assembly out of 423 seats, the 
Janata secured 350 seats» Congress 46 seats, Cpl 9, CPM 
2 Independents and others secixred 16 seats. 
The Janata Party interpreted its victory at the Centre 
as a defeat of the Congress and a challenge to the moral riyht 
of Congress to continue to rule the Northern States, As most 
of these Assemblies had already completed their term of five 
years (though their term had been extended to six years under the 
42nd Amendment), the Janata Party thought it desirable to seek 
the verdict of the people. The Union Home Minxster requested 
the Chief Ministers of Punjab, Himachal Pradesh/ Haryana, Uttar 
Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa and West 
Bengal to advise their Governors to dissolve the Legislative 
Assemblies and order tre&h elections. But when the Chief 
Minj-sters of these nine States refused to oblige the Janata 
Party, the Government decided to invoke Article 3 56, Without 
the recommendation of Governors of these States, the President 
of India dissolved these Asaemblies. 
1. Chhabra & Jones, Op.cit,> p.439 
2. Ibid,, p. 443 
CHAPTER ~ IV 
JANa>TA PHASE IN U.P, & RAM NftJRESH 
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After the Lok Sabha polls in the first trial of strength 
in U»P. Assembly on April the Congress, with the help 
of Cpl, defeated the non Cpi opposition's amendment to the 
motion of thanks for the Governor's address by 46 votes, thus 
frustrating the attempt to topple the N.D. Tewari Ministry. 
223 members including 15 of the Cpi voted against the amendment 
and 177 for it." Though the Con^resi. win was a forgone con-
clusion, there was a lot of excitement and tension, 
Accordii^ to the position the Con^^rese strength in the 
House was 208 ano the Cpi's 16. The Janata Party's latest 
strength 132 ano CED's 44. 
on the advice of the Prime Minister {There was Janata 
Government at the Centre) the acting President B.D. Jatti 
2 dissolved 9 fatate Ai^cemblies including U.P. on May 1,1977. 
The UPCC Parliamentary Board, on May 9,1977 decided 
for an alliance with the CPI and the Republican Party (c»awai 
3 faction) in the ensuing state As&embly elections. 
The CPI wanted to contest 60 to 70 seots and desired an 
adjustment; with the Congress. The Cpl State Executive took 
a decision that uhe Cpi and the Con.,resa would not contest 
1. The Hincustan Times, New Delhi, April 2,1977 
2. Ifciflx/ May 2,1977 
3. Ibid.. May 10,1977 
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elections against each other. Hovjcver both the Parties were 
free to put forward their political points ox: view £reely# 
even on points on which they did not agree^. 
There wos great rush for Janata Party tickets. Thousands 
printed forms hcid already been taken away by applicants. 
There was such a ^reat demand that private typists were selling 
the forms on their own. Thousands of aspirants for the party 
ticket had arrived in the istate capital with their supporters. 
The State committee oi the CPI(M) had set up a five men 
committee to conduct negotiations with the Janata Party for 
adjustment ot seuts for Assembly Elections. In a statement the 
party secretary said that the party would have 'no teuck' with 
the Cpl because the latter was still continuing to support the 
Congress* 
A meetiny of the U.P. Chhatra Yuva bans^harsh Samiti had 
demanded 50 percent representation for youths in the selection 
of candidates. At a meeting the tiamiti declared that it would 
not allow selection ot candidates "who had stabbed the J.P. 
movement in the back." 
All the decisions taken Ly the Tiwari Ministry during 
the last days of its existence which were against the intereiit 
of the people were to be reviewed. For this purpose the Governor 
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M. Chenm Reddy set up a three men review coramittee con^rising o 
of the Revenue Board Chairman* the Chief Secretary and the 
Law Secretary. 
Satish Chandra, the Governor's advisor declared that 
there were mainly two taaks beiore the adminiatration. First 
there should be free* fair and peaceful elections. Secondly 
the tempo or development and economic welfare scheme should be 
maintained at the existing Ifcvel if not increased. On May 3,1977 
the Governor distributed work among his advisors. Satish 
Chandra was allocated 12 departments and Oidwai 18 Departments.^ 
The Jaiata Party working Committee on May 10,1977, 
appointed observers for 11 States and two Union territories 
going to polls with the authority to take a final decision in 
consultation with the President. Where the State Election 
Committee fails to arrive at a consensus on the selection of 
candidates. Accordingly Charan Sir.gh was authorised to be 
observer for U.p. and to finalise the U.P, list. 
The Election Commission on May 10,ly77 finalised the 
date tor As&embly Elections to be held between June 10 and 14 
and apart from other States, it was declared that Uttar Pradesh 
1. The Times of India, New Delhi, May 3,1977 
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will have three days polling. 
On May 18,1977, the All India Congress Committee 
released the list ot candidates to contest elections on 
Congress tickets. 
Till May 19,1977 with only 48 houis left for the with-
drawal of names *> the Janata Party seemed nowhere near firjalising 
a uniroous list o± candidates for Uttar Pradesh. The problem 
was the Janata leaders then were not as unxted as they were 
when they contested the Lok Sabha elections. 
On May 20, the Janfeta Party released the list oi: its 
candidates for U.p. State Assembly. Raj Mangal Pandey, Udit 
Narain Sharroa and Ram Prakash Gupta, all former Ministers, were 
among the 421 candidates from U.P., which included 87 members of 
the dissolved St^te Assembly. 
The Hincustan Times wrotet ''The Janata Party in Uttar 
Pradesh is threatened with the defiance bv a large number of 
Party men who appear to be keen to contest the coming Assembly 
elections oS independents in disregard of the Party directives. 
This unusual situation has been largely created by the inordinate 
delay in declaring the list of P^rty candidates."^ 
1* The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, May 23,1977 
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The Jamta Party which decided tx> 90 it alone against 
the Congress - CPI combination fielded os many as 132 members 
of the dissolved House. While a larye k chunk of 42b party 
tickets went to the Bhartiya Lok Dal, the Jana Sangh earned 
the second position. There were 43 Muslim candidates in the 
list including Habib Ahmed, the state Chief of the Muslim 
Majlis. 
The Cor^ress on the other hand left 38 out 01 total 425 
seats to its allies - 30 for^Cpi, 5 for RPI and 3 for National 
league. In a bid to regain power in the most populous and 
politically inportant state in the country, the party fielded 
a total of 160 members of the dibsolved House including former 
Chief Minister N.D. Tiv.ari, nine Ministers and 12 Ministers of 
State. There were 41 Muslim candidates in the Congress list. 
With hardly a week left for the three day polling to 
start in Uttar Pradesh, a hu ried survey ot the northern, 
we^3tern and central parts oi the sprawling state, revealed 
that the Janata wave witheased during the Lok aabha election 
10 weeks ag. , viss persisting. It had n^t evaporated* ho%vever 
for a variety ox: rec»i.ons, it was diffused, enabling a more 
objective assessment on i-he basis of individual candida$;e's 
merits. There was afair possibility of the congress consoli-
dating itself as an opposition party.^ 
1. The Hindustan Time;^. New Delhi, June 21,1977 
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Even the best supporters of Con^ atress couia riot persue 
themselves to wish it better* Haviny derailecl the whole nation 
during the eroeryency, the ConQreias l<_aclership vvas living in 
its own paradiese while etaagining tliat the party was "staging 
a come back". Polling 195,31^434 votes, the «Janata Party had 
secured 68.06 percent popular support in the March elections. 
The Congress Inad obtained 71,70/180 votes representing 25.03 
percent oi. the valid votes polled. 
Ai^lysis of Assemjalv £le|Ctions (May 10 - 14^1977) 
The Janata Party won 35o of the 422 seats in U.P. The 
Congress could scctare only 46 seats. Three more than the number 
required for being recognized as an opposition. The party had 
won 216 seats in the 1974 elections. Its poll ally, the Cpi 
could secure only nine seats as against 16 in the last Assembly 
elections. The CPI(M) which got two in the last elections had 
to be content with only one this time. 
Of the 20 roerabers of the Tiwari Ministry who contested, 
as many as §6 were rejected. Only the former Chief Minister 
N.D. Ti^ari, his former cabinet colleague, Laxmi %ankar Yadav 
and two former Ministers oi State Chhed Ram Gangawar and Yash 
Pal Singh could get through. Tho^e defeated included the UPCC 
President Mro. Mohsina Qidwai, fowmer Agriculture Minister and 
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member of the Conwreas Working tomraittee* Virenda Verroa* 
fortner PfeD Minister, Baldeo Sinc^h Arya. former hSC Minister* 
Rajendra Kuinari Bajpayee and former Education Miuister Awtnar 
Rizwi* 
The Janata rebels who had won, included Indlramani 
Badori, Babu Singh and Kanhai Singh. Most of the rebels v;ere 
rejected by the people.^ 
As many as 41 members of the dissolved House had been 
reelected. 110 of them belonged to the Janata i^arty, 26 to 
Congress/ 4 to Cpl and one to CPICM) • Banarsi Das was the 
only metnber of the Rajya Sabha to have contested and won. 
Among the candidates of national Parties who had forfeited their 
deposits, the Congrei^s accounted for eight, the Janata Party 
two, CpI(M) 11 and Cpi 3, Out oi 1,380 independent candida tes 
only 48 coald manage to save their deposits.^ 
The nev;ly elected seventh Uttar Pradesh state Asaetnbly 
had 283 new foCes of whom 242 belonged to the Janata Party, 20 
to the Congress, 5 to the Cpl and 16 Independents. Among the 
newly elected were 10 women members oj. whom 8 were new. This 
included two members Mrs. Qudsia Begum (Independent) and 
Shakuntala £^yyar (Janata) who had previously been ineu.b€srs of 
3 the House. 
1. The Times of India. New Delhi, May 15,1977 
2. , Jane 19,1977 
Ibid.. June 21,1977 
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The Jajaata Party had also claimed the bulk of 82 
ouy of 90 seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes while the Congress got only 7. One seat was won by an 
Independent. Anions 82,56 were new. 3 out of 7 Conyres© members 
and the one Independent elected from reserved seats were also 
new* 
Theee women also figxired among the Janata ^'arty's 
members elected from rei>erved seats. Two of them were new. 
Of the 49 Muslims elected to the House# 3o belonc,ed to the 
Janata ''arti * £> to the Congress* one to the Cpi and 4 were 
independents. Twenty six out of the 39 Muslim members belongir^ 
to the Janata Party were new while two of them belonged to 
the Conyreias and fovur were Independents.^ 
MfF.t 
On June 2l«l&77 Ram I^ret>h Yadav* M.P, was elected 
leader of the Jcnata Legislature ^arty, defeating his rival 
Ram Dhan, M.P. by a big margin. Yadav Polled 277 votes as 
against Ram Jinan's 103. Two members were absent, ^adav was 
known to be Charan Singh's choice. It was obvious that he 
received the solid backing of the erstwhile BLD and Jana Sangh 
constituents. On the other hand# despite the open support of 
C.B. Cirupca for Ram Mean's candidature there was division in 
the Con'yres8(0) ranks» while the erstwhile Socialists i^ ere 
1. Tfte Times of India. New Delhi, June 21,1977 
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diviaea-
Efforts Mere made in the inornlng of June 21, to avoid 
the contest. Raj Karain the Union Health Minister and Banarsi 
Das roet C.B» Gupta in a bid to get the candidature of Ratn 
Dhan withdrawn. But Gupta did not agree. 
Ram Naresh Yadav, a lawyer by profession/ v^ as elected 
to the Lok iaabha in March, 1>77 defeating Charanjit Yadav 
from the Aaamgarh constituency. He earlier had worked tor 
sometime in the Socialist party under the leadership of 
Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia. His rival Ram fehan, a harijan, also 
came from Azaragarh and was also elected to the I»ok Sabha. 
On the evening of June 28,1977 allocation of portfolios 
among the members of the new five men U.P. cabinet was announced, 
Chief Minister Ram tiaresh ^adav held charge o^ as many as 17 
departments anc sui^jects including general admii.istration, home, 
finance* planning, confidential, appointments, vigilance, 
election, home guards, economics and statistics, salca tax* 
registration, stamps, court fees and entertainment tax. He had 
also been allocated the portfolios of industries v/hich included 
heavy industries, small industries, handlooms and handicrafts, 
habilitations environment and ecology.^ 
1, The Hindustan Time^, New Delhi, June 29,1977 
138 
The first set of major administrative changes by the 
new Jan«-ta Government involved the transfer of over two dozen 
officers both at the State secretariat and district level. 
The ofricers had been transferred tor aominifatrative reason 
and in public interests,^ 
R.N, Yadav, Chief Minister had a talk with the leader 
of opposition N.D. Tiwari on the choice ot Speaker and there 
was unanimity on the name of Eanarsi Das, who on July 12^ was 
declared elected unopposed as the Speaker of the seventh U.P, 
Assembly^ 
The Uttar Pradesh Ministry was expanded on July 4,1977 
with 41 new incumbents. In all there were 21 Cabinet Ministers, 
five Ministers of State and 15 Deputy Ministers. 
On May 2,1978 Ram imresh Yadav added 7 new Ministers 
and promoted another seven from the Deputy Minister.uhip to 
the rank of Minister of State. V»ith this, strength of the 
2 Ministry had yone up to 48 from 41. 
1. Th^ HifidUfatan Tj^es, Ksw Delhi, July 1,1977 
2. The national Heyaj^d. Lucknow, May 13,1978 
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Among the seven new entrants three belonged to the 
erstwhile BlLD yroup, two to the former Congress (O) and one 
each to the Jaca bangh and the Socialist constitutents of 
the Janata Party, The txpansion took the Cabinet strength 
to 24, Ministers of State to 15> anc the Deputy Ministers to 
9. In the fully expended 48 roeirdaer Council of Minxsters 
there were five Muslims, five Horijans and three women.^ 
On May 2,1978 all the 11 official Janata Party candi-
dates were declared elected to the U.P. Legislative Council 
2 
in the biennial elections from the Assembly constituency. 
The other two candidate^j were Congress (I) nominee Mrs. Indira 
Mohani and the Congress supported Cpi member Dr. Z.A. Ahmed. 
on August 4,1977 the U.P. Governor Chenna Reddy, on the 
recommendation of the Chief Minister dropped Mr. Jogeshwar 
Deputy Minister of Health from the Council of Ministers, In 
his statement the Chief Minister said that Mr. JQgeshwar had 
sent him a conditional resignation following the development 
after his surprise inspection of the Kanpur Medical College, 
where dectors. Junior Doctors, Nurses end students had gone 
on strike. The Deputy Minister released the contents of his 
resignation letter Lu the press before the Chief Minister 
could arrive at aay decision. 
1. The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, July 5,1977 
2. The National Herald. Lucknow, May 13,1978 
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On September 28,1977 the Deputy Minister for Excise, 
Arif Mohaminaa Khan resigned from the State Ministry in protest^ 
against the State Government policy in regard to the Shia Sunrii\ 
situation in Lucknow. 
on September 28,1977 President M. Sanjiva Reddy, 
appointed G.D. Tapase, a former Minister in the Bombay Stat;6, 
as the Governor of iJttar Pradesh in succesoion to M. Chenna 
Reddy who had resigned, Tapase had to join from October 2,197^.^ 
On May 3,1978 the dissident Janata Party legislators in 
Uttar Pradesh threatened open revolt unles:^ the party High 
Command intervened by May 8 to remove Chief Minister Ram Naresh 
Yadav. In a Joint letter to the party Chief Chandra Shekhat 
22 legislators condemned as "Unconstitutional, undemocratic 
end dictatorial", Yadav's action in dropping from his Cabinet 
2 Satiya Prakash Malviya, Minister for Local Self Government, 
In reply to this threat the Party President Ciiandra 
Shekhar described the dismissal of Malviya as unfortunate and 
unparallelled in the history of parliamentary democracy. 
Chandra Shekhar said that he was upset because "the Chief 
Minister had chosen to ignore the Central Parliamentary Board 
1* Hindustan Times. New Delhi, Aug 5,1977 
2, Mukhtar Anis, a Minister of State anriounced his resignation 
in protest against Malviya's dismissal. However he withdraw 
his refignation later. 
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in this matter; and also because this might lead to intensifi-
cation of dissident activity in the state." The State Janata 
Chairman Abbas Aii announced on May 1,1911 that he would ask 
the Chief Minister to clarify on what basis he had dropped 
Malviya from his Cabinet. 
The crisis in U*l?. wqs discussed on May 5,1978 by the 
Party President Chandra Shekhar, with Prime Minister Morarji 
Desai^ Party secretaries and some members of the Hiyh Command, 
who disapproved of any move by the dissidents in the Uttar 
Pradesh Legislature Party to bring a vote of no confidence 
against Chief Minister Ram Naresh Yadav in the state Assembly.^ 
The High Command wanted the dissidents to air their views at 
a meeting of the Legislature Party and not impair party unity 
by forcing a showdown on the floor ot the House. 
Pandemonium broke out in the U.P. Assembly on May 8,1978 
while it was discussing:! the aanissibilit^ of an opposition 
adjournment motion on the dismissal of Local Self Government, 
Minister &.P, Malviya from the Cabinet. Three Janata dissidents 
were physically removed by the House Guards and one of them, 
Arif Mohammad Khan, a former deputy minister was suspended for 
the rest of the session; but later the punishment was reduced 
1. New Delhi, May 6,1978 
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t© three days only. The dissident whose protest spiled over 
in an organized and deinonstr<utive itanners on the floor of the 
House, shouted slogans like "S.p, Malviya S&indabad" and "Tana 
iihahi Naheen Chalegi" during the ^j^roar which was sparked by 
the Chief Minister moving for the suspension of Arif Mohammad 
Khan. 
On April 11,1978 Union Health Minister Raj Narain held 
talks with about a dozen Ministers and some party legislators 
to resolve the tangle over the suspension of six party members 
for anti party activities.^ 
The party president Chandra Shekhar had talks with the 
Chief Minister and the issue was resolved on a formula which 
provided that thu suspended members will address a letter to 
U.P. Janata Legislature Party deptty leader Ram Prakash giving 
portions of their representation to Chandra Shekhar dealing 
with their replies to the charges against than contained in the 
show cause notices. The understanding was that on the basis 
of this letter the suspension would be revoked. 
Union Home Minister Charan Singh, who arrived in 
Lucknow on April 17#iy78 had very brief talks with his close 
associates including Mr. ^adav and members of the Lok Sabha 
2 Madhav Prasad Tripathi and Gauri Shankar Rai. The pxirpose 
1. The Hindustan Tipi^g. New Delhi, April 12,1978 
2. t^^ional Hcy^^fg. Lucknow, ^^ril 18,1978 
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of Charan Singh's visit was# his wish to impress on Janata 
legislators the need for unity and cohesion. 
On April 19#iy78 the executive of the U.P, Janata 
Leyislatvire Party revoked the suspension of six party legisla-
tors* who were alleged for anti party activities; but with a 
warning that they should tjat indulge in anti party activities 
in future.^ 
The Union Home Minister Charan Singh, on ^ r i l 29,1978 
resigned from che Janata Party's National Executive and Parlia-
mentary Board in protest against the High Conwand's move to 
2 
o\ist the Chief Minister of Haryana and Uttar Pradesh. He 
alleged that the dissidents in these states were being ei^ouraged 
by a section of the central leadership of the party. 
Though he had not mentioned the names of the High Command 
members, but his reference was, among others, to Chandra Shekhar, 
Party Secretary, IfeiHhu Limaye, Jagjivan Ram^ H.N. Bahuguna and 
others. He wesj? also not satisfied with the attitude adopted 
by the Prime Minister in party matters. 
1. Time^ of India. Mew Delhi, April 20,1978 
2, i & J ^ April 30,1978 
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The Janata Party debacle in the three by-elections in 
a row in the State had deepened the crisis in the party* The 
Congress(X) on May !^,1978 won its first LoK Sabha seat when 
its candidate Mrs. Mohsina Qidvv-ai defeated her nearest Janata 
Party rival Ram Bachan Xadav by 35,385 votes in the Aaamgarh 
by--election.^ The Congress also annexed the two Vidhan Sabha 
seats of Soron and Mankapixr, the strength of the party in the 
Vidhan Sabha had risen to 40. 
The State Janata Party President Abbas All had in a 
telecsirain to the party Chief Chandra Shekhar demanded his 
"immediate intervention" to resolve the grave crisis created 
by the p^^rty deieat in all the three by elections* the dismis-
sal of S,p, Molviya and the resigne^tion ot Mukhtar Anis. 
The dissidents had held the Chief Minister responsible 
for the defeat and demanded his resignation it he c.id not go 
voluntarily. Meanwhile the Janata Legislature Party executive 
/e-U. to remove Arif Mohammad Khan and recomraended his expulsion 
froBi the tstate party organization since he canpaigned for the 
Congress (I) candidate Mrs. Mohsina Qidwal in the Azamgarh 
1. ^tfpnal Herald. Lucknow, May 10,1978 
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lK3k Sabha by-election. 
The Janata Central Parliamentary Board on May 10#1978 
decided to svunmon Chief Minister R.N. Vadav, State party 
presioent Abbas Ali and the dismissed Minister Malviya to 
Pelhi to sort out the crisis which had caused doubts about 
the stability of the Government.^ 
On behali oi the Parliamentary Board which was supposed 
to regulate the affairs of the various Janata Governments* 
two of its members A.B. Vajpayee and George Fernandes dealt 
with the Chief Minister and others irxvolved in the dispute. 
They held consultations with Home Minister Charan Singh* 
Vajpayee, Fernances and Abbas Ali later met Prime Minister 
Morarji Desai. 
Yadav in^jressed upon the central emissaries the funda-
mental need of discipline at all levels for the smooth func-
tioning of the party. Legislature and Government. He had also 
stressed the need for evolving a code of conduct for partymen. 
There should be some norms for running the party and the 
Government, he said. 
1« t^^ jrOnftJL., HOTJLd^ I'UCJtnow, May 11,1978, 
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The Chief Minister H.N. Yadav in the «Janata Legislature party 
meeting on June 4/1978 secured 278 of the 388 votes. The 
voting took place under the party's High Cotnmand observer 
George Fermndes.^ 
On June 29,1978 the crisis in the Janata Party deepened 
further when the Prime Minister Morerji Deaai asked Charan 
2 
Singh and Raj Narain to resign from the Union Cabinet. The 
Prime Minister objected in particular to Charan Singh's 
statement of a day before blaming the Government for delay in 
taking legal action against Mrs* Indira Gandhi and calling for 
her immediate arrest* 
Rama Shankar Kaushik* Excise and Labour Minister and 
the Janata Legislature Party General Secretary warned that if 
Charan Singh resigned all the Janata ruled Governments would 
fall. Janata party's General Secretary Ram Saran Das also warned 
that if there was a break in the party* the Central Government 
would collapse and nobody would be able to save it. 
Chief Minister Yadav felt that the development at the 
Centre would not have any effect on the stability of U»P. 
Goveriiment. He spoke high of Charan Singh's efforts for the 
pawat, the Urdu daxly, New Delhi. June L,1978 
2. 'Janata Count down to split', |.inkf fuly 1,1978, p.21 
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uplift of the downtrodden and backward people and for the 
farmers generally. On the other hano Ilr. Rakesh Chaturvedi* 
a dissident* conyratulated the Central Cabinet and Party 
leaders for their "historic and timely decision." On July 1,1978 
Charan Singh announced that he would continue in the Janata 
P©rty. Confidence was expressed that he won't advise the 
Chief Minister H.N* ^adav to resign. A meeting of prominent 
BLD leaders held at U.P, Niwas at New Delhi on July 2,1978 
decided to organise a massive rally on July 17 to protest 
against the ouster of Mr. Charan Sinflh from the Union Cabinet.^ 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee# External Affairs Minister expressed 
a desire to s t ^ down from his government job to take up party 
2 ^ work. Prime Minister Morarji Desai rejected Vajpayee*s idea. 
Desai was keen on maintaining a balance among the various 
Janata constituents in the Cabinet. Charan Singh on the other 
hand in a letter to Party President Chandra Shekhar wrote that 
his resignation from the party Central Parliamentary Board and 
the Kational Executive was final. 
On Charan Singh's organized rally move scheduled for 
July 17# it was feored that if any U.P. Minister takes part in 
the rally, and the Central leadership takes action against 
1» The T ^ e s of In<^ia. New Delhi, July 3,1978 
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hiia# It would precipitate a crisis in U.P. too. The U.p. 
Ministers belong inc, to the former BLD faced a big dilemraa 
whether to join the rally and face action or leave their leader 
Char an Singh in Ivirch, 
Later on it tvas understood that section of Minxaters 
and legislators, belonging, to the c . stwhile ELD, appeared to 
be determined to participate in the July 17 rally/ even if 
the party High Command placed restriction acjainst it. But 
as a surprise move Charan Sii^jh declared on July 6 the cancelr-
lation of July 17 rally. Once a^^ain on July 7 Charan Singh 
threatened that the proposed Kii^an Rally on July 17 v.ould be 
held as scheduled unless th© differences were ironed out by 
July 10 a day before the Janata party National Executive met. 
The Janata Party National Executive on July 11,1978 
made a determined effort to refurbish its image by unanimously 
adopting a resolution which called for un^ty with dii>cipline# 
The resolution asked Charan Singh to withdraw his letter of 
resignation dated April 28,1978 from the Natioral Executive and 
Parliamentary Board and continue to serve on these bodieo. On 
July 12, Charan Singh comnwnicated in writing to Chandra Shekhar 
that he was withdrawing his letter of resignation. 
1. yne g^ New IJclhi, July 3.1978 
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The division between 8uppozrtoir£ &nd oppont-nts o£ 
Ri»t3 in the Uttar Pradesh Janata Party aur±aced on Decendser 25, 
1978 when three party legislators, Stivanadd Nautiyal, Lalji 
Tandon and Ja^at Narayan* demanded the resignation of 
Cabinet Minister working for the proposed Ki^an Rally in biew 
Delhi on December 23.^ Party General Secretary, Rain baran Das 
also criticised attempts by two of his colleagues to make 
the RSb synonymous with che Janata Party. 
The U.P. Muelim ]^cague General Secretary Mukhtar Ahmed 
said in Moradabad that the reports of the two General Secre-
taries oj. the State Janata Party on the Ali^^arh riots had only 
tried to cover the misdeeds of the RSS in the Aligtirh riots 
at a time when a judicial inquiry had already been ordered. 
In a signed statement, he said even Janata leaders like Prime 
Minister Morarji Desai and Chief Minister Ram Nartsh Yadav had 
avoided comraen.s. The statement of the Janata Panel at this 
juncture Vvaa a calculated attempt to influence the juaicial 
2 commisi>ion, he said. 
RSS Chief Balasaheb Deoras said it was unfortunate 
that RSS workers had been blara»ed for the Aiigarh riots. He 
1. file U^tTn^ Si New Delhi, December 26,1978 
2. I^^d. 
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deniea any Ri^ a hand in the incident and said the people 
should wait for the judicial inquiry verdict. Addreasiny 
a rally of RSS workers of Faizabad and adjoining districts* 
Deoras said the RSS had been blammed for communal riots in 
the country without any basis. 
5". Diesidence in U.P* Janata 
On January a meeting o£ the dissident Janata 
legislators demanded in a resolution demanded the removal 
of Mr Yadav and said it v/aij unfortunate eno undemocratic 
that he had rK>t immediately reiyi^ned. It said Yadev v;as in 
a mirK>rity now e^ nd the p^rty image under his leadership was 
getting te-rni^hcd every day. 
The meeting held under the Chairmanship of State Janata 
Party President Abbas Ali was attended by 163 Legislators, 
four Members of Parliament, four out of six State Party Vice 
Presidents, three General Secretariei^ anc the Treasurer* 
Ignoring the Party High Command publicly expressed 
reactions, Chief Minister Raw Naresh "ifadav not only got 
accepted by the Governor the resignation of the four Ministers-
two Cabinet Ministers and two Deputy Ministers, whom he had 
asked to quit, but also went a step ahead and elevated all 
the six r^main_ng Deputy Ministers to the rank of Minister 
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of State.^ 
The U.p. Ministry vjould then be a two tier one, and 
there was to be no IDeputy Miniatera. Its strength was 
reduced to 43 after the resignation of four Ministers. 
There would be 21 Cabinet Ministers and 22 Ministers of atate. 
The Chief Minii^ter declared that there was no possibility of 
any further reshuffle or addition to Wts Cabinet* 
The campaign against Chief Minister Ram Naresh Yadav 
within the Uttar Pradesh Janata Party received a boo^-t with 
the first Joint meeting of leaders of practically all cons-
tituents except the BLD to plan their line of action. They 
had also confoultatioii with C.B. Gupta* about the form of 
requisition to be submitted within a few days to the Chief 
Minister for a Legislature Paxty meeting, with copiet to the 
Party President and the Prime Minister. Immediately thereafter 
a telegram signed by vorious leaders was aent to all the 
party legislators supporting the den.and for the ouster of 
Chief Minister to meet at Lucknow on February 1,1979. 
An important development had been the coming out into 
the open of the Jana Sai^gh constituent against the Chief 
Minister. Their strength in the Lower House was 95 and in 
1. The Hindustan Time?, January 28,1979 
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the Upper House seven. In fact it was the Jana Sangh legislators 
who were most active in collecting signatiires on the requi-
sition for the party meeting . A fresh requisition had now 
been drafted as the earlier text* signed by about 70 metnbers# 
was found defective. The Prime Minister and the Party President 
to whom copies were sent were requested to intervene immedia-
tely if the Chief Minister did not call a party meeting. 
The four ousted Ministers held a joint news conference 
and levelled allegations against the Chief Minister. Meanwhile 
former,Minister ^.P. Malviya charged the Chief Minister with 
entering a "secret deal with the ConQress to continue in power" 
and said the Janata Party would not permit hiro to form a 
Government with Congress support. Malviya also discounted the 
fear that the Chief Minister could get the Assembly dissolved. 
The U.p. Janata Party Chief Abbas Ali had said tha^ 
the ouster of four Miiaistersby Yadav was an unwise and unfor-
tunate i>tep which woxild have serious repercussions. He 
said chat there was no doubt it was the Chief Minister's 
prerogative to dectiaixd reaiynation of any minister, but in the 
wider interest o£ the party it would have been better if the 
Chief iMinister had consulted the persons involved as also the 
party leaders. He further said tl^t the political crisis at 
the Centre which was settled after prolonged efforts could 
occur at the State and national level with such unwise action 
153. 
by Yadav.^ 
A Lok £>abha member and tvvo State legislators from 
U,P, supported ^adav*s action in throwing out some Ministers. 
In a joint statement, Rasheed Masood# M.p. and Ajab Singh and 
Mrs, Bimla Rakesh, both MLAs ev.pressed# the confidence that 
the Chief Minister would definitely secure majority support 
In the iitate Legislature party in a trial ot strength. Accor-
ding to them the image of the State Government would improve 
after the exit of Ram Singh and other Ministers who had been 
removed by the Chief Minister. 
The critsis in the Uttar Pradesh Janata Party further 
deepened on Janaury 30,1979 when 14 dissiidents belonging to 
2 different constituents met the Governor G.D. Tapase, to handover 
a memorandum a&fc.ertin<d that the Chief Minister was in rairx>rity 
and requesting t^ wit his advice on no subject be accepted 
3 
until he proved his majority. The memorandum alleged that not 
only was the Chief Mxiiister tlireatening to get the House 
dissolved but he was also offering xr.ducementa to members to 
2. Those wtto met the Governor included ^.P. Malviya, Raj Mangal ^andey, H.K. Srivastava and Muzafrar Kasan. 
3. T|iie Tjjne^  of Indx^. New Delhi, Jan 31,1979 
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regain majority. Certain legislators had been nominated 
to corporations and boards in the last two days, it said. 
A delegation of legislators, demanding a chanye in the 
party leadership, left for Delhi on the niyht of January 
3©,1979 to submit a memorandum to party President Chandra 
Shekhar requesting him to direct Yadav to call a meeting 
of the Legislature Party at which the Chief Minister should 
test his majority. They also met the Prime Minister and 
other members of the Parliamentary Board.^ Malviya stated 
that as mentioned in the cnemorandvun to the Governor^ more 
than 100 members had claimed in writing that the Chief Minister 
had lost the majority. Yadav had asserted that the dissidents 
were indulyin^ in a "futile exercise" . i^ e said that he enjoyed 
the confidence of the party legislators* There was no ne^ ed 
for him to seek a confidence vote on his own# he added. He 
denied that the four Ministers had been asked to resign because 
of "political malice". He warned that he would take action 
against those Ministers who were hatching a conspiracy to oust 
him. 
The political crisis sparked off by Chief Minister 
Ram Naresh Yadav's action against four of his Ministers took 
a critical turn on the night of February 3,1979 when all the 
1. The delegation which left for Delhi included Malviya, 
Moti Ram, Ramji ^ingh, Avsan Singh Yadav, Budhu Ram, 
a.K. £»rivastava and Shatrudh Prakash. 
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eight cabinet Ministers belonging to the erstwhile Jana 
Sangh constituent of the Janata Party sent their resignation 
letters to the Party Chief Chandra SheJchar, The rcmainxng five 
Ministers of State belonging to tho erstwhile Jana Sangh yroup 
were liHely to despatch their resignations letters to Mr.Chandra 
Shekhar by Pebrtiary 
The Ministers in their separate but identical letter 
wrote that they were unable to consinue in the Raro %resh 
Yadav Ministry in view of the atmosphere of "Lack of trust 
and suspicion". They maintained that the attitude of the 
Chief Minister towards them was not cooperative. 
State Janata Chief Abbas Ali appealed to the party's 
central leadership and legislators "to liberate the State 
2 from Vadav's leadership as soon as possible." 
With the bettle lines between Yadav and the growing 
number o^ dissidents* backed by a powerful Ministerial group, 
getting clearly drawn, the Janata Central leadership was now 
looking for a successor who could conmiand fuller support of 
the party legislators and who did not have a sectional image. 
The dissident leaders present at Lucknow on February 6 
declared that there could not be any compromise short of the 
1. The Hindustan Time^» New Delhi, Feb 4,1979 
2. Ibid.> Feb 5,1979 
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ouster of the Chief Minister and eonplete freedom to the 
Leg isleture Patty to elect a leader of its own choice. 
The Janata Parliamentary Board which met on February 
7#1979 in Delhi directed the Chief Minister R.w. >fadav to 
call a meeting of the Janata Legislature Party on February 
15 to seeK a vote of confidence*^ The Board asked Railway 
Minister Madhu Dandavate to act as the Central observer at 
the meeting. EJandavate could decide in consultation with the 
Party President whether, it necessary a new leader should be 
elected at the meeting or later# depending upon the circums-
tances . 
According to Kaushal Kishore/ one of the dissidents, 
the menKjrandum againiit Yadav which the Board considered, was 
signed by 187 Janata MLAs» Dissident leaders including former 
Minxsters, Ram &ingh. Raj Mangal Pandey i^ nd Muzaffar riasan, 
in a joint statement welcoming the Parliamentary Board's deci-
sion appealed to the Party legislators to prove that Mr Yadav 
did not have a majority by boycotting next day's meeting at 
his residence* Ministers of the Yadav Government said that 
they were sure ot proving the Chief Minister's majority at the 
February IL meeting. 
1. The Hindustftn T^es, New Delhi, Feb 8,1^79 
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Pro Chief Minister Janata Legislators of Uttar Pradesh 
at a tneetiny at Lucknow on the night of February 8,1979 
demanded the dismissal of 13 Ministers belonging to the erst-
while Jana Sangh without any further delay as they were trying 
to sabotage the working oi the Covernnient from within the 
Government,^ The members also urged the Chief Minister to 
airect the administration not to carryout order of these 
Ministers who had submitted their resignations to Party Chief 
Chandra Shekhar instead ox sending them direct to the Governor 
or the Chief Minister. 
They alleged that Ministers belonging to the erstwhile 
Jana Sangh were busy giving last minute orders to influence 
the lecrfislators. This should not be allowed* they said. The 
Chief Minister assured the meeting that he would definitely 
take action against those Ministers very soon. The U.p. Janata 
Legislature Party General Secretary and Labour and Excise 
Minister Rama Shankar Kaushik claimed at the meeting that 239 
of the 383 Janata Legislature Party members were with the 
Chief Minister.^ 
Addressing the meeting former Union Health Minister 
Raj Narain said the current stru^^gle was between democratic 
and dictatorial forces. He informed the legislators that 
Deputy Prime Minister Charan Singh had refused to give any 
1. H^ajfl,, Lucknow, Feb 9,1979 
2. Ibi^.^ Lucknow, Feb 10,1979 
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advice to him on the cxirrent political crisis in the State 
and had authorised him to atudy the situation and take action 
that he (Raj ttorain) deemed fit to deal with the crisis. 
Raj Narain advised the Chief Minister to taJse strong action 
againwt the dissident Minister. The Minister who had diffe-
rence with the Chief Minister had no moral rii^ht to stay in 
office and fiyht againot the leader* he said. 
The Uttar Pradesh Governor G.D. Tapase was understood 
to have apprised the Centre* in a special communication on 
February 9,1979 of the critical political situation in the 
State. 
OvvM^ 
The Ministeriall^took a deeper plunge on the morning of 
February 9 when the Jana Sangh Ministers refused to give an 
explanation as demanded by the Chief Minister* ^adav* for siding 
with the dissidents in their attempt to oust him. While the 
Chief Minister declined to divulge the nature of his talks 
with the Governor at a 45 minut-e meeting on February 9 iiK>rning* 
it was believed that Yadav mentioned his intention to sack the 
11 Jana Sangh Ministers.^ 
The dissidents had already submitted a memorandum to 
the Governor urging him not to take any action on the advice 
of the Chief Minister since "he had been reduced to a minority 
1. Hgr^ia* Lucknow, Feb 10,1979 
159 
in the state Legialature Party." KauslMil Ktshore describes 
Xadav's action as highly objectionable. 
The 13.P. Ministry was plunged into a first rate crisis 
on February 10*1^79/ when Chief Minister "Jfadav advised the 
Governor to dismiss 13 Ministers belonging to the former Jana 
Sangh, on their refusal to resign.^ The Chief Minister called 
on the Governor, accompanied with Parliamentary Affairs Minister 
Madhukar Dighe and Labour Minister Ram Shankar Kaushik and 
handed over a letter advising him to dismiss the Ministers. 
On February 11#1979 the Governor accepted the resignation 
of 13 Ministers - all belonging to the former Jana Sangh on 
the advice ot Chief Minister. Eight of them were Cabinet Ministers 
2 and five Ministers of State. 
The resignation which had been sent to the Janata Party 
Presioent Chandra iihekhar by these Ministers on February 4* 
were haneed over to the Governor on the morning of February 11 
by two btfcite Janata Party Secretaries on instructions from 
Chandra Shekhar, though they were addressed to the Chief Minister. 
1. yne M l ^ n Sy^ girgis^ , New Delhi, Feb 11,1979 
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The Governor informed Yadav on telephone about the 
receipt of the resignations/ and apparently sxiranoned him* 
After meeting the Governor* Yadav disclosed that the latter 
had accepted the resignations, ^adav also said that dismis-
sing the 13 Ministers, as advised by him yesterday, was now 
redundant in viev of the receipt of their ret-iynations. 
The Janata Party General Secretary Madhu Limaye claimed 
that if Bahuguna and the Party President, Chandra Shekhar came 
out openly in favour of Ram Naresh Yadav, the U.P. Chief 
Minister would win the trial of strength with greater majority. 
Limaye appealed to all secular elements within his party to 
come together "to defeat the designs of the RSci." Limaye, who 
was known to be a supporter of Charan Singh also claimed that 
majority of the former Congress(O) and former socialist members 
of the Janata Party were supporting Yadav. This claim was 
contested by anti Yadav leaders. 
The breakdown of different elements within the Janata 
Legislatxire Party (MLAs only) was BLD-155, Jana Sangh-93, 
Congress(0)-29, CFD-31, SF-19, Chandra Shekhar Group-®, and 
Majlis-8 and others-6 to make a total of 350.^ 
There was a perceptible hardening of attitude at the 
top level of the constituent units of the Janata Party on the 
ev« of the U.P. Janata Legislature Party meeting scheduled for 
2L. 
1. The Statesman. New Delhi, Feb 14,1979 
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February 16#1979. At the end of a hectic day of meetings, 
Madhu Limaye* supporters of Cha^Lan Sinyh, claimecl that "we 
will win". The former CFD elements» on the other hand* 
expressed their determination to vote agc^inst Yadav. 
Yadav lost the fiercely contested trial of strength 
in the Janata Le^ialattire Party by a wajier thin margin of 
nine votes 190 members casting their ballots for him and 
199 against, 
Accep^ny his defeat at the State Janata Legislature 
Party meeting on the evening of February 16*1979, Uttar Pradesh 
Chief Minister Ram Nareuh Yadav at late night subpaitted his 
resignation to Goveriior G.D. Tapase.^ On his resignstion 
raove# he said have submitted my resignation to uphold the 
democratic tradition," He further said that he vas leaving 
the Government* he and his supporters would continue to fight 
against the RiiS, He would have nothing to do with any Government 
which was dominated by "the RSS and other fa^fscist elements." 
Most leaders from the State as well as from the Centre 
appeared to favour a consensus candidate rather than a contest 
to choose a new leader of the Janata Legislature Party. Yadav 
was keenly interested to contest for U,p, leadership again aa 
1, Tte, Hsyalflr Lucknow, Feb 17,1979 
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was evident from his replied to questions at a news conference 
on the evening of February 18#1979. He said he would contest 
again if the legislators wanted him to as so and that in that 
case "his victox-y was certain" # for he said legislators 
themselves were taking vigorous initiative in this regard*^ 
Asked about consensus# ^adav said that it vvas not 
necessary in a democracy and the views of the majority should 
prevail. He said the Government to be formed would be quite 
broad based and every section would have adequate representa-
tion." But it would consist of secular elements and there woulJl 
be re? place for those associated with the RSS, he emphasised. 
He saids "I'here was no question of dissidents or separate 
c&TCpB of 199 and 190 members now. All were following the same 
line now." 
Janata Party President Chandra Shekhar had a 90 minutes 
meeting on the night ot February 19,1979 with Deputy Prime 
Minister Charan Singh amid reports that the Central Party 
leadership and several Uttar Pradesh groups were nearing agr«ewent 
2 
on a consensus choice for the leadership of the State. All 
indications were that the choice was veering round to H.M. 
Bahuguna, Minister for Petrolexan. 
1. The National Heyalc^. Lucknow, Feb 19,1979 
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Apart froM being approached by Janata Legislators 
belonging to warring groups# \ma i^nderstood to have 
been sounded by Prime Winister Morarji Desai himself. 
However# Bahuguna v.as reluctant to undertake the responsibility. 
He reportedly told all those who reque£.ted him to shift to 
U.P, again that he would not be able to deliver the goods 
unless the Party legislators were prepared to give up their 
factional loyalties and that "there should be no v;ire pxilling 
by anyone in ary manner from the Centre*" 
A contest for the leadership of the U.P* Janata Legis-
lature Party between Banarsi Das» %eaker Oj. the Legislative 
Assembly and Raj Wangal Pandey, MLA, appeared to be inevitable. 
Banarsi Das was the nominee of the former BLD group which had 
ultimately decided against putting up Ram Naresh Yadav* the 
outgoing Chief Minister# again for the contest being held 
at Lucknow on F e b r u a r y B a n a r s i Das enjoyed the support of 
Charan Singh* 
The pro chcingers on the other hand had decided to 
field Raj Manssal Pande* a prominent leader of CFD. He was to 
have the support of 103-member-Jana Sanyh group* crucial for 
any candidate tor Chief Ministership* 
1. Yr.dav resigned on Feb 16 
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The niinlstrriallsts were said to be civlded over the 
selection of someone who was from upper cast® (Banarsi is 
vaishya) and not from e backward cocimunity or Harijan, The 
pro rebel BLD iwjiders such as Ranvdhar Ral, Shatrudra Prakash 
and H.K. Shrivastava felt that Satya Prakash Malviya was the 
most suitable candidate. 
A three member committee consisting of H,N, Bahuguna 
C.B* Gupta and Nanaji Deshroukh was to take the final decision 
on the pre changers candidate. 
C.B, Gupta withdrew from the contest for party leader-
ship 4n the everting of February 26,1979, This withdrawal was 
on a technical objection*/barely 18 hours before the voting 
next day, and instead named Raj Mangal Ponde o± the CPD as 
the candidate ot the pro chan^^ers. Other leaders of the 
caotp who had authorised Gupta to make the choice also announced 
their sv^port for Pande. 
The rival ministerialist candidate# Banarsi Das resigned 
from his o-^fice of Speaker on 26 Feb, and immediately swung 
into hectic canvassing. He was goiny from room to room in the 
legislators hostel commenting that probably the prechangers 
would change their candidate once again. He did not consider 
Pande as a serious candidlate,^ 
1. National Herald, Lucknow, Feb 27#1979 
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The consultations ainong the Central Janata leaders 
and the new aligwnents in the offing, indicated that Banarsi 
Das would become the next Chief Minister, The exploratory 
talks between Charan Singh and Bahuguna on February 25^ 
1979, followed by Charan Singh's discussions with Jagjivan 
Ram on February 26 and subsequent consultations of Jagjivan 
Ram with Bahuguna seemed to have brought the BLD and CFD 
faction of the Janata Party considerably closure^ atleast for 
the time being. 
Jagjivan Ram and Bahuguna were assured that Banarsi 
Pas would not act in the sectarian fashion that ^adav had 
tried to do. He would form a composite a£ Government with the 
best talents available from all groups. No efforts from Delhi 
will be made to influence the Chief Minister in his day to day 
functions. 
On February 27,1979 the U.p. Janata Ministerialist 
turned their recent defeat into victory by a convincing margin 
of 3b votes, when their nominee, Banarsi Das, was elected 
leader of the Jonata Legislature ^arty, defeating the di.ssident 
leader Raj Mangal Pande by 212 votes to 177.^ 
1, The Hin^^sji^sn H m ^ t New Delhi, Feb 26,1979 
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Bamrsi Das described Raj Mangal Panae« his opponent 
in the leadership conteat, as a valued colleague and co-worker 
and also appreciated the sportsman spirit of others who had 
di..fer©d with him on this occasion. He said the chapter was 
closed and everybody roust forgive and forget and the party 
must work unitedly.^ 
Banarsi Das left for Delhi immediately after the oath 
taking ceremony for consultation in Delhi on Ministry making, 
particularly with Charan Singh, Jagjivan Ram, H.N, Bahuguna 
and Raj Narain, He also met prime Minister Morarji Desai 
and Party President Chandra Shekhar. 
About the significance of his election, Banarsi Das 
said the biggest achievement was that Cha;itan Singh, Jagjivan 
Ram, H.N. Bahuguna and Raj Narain had come together at one 
place. He said the ultimate aim was transformation of the 
party. "We are the true Janata Party"* he remarked. 
1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Feb 26,1979 
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(A) CRISIS IN CENTRAI^  LEADER^ jHIP 
The Janata Parliamentary Party leadership remained 
unperturbed at the 13 resignation form the JPP, 10 in support 
of Raj Narain, reducing the ruling Party strength in the Lok 
Sabha from 3o2 to 289. The House had a total effective 
strength of 5 3 O n July 10,1979 14 more MPs quit the Janata 
Paety. By this no immediate threat to Morarji Government was 
seen. It reduced the party's strength from 3o2 to 275 in a 
House of 53 9/ eiccluding five vacancies. The support of Nine 
2 Akali members was assured to Janlita Party. 
on July 11,1979 the Morarji Government fell in minority 
3 
as 19 more quit the Janata. Even v/ith uhe party strength 
having dropped to 255 in a House of 539* Prime Minister 
Worarji Desai maintained that his Ck)vernment was not in minority. 
Even as Morarji Desai confidently declared at the general body 
meeting of the Janata Parliamentary Party on the morning of 
July 12,1979 that his Government would face the no-confidence 
motion being debated in the Lok Sabha# the party suffered 
another blow when Health Minister Rabi Ray and tv>o Ministers 
of State resigned from office* This was followed by the 
resignfction of 9 more MPs from Janata Party,* 
1. .HgyaJLct, Lucknow, July 10,1979 
2. Jyly 11,1979 
3. Ipid,. July 12,1979 
m ^ * Jruly 13,1979 
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As a result of continuous resignations of Ministers 
and defection of MPs the leader of Ck^ngress Party Y.B, Chavan 
iiaet President Sanjiva Reddy and discussed the crisis in Janata 
?fc.rty. He said that the Congress Party in the Lok Sabha would 
like to be asked to explore the possibilities of forming an 
alternative Government. 
On July 13 the fate of Janata Party Government hung in 
balance as Petroleum Minister Bahuyuna and two more 
Ministers of State resigned from the Ckjuncil of Minit.ters.^ 
Earlier the same day Charan Singh and Bahuguna had told Desai 
that they could not continue in the Cabinet if the issue of 
2 
dual membership was not resolved. Chandra Shekhar and Jagjivan 
Ram used their best efforts to dissuade Charan aingh and Bahuguna 
but failed* As soon as Bahuguna's resignation vias announced 
some Congress leaders met him to try to persue him to join 
the Congress but they failed. 
In % dramatic turn of events within the Janata Party, 
Prime Minister Morarji Desai found himself under great pressure 
to step down. Faced with an imminent adverse vote against it* 
the leaders of the various constituents of the party came to 
1. National Herald. Lucknow, July 14,1979 
2, One of the major issuei» which contributed to the split 
and downfall of Janata Party was the question of dual 
weBRbership. Most members of the erstwhile Jana Sangh 
held on to their RfciS membership and refused to give up 
the saro*. 
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the conclusion that the unity within the party could be 
maintained only if Desai stepped down. The consensus among 
them was that Deputy Prim© Minister Jagjivan Ram should 
succeed Desai as leader of the Party, 
With the strength of the Janata Party in the LoK Sabha 
depleting from 223 on the night of July^ 14 to a little over 
200 in a House of 539 on J\ily 15, Prime Minister Morarji Desai 
decided to step down and tendered his resiv^nation to President 
Sanjiva Reddy,^ The President accepted the resignation but 
requested Morarji Desai to stay till a successor was found 
Judging from the consultations at various levels the most 
acceptable name tor leadership in the Janata Parliamentary 
Pari:y seemed to be Deputy Prime Minister Jagjivan Ram. 
Janata Party President Chandra Shekhar strongly criticised 
George Fernandes, H.N. Bahuguna and others who left the party. 
Speaking of their resignations* he asked "is it political oppor-
tunism or expedienceChandra Shekhar rejected the suggestion 
that the RSb was the cause of the resignations. He saidt "the 
RSS is not an issue before ua." 
On July 18,1979 Y.B. Chavan, Opposition leader in the 
Lok Sabha was asked by President Sanjiva Reddy to e^qjlore the 
1 . T^e Hindustan Times, Mew Delhi, July 16,1979 
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possibility of fortiiing a cohesive and stable alternative 
Government to replace Morarji Desai's caretaker Government 
at the earliest,^ Chavan request-d the President to give him 
three or four days to form his Ministry* He. vras confident 
of forming a cohesive and stable Ministry in coalition and 
with the support of other secular and democratic parties. 
h new grouping of Political Parties with the Janata 
(Secular) and the Congress was taking shape for the foiroation 
of a Government at the Centre. But the question of leadership 
had not yet been decided. Contacts had not been established 
with the CPI-M, the Cpi, AIAEf4K and other like rcii.ded groups 
which believed in secularism and ^ere pledged to adopt progres-
sive policies. 
The only iao stake his claim for the office of Prime 
Minister was Charan Singh who was elected as the leader 
of the breakaway Janata (Secular) soon after resignation from 
the Party of which he was the cofounder. Charan Singh told 
President Sanjiva Reddy that he had the support of over 3®0 
members including 91 of his party.^ 
Tht^  Hindutitayx Times. Wew Delhi, July 19,1919 
2. Nai^ forjal Heyald. Lucknow, July 20,1979 
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The Congress Parliamentary Party leader YlB. Chavan 
reported to the President of India of the failure of his 
etforts to form a comprehensive and stable Government to replace 
the Desai Ministry, Driven to frustration by the Janata(S) 
insistence on Charan Singh being made Prime Minister of a coali-
tion Government, Chavan gave up the efforts in desperation. 
At a meeting at Desai'a residence^ Desai and Jagjivan 
Ram made a joint appearance when the latter announced: "we are 
together and will [^together", The members of the new Janata 
Executive who reeeived the statements ot Desai and Jagjivan 
Ram with jubilation were later told by Party functionaries 
that the reconciliation was "the resiilt of day long efforts fey 
by the leaders of several Janata groups who helped bring about 
heart to htart talk between Desai and Jagjivan Ram." Charan 
aingh's supporters/ nevertheless, were Iropeful that the breakaway 
Janata(S^ being the largest among the opposition parties, would 
be the next to be called by the President to constitute the 
Government, 
Janata(S) leader Charan Singh•s presistent eiforts to 
seek Mrs. Indira Gandhi's support in forming an alternative 
Government were rewarded on July 23,1979 when the Congress(I) 
decided to cast its lot with hiro.^ 
1* ^tional, Herft;i,r3. Lucknow, July 24,1979 
1V2 
Morajji Desai called on President Redfiy in the evening 
of July 23, and maintained that he had the requisite majority 
support which included the support assured by other groups 
end independent ro»rabere. 1% indicated that he would submit 
his list to the President within 48 hours. Charan Singh earlier 
in the day forv^arded to the President a letter he had received 
in the roornirig from Y,B. Chavan, recognising him (Qiaran Singh) 
as leader of the Congress-Janata(S) alliance* 
Besides 75 Congress members, the Janata(S) had a strength 
of 79 in the Lck Sabha. The alliance also had the siJ^port of 
Bahuguna group and Socialist bloc. This raised their strength 
to 203, On July 24,1979 Desai and Charan Singh submitted their 
lists to the President containing 279 and 28p names respectively, 
on July 27,1979 Morarji Desai stepped down from the Janata 
Parliamentary party and said that he was disturbed by the recent 
developments which brought down to the lowest possible level 
political conduct and behaviour. He anix>unced his decision to 
retire from active politics, indicating he might resign from 
membership of Lok Sabha also. However* when the leader® of the 
party Jagjlvan Ram, Party President Chandra Shekhar, JLP deputy 
leaders, general secretaries and several MPs approached him with 
the request that he should continue to be available to the 
party to provide guidance as a respected leader, Desai qgreed 
to review his decision.^ 
A nine member coalition goverranent headed by Charan 
Singh was sworn in on July 28,1979 Y,B. Chavan, leader of the 
Congress Parliamentary Party* who was the only nominee of his 
party to be sworn in/ vas later named Deputy Prime Minister 
2 
with the portfolio of Home Affairs. H.N. Bahuguna had been 
appointed S'inance Minister and S.N. Mishra Minister for Exter-
nal Affairs, 
The other portfolios were to be announced later after 
Congress had resolved its differences over its nominee and after 
the second batch of Ministers wai> sworn in. The other Ministers 
sworn in were Zulfiqarullah, Rabi Ray, Ram Kinkar and 
Purushottam Kaushik, all members of IJesai's Council of Ministers. 
The Cor^reas Parliamentary Board resolved the crisis by 
retaining all the earlier six names and adding four others for 
3 
inclvjision to the Charan Singh Ministry, The new names had been 
so selected so as to give representation to the minorities# 
scheduled Castes and Women. The North-Eastern Region also 
found a place in the choice finalised. In addition to the six 
1. The Hii^^ustan Tipies.. New Delhi, July 28,1979 
2. July 29,1979 
3. Slai^, July 30,1979 
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names (Brahtnanand Reddy* Hltendra Desat# Subrainanyain, T.A, Pai, 
Karan Singh and K»C, Pant) # the Board decided to recommend the 
name of Mohd. Shafi Quret>hi for Ministership of the Cabinet 
rank* Henery Austin (Kerala) and Mrs, Rashida Haque Chaiidhry 
(AssaB)) / wife of the late Moinul Haque Chaudhary were to be the 
Ministers of atate. The third name for Minister of State was 
left to be finalised in consultation with KarnataKa Chief 
Minister Devaraj Urs. 
In the allocation of p0»tfolios of his Governments which 
itfas announced late on July 30,1979, Prime Minister Charan Singh 
allowed roost of the former Janata Ministers to retain their 
portfolios and gave C. Subraroanyam, Itefence* Brahmanand Reddy 
Industry* T»A. Pai Petroleum and Chemicals> Karan Singh Education 
and Hitendra Desai Commerce and Civil An unexpected 
addition to the Cabinet was former Supreme Court Judge and Law 
Commissioii Chairman H.R, Khanna who* had replaced Shanti Bhushan 
as the Minister for Law# Justice and Company Affairs* 
On Axigust 5/1979 Jagjivan Ram asked all "right thinking 
people to get together and bring down the Government of 
defectors and deserters" and said that the Janata Party itself 
would not mind voluntary help from any quarter including Indira 
1. T^e Times of India, New Delhi, July 31,1979 
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Gandhi's Ctongress.^ 
On August $,1979 a Presidential Order summoning th© 
two Houses of Parliament to meet frora August 20 was issued. 
It was for a short session from August 20 to 24 for enabling 
Prime Minister Charan Singh to seek a vote of confidence in 
the Lok Sabha in term of the advice by President Sanjiva Reddy 
2 
while inviting him to form the Government. Leader of the 
Opposition «3^ agjivan I^m made it clear on August 9 that if Charan 
Singh's Government failed to win the confidence vote on August 
20 in the Lok Sabha^ the President vas bound to call him to 
form an alternative Government. 
The 24 day old coalition government headed by Charan 
Singh resigned on August 20,1979 even before seeking the vote 
of confidence from the Lok Sabha which had been called for the 
3 
purpose. Following the Congress(X) decision to oppose the 
Government/ the coalition partners came to the conclusion that 
they would not be able to muster majority support. At an emer-
gency session of the Cabinet in the roornirig of August 20, it 
was decided not to e3«.pose the Government to the judgement 
of the House. 
1. The Tiroes of ly^dia. New Delhi, August 6,1979 
2. IMS*/ Aug 7,1979 
3. Ibj.d.. Aug 21,1979 
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Accordingly, as the I^ ok Sabha assembled to discuss the 
motion for the vote of confidence# Prime Minister Charan Singh 
drove to Rashtrapati Bhavan with the resignation of his Council 
of Ministers and its advice to the President to dissolve the 
House• The President accepted the resignations and asked 
Charan Singh and his colleagues to continue in the office till 
other arrangements were made. This communication from the 
President was read out by Speater S.K. Hedge in the LoK Sabha 
after which he adjourned the ^tou6e sinedie. 
on August 21,1979 President Sanjiva Reddy rejected 
Janata leader •J'^ agjivan Ram's claim to form an alternative 
Government- H© dissolved the Lok Sabha and ordered fresh elec-
tions in mid-December 1979 to resolve the political crisis that 
has arisen following the resignation of Charan Singh's Coalition 
Ministey.^ 
1. The Times of Ipdia. New Delhi, Aug 22,1979 
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(B) JAtQAYA GOVERNMENT DURING BANARSI m S * S CHlfiF MINISTERSHIPt 
CRISIS IN THE PARTY AND ITS END ' 
Sanarsi Das, the newly elected Janata Party leader was 
sworn in on February 28,1979 as the tenth Chief Minii>ter of 
Uttar Pradesh. Six other Cabinet Ministers who were members 
of the outgoing Vadav Cabinet/ were also sworn in by Governor 
lipase. %e!se Ministers were tJaroupa Prasad Bose (erstwhile 
socialist) Hadhukar Dighe, Ram ShanJcar Kaushik, Rajendra Singh 
(former Congress-O)» Rest of the Ministers were to be appointed 
later on in consultation with the Central leaders, 
fenarsi Das declared that he would not include anyone 
in his Ministerial team who had links with RSS, On March 6,1979 
he expanded his cabinet taking in 18 more Ministers including 
Ram Naresh Yadav who was made the Deputy Chief Minister, 
raising its strength to 25,^ 
Of 25 Ministers the lion's share of 11 went to the BLD, 
eight to CFD, three including the Chief Minister went to the 
Congress(O) and one each to Muslim Majlis, Socialists and Jana 
Sangh dissidents. Banarsi Das proposed further expansion of his 
Cabinet. Dissident leader Raj M^ngal Pande, meanwhile complained 
1. The Hindustan Times^ New Delhi, March 1 and 7,1979 
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to Prinie Minister Mora#ji Desai and Party President Chandra 
Shekhar denouncing the expansion of the cabinet as "partisan 
and one sided" and demanded immediate intervention and appro-
priate action. 
The Banarsi Das Cabinet was ejqjanded ac,ain on March 7,1979 
to include two more Ministers &»P, Malviya and H»K. i»rivastava» 
both well known 8L& dissident leaders, raising its strength to 
It was announced that Narayan<,Singh (CPD) would also be desig-
nated Deputy Chief Minister, the first Deputy Chief Minister 
beiny Ram "aresh Yadav. Narayan Singh, a trusted lieutenant 
of H.N. Bahuguna would also be the leader of the Upper House. 
The portfolios were announced immediately after the ceremony. 
The Cabinet was expanded for the third tiroes on July 1,1979 
to include 16 more Ministers of State raising its strength to 43. 
Of these 16 Ministers 10 belonged to the erstwhile BLD, two to 
the Socialists, three to Congress(O) and one to the CFD. They 
inc uded three Harijans and three from backward classes. None 
from the erstwhile Jana Sangh was included* 
1. Hgffftld^  New Velhx, March 8,1979 
On Auyust 2,1979 the U.P. Coupcil of Ministers paased 
a unanimous resolution declaring that they were members ot the 
same party of which Charan Singh and Raj Warayan are the leaders 
and they had no connection with the party led by Chandra i^khar.^ 
Chief Minister Banarsi Das said that they recognised the 
Janata<.S) unit of which Ram Saran v.ao the convener. The Council 
meeting which was attendees by 25 of the 27 Cabinet Ministers and 
all 18 Ministers of States showed their loyalty to the Janata-S 
Banarsi Das said that the Janata Legislatxare ^arty of the State 
would continue to be called so* ^hose who differed with him were 
free to leave* he added. 
According to Banarsi Das it was a trial of strength 
between the RSS led dissidents and those who had elected him the 
leader* "In this the secular and democratic forces had won over 
the obscurantist forces"/ he said. He felt that the Janata 
Party had split both horizontally and vertically and that Chandra 
Shekhar and other leaders had failed to resolve the iusue of dual 
membership and prove that the party was wedded to secular ideas. 
On August 3,1979 the Janata Barty President Chandra 
Shekhar announced that Chief Minister Banarsi Das had been removed 
from the leadership of the Janata Iiegislature Party as well as 
"griXfl^ Lucknow, Aug 3,1979 
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from the XTI^L'ship of the Janata Party.^ He said that he had 
no option but to take this vmpleasant decision in view of I>as*s 
categorical statement that he owed his allegience to the Janata 
The open confrontation between the Chief Ministers 
Legielatvire Party and the other Janata Legislature Party was 
carried a step further on August 4,1979 when the Chief Minister's 
side announced as a retaliauory measure, the expulsion of 16 
2 
of its main opponents* The latter in turn, met the Governor 
and in a memorandum urged him to treat the Das Ministry as a 
Caretaker Government and not to allow it to take policy dicisions. 
Health Minister Ram Shankar Kaushik* General Secretary 
of the Legislatvire Party led by Banarsi Das issued a warning 
that disciplimry action would be taken against those party 
members attending the meeting of the Janata Legislature Party 
announced by the party president Chandra Shekhar for August 9 
to elect a new leader. 
1. National Herald, Lucknow, Aug 4,1979 
2. Xbid.f Aug 5,1979I Those expelled included State Janata 
Chief Abbas Ali, their spokesman Raj Mangal Pandey, Ram 
Prakash Gupta, H.O. Shrivastava, Kesarinath Tripathi, 
Kalyan Sdngh, Chandra Bhakta Singh, Omprakash Singh and 
R.K. Sahi, All former Jana Sangh Ministers besides 
Muzaffar Ansari former Congress(0) Minister, B.p, Vadav 
MLA (Socialist), Padmakar Lai MLA, and SVS, Towar, both 
of Chandra Shekhar group, Ravindranath Tiv.ari MLA, and 
Raj Kumar Sama MLC (Jana Sangh) . 
Chandra SheHhar claimed that Banarsl Das would be 
reduced to minority^ after the Janata Party MLAs withdrew 
support from him «nd elected a new leader on Auguat He 
said that atleast 150 members Oi. the 250 strong unxted JLP 
would attend the meeting. This would reduce the number of 
supporters of JDas in the Assembly to about 200 in a house of 
426 with two seats vacant. 
Chandra Shekhar recalled that in the leadership contest 
in February 1979 Raj Mangal t-andey had polled 176 votes against 
Das of which about 144 were from the Assembly and 22 from the 
Council and that Banarsi Das had no chance of survival. On 
August L,1979 the Executive of the State Janata Party led by 
Chandra Shekhar passed a resolution calling upon the Governor 
to dismiss the Government led by Banarsi Das as he had by that 
time not been declared leader of the legislature party of any 
2 
of the recognized political parties. The resolution said that 
Das was no longer the leader of Janata Legislature Party as he 
had been removed from the primary membership of the Janata Party 
by Chandra Shekhar, 
Three General Secretaries of the U.p, Janata Party 
at a meeting with Governor G.D. Tapase reiterated their Party's 
1. The Hindustan Ti^f>a. New Delhi, Aug 3,1979 
2. Ibidl. Aug 6,1979 
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demand for the dismissal of the Banarsi Das Govt. The Governor 
discussed every Issue raised by them in detail and assured 
thein that he would take appropriate action. It was pointed out 
that since Banarsi Das had been expelled from Janata Party by 
Chandra Shekhar the Chief Min^-ster not only was no longer leader 
of the Janata Legislature Party but had also lost his position 
as a member of the J.L.P. 
On August 9,1979, Raj Mangal Pande* who vas uninously 
elected leader of the Janata Legislature Party owing allegience 
to Chandra Shekhar* had demanded from the Governor the dismissal 
of the Banarsi Das Government and a chance to form a new Gover-
ment.^ 
The split in Janata Legislature Party was officially 
and technically formalised when the U p. Assembly Acting speaker 
Jagannath Prasad* recognised Raj Mangal Pande as the leader of 
the Opposition , and the two factions as two dxstinctly separate 
parties to be known as the Janata Legislature t'arty (Banarsi 
Daa) and the U»P, Janata Legislature Party (Raj Manual Pande) . 
N.D. Tivari cea^ied to be the leader of Opposition as soon as 
Pande was declared as the leader. 
1. T^e Hindustai^ Time^. New Delhi, Aug 19,1979 
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Pande was recognised aa the leader of the opposition 
after he suhmltted a list of 160 members/ all (except one 
Independent) being members of the undivided Janata Party, which 
had a strength of 354 In the House. This left 195 Janata 
members for the Chief Minister's Party. Banarsi Das had also 
the support of 9 Cpl members, seven from Congress and five 
Independents/ the total came to 216 while he required only 211 
for a majority.^ 
On August 20/1979 Raj ^iangal Pande* leader of the oppo-
sition, moving a no confidence motion in the State Assembly 
said that there had been all round deterioration in the State 
2 
ever since the Government led by Banarsi Das assumed oifice. 
He said that "the political atmosphere had got polluted* the 
economy was in bad shape with drought in 26 districts/ the 
crime rate had gone up alarmingly and the bad power supply was 
adding to the miseries or the rural pepple." 
The Coogress For Democracy/ headed by H.N, Bahuguna 
decided on November 14/1979 to join hands with Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi in the forthcoming elections.^ As a result Lok Dal 
General Secretary ^adhu Limay© said if CFD ultimately joined 
1. New Delhi, Aug 29,1979 
2. JMsSU* Aug 31/1979 
3. The Tinges pf Indif. New D«lhi/ Nov 15,1979 
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the Congress(I) and deserted the anti authoritarian front, 
the CFD Ministers in u,p. should quit the Government. But 
at the same time he appealed to Deputy Chief Minist«-r 
Narayan Singh (belonging to CFD) ^ no his friends to consider 
the whole position and not to leave the anti authoritarian 
front. In response to the appeal CFD Ministers in u.p, had 
informed Chief Minister Bc^narsi Das that they vould resign 
from the Cabinet if they joined the Congress(I) but would 
continue supporting his Government from outside. 
Seven CFD Ministers of Cabinet rank resigned from 
Banarsi Das Government on November 17*1999, The same day 
Bahuguna said at Delhi that the CFD vvas r»t in favour of 
elections at Present because of unprecedented drought in the 
State. It would not be fair to ask the people to go to polls 
there now. CFD would support the present Government from 
outside.^ 
A section of the top Central Lok Dal Leadership favoured 
dissolution or the U.P. Assembly and its mid-term elections 
simultaneously with the Lok Sabha Poll in early Janaruy»1980. 
But Chief Minister Banarsi Das was dead set against it and 
conveyed hia opposition to the idea to Pr<4rae Minister Charan 
Singh. Bcnarsi Das met the Prime Minister on October 28/1979 
1. Th« Times of India. Nov 18,1979 
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ana it vRis decided that the U.P. Assembly would not be dissolved.^ 
The month long speculation about the dissolution of U.P, 
Assembly was set at rest on November 12, when all the 2 7 Cabinet 
Minister unanimously expressed the viev/ that there should be 
no mid-term poll. 
Zulfiqarullah, Minister for Communications, resigned 
from the Union Cabinet on December 3 and announced that he and 
the Muslim itotional Front of which he v.as the convenor were 
2 
aligning themselves with the Janata Party in Uttar Pradesh. The 
President of the U,p, Congress for Democracy Subedar Singh and 
General Secretary B.N. Singh announced the merger of their party 3 with the Congress. 
on Decembet 24, Ram Singh, Former Home Minister and U.P. 
Janata Party General Secretary rebigned from the party alongwith 
18 other senior Saharar^ur Partymen. They joined the Congress (I) 
on the plea that only Mrs. Gandhi would provide a stu. ble and 
strong Government.* Jamuna Prasad Bose Rural Development and 
5 Panchayat Raj Minister also resigned from the Banarsi Das Cabinet , 
liftUgnfrX Her^lflf Lucknow, Oct 29,1979 
2, The Hindustan Tiroes, Nev/ Delhi, Dec 4,1979 
3* Xbi<^., Dec 9,1979 
JSLtiUx Dec 25,1979 
5- The Tiroes of India, New Delhi, Dec 3o,l979 
He m a the ninth Minister to leave. Eight CFP Ministers haci 
earlier resigned and joined the Congress-X, 
After January 1980 General Elections it was indicated 
that a number o£ S.tate Assemblies domitiated by non-Congress (I) 
parties would be dissolved in the second week of February so 
that fresh electioxis could be held in March,^ The U.P, Chief 
Minister Banarsi Das declared that the Janata Party and hok 
Dal would jointly contest the Assembly elections* if the House 
was dissolved and mid-tertn polls held. He was sure "the 
Con^ressiD would meet its Waterloo in this State." 
After a three hour stormy debate on February 6#1980 
the U.P. Assembly passed by voice vote without any dissent a 
resolution sponsored by all non-Congress(I) parties expressing 
the "definite opinion" of the House that there was no "appropriate 
2 
basis" for its dissolution. Chief Minister Banarsi Das charac-
terised the Prime Minister's Charges on the Karainpur issue 
against his Government as "misleading, baseless and politically 
motivated" and that they were aimed at frightening the members 
of State Assembly into defecting to the Congress (I)" by dangling 
the sword of dissolution on their heads. 
1. The Times of Int^iy, New Delhi. Jan 29,1980 
2* ifciduL/ Feb 3,1980 
3. gtttional JBera^ l^ ^^  Lucknow, Feb 7,1980 
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"Any Chief Minister who cannot protect the life and honour 
of the people hos no right to continue in the office." said 
Sanjay Gandhi. Blaming the Janata leadership he saidt "Women 
were raped in Narair^ur* houses broken into, the men beaten up 
and even minor girls were molested. The Chief Minister should 
resign for these atrocities. Dissolution of Assembly was not 
because of Party reasons but on moral grounds. It w^s a game 
started by Janata Party,"^ 
On February 11,1980, Banarsi Das sought President Sanj4ya 
Reddy's intervention to save his Government which, according 
to him, continued to have the confidence of the people as 
2 
demonstrated by the majority it enjoyed in the State Assembly. 
At his 30 minutes meeting with the President Banarsi Das maintained 
that the dissolution of the U.P. Assembly in the existing 
circuTistances would be "malafide and constitutionally untenable." 
He therefore wanted the President to advise the Prime Minister 
"not to embark upon the precipitous course", which coxjild lead 
to a chain of unfortunate reactions. 
In a dramatic move on February 16,1980 President Sanjiva 
R«ddy appointed C.P.N. aingh as Governor of Uttar Pradesh to 
succeed G.D. Tapase who was moved to I^ryana. The Times pf 
1. .Yhfi, Yimfta, i^ ew Delhi, Feb ii,i98o 
2. National Herald. Lucknow, Feb 12,1980 
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commented that the "chancre In the Governorship v;as linked to 
political critiis, with the gradual unfolding of Centre's plan 
to dissolve the Legislative Assemblies of U.P. and some other 
States."^ 
On the night of February 17,1980 President iianjiva Reddy 
issued a proclamation diasolving nine non-Coi^ressd) ruled 
state Asaeinblie®* The Assemblies dissolved were those of Uttar 
Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, 
Orissa, Gujarat and Maharashtra4 These nine 3tatet> had come 
2 under President's rule. 
Formalising the parting of v;ays with the Janata Party, 
delegates attending the convention called by L.K, Advani on 
April 6,1980 constituted a new party which they christened 
Bhartiya Janata Party and elected v/ith ^ne voice Atal Bihari 
Vajpayee as its first President.^ The new party, it was 
decided, would have a separate constitution, separate flag and 
a separate election symbol. L.K. Advani M.P., «»ikancLr Bakht 
and Murli Hanohar Joshl were appointed as General Secretaries of 
the party. 
1. Thp„ New Delhi, Feb 17,1980 
2. Ibid.. Feb 18,1980 
The Times of India, New Delhi, April 7,1980 
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Immediately after the Assetnbly elections (1980) in which 
Congress won with overv^helminQ majority/ the UPCC(I) President 
Dharamvir met the Prime Minister and aanjay Gandhi for consul-
tations regardir.g leadership. It wai. believed that a senior 
leader would be sent from Delhi to take charge of U.P,, if no 
satisfactory choice was available from among the newly elected 
members of the Assembly, The names being mentioned in that 
context included those of C.p.N, Singh, Vishwanath Pratap Singh 
and Dharam Vir, 
Men±)ers of the Youth Copgress elected to the U.P. Assembly 
had launched a move for making Sanjay Gandhi the Chief Minister 
of U.P. "in the larger interest of the State and the Country." 
But to this move Mrs. Gandhi ruled out the possibility of 
Sanjay Gandhi being inducted as Chief Minister of XJttar Pradesh. 
Following was the Party pot-ition in the elections of 
U.P, Assembly!-
party Pffsi^ ijpn 
Total seats 
Seats declared 
Conv^reesCl) 
J.C.S, 
B.J.P. 
J.P. 
C.P.I. 
Cong. (U) 
J.R.N, 
Independents 
425 
419 
305 
58 
11 
4 
7 
13 
4 
17 
1. The Hindustan Tiroes. Mew Delhi, June 4,1980 
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The U.P. Congress-I Legislature Party on June 6,1980, 
unanimously elected Sanjay Gandhi as its leader, but authorised 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi to nominate any other suitable person in his 
place as the leader "in case Mr Gandhfi's valuable services 
cannot be spared for U»P, in larger national interests",^ 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi rejected this unanimous plea» 
This had further brightened the chances of Vishwanath 
Pratap Singh MtP. and former Union Minister whose name for 
Chief Ministership had earlier been suggested by Legislators, 
Vishwanath Pratap Sin^h flew to Delhi immediately after the Party 
meeting. N.D. Tiwari the other notable candidate, C,p,K. Singh, 
Union Mifiister of State for Defcnc-e, Sanjay Singh, U.P. Youth 
Congress President, Dharamvir UPCC(I) President and Lokpati 
Tripathi, Vice-President also rushed to Delhi. 
Prime Minii^ter Indira Gandhi's intervention had averted 
a contest for the Chief Ministership of U.P. which was decided 
to be led by Mr. Vishwanath Pratap Singh. 
A fifteen memi-er Ministry headed by Vishwanath Pratap 
Singh was sworn in on June 9#1980 at Raj Bhavan which consiststed 
of /ill Cabinet Ministers including the Chief Minister/. This was 
I. National Hera;^^. Lucknow, June 7,1980 
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the I2th Ministry to be installed in U.P. since independence. 
The President's rule in the state came to an end v,-ith the 
installation o± the new Ministry. There were 10 Cabinet Minxsters 
besides the Chief Minister and five Ministers of atate.^ 
The Janata Government in U.P» took a number of decisions 
during its short tenure* Of all the decisions taken, some major 
decisions are being referred to in this chapter. The perfor-
mance of the Government had an impact on the general administra-
tion in the atate and also affected the people at large* '^'^any 
decxsions were welcomed by the people; but some were subjected 
to criticism, 
isome of the policies laid down by the Janata Governn^nt 
could not be implemented due to the short tenure of the Govern-
ment. The Government had to go very soon and most of the 
schemes had to be shelved. Decisions taken and promises made 
iii the political, economic, administrative, aocial and other 
fields are i^iven below» 
1, The Hindustan TAme^, New Delhi, June 25,1977 
On June 25,1977 the Jtnata Government declared that 
stern action would be taken agoinst officers responsible for 
excesses under the Emergency in U.P.^ The Government emphasized 
on the need to establish the rule o£ lav;. Jiither the bureau-
cracy vjas derno alised unoer preinf^ sure or there was a compact 
between it and the politicians to protect each other. Xt 
believed the latter was true. 
The benefits meant for the people at the lower level 
under the plans could not reach them as it was mostly eaten 
away on the warp which the Janata Government characterxsed as 
"daylight robbery". If the people were vigilant and kept a 
watcrif^ eyed on the iraplementationof Government policies and 
plans* it would be easier to solve their problems. The 
Government had pleaded with the people to have patience and 
to wait for the results of -he v.'crk Jc-nata Party had undertaken, 
.to. Ptfi M I ^ 
The Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh R.N. tadav declared 
in a pretis coiiference that the Government servants arrested 
under DIR or MISA during the emergency would be taken back and 
paid full salaries and allowances during the period of their 
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absence.^ Victimised employees would be rehc^bilitated tx) their 
oriQiml poaitions. iaitnilorly lobourers* whoo© services were 
tezroinated under t-ilSI-. and DIR wovac be reappointed with a view 
to providing a clean and e^iicient administration the vigilance 
establishment had been strengthened at the state and district 
levels to trap corrupt employees. 
All Divisional ^commissioners and District ^iagistrates 
in the State were asked to ensxire that Members of Parliament* 
State Legislators and other representatives of the people who 
call on them were shown due respect and courtesy by them and 
their subordinates. The instructions contained in the Chief 
iiecretary's letter to all the Commissioner^ end District 
Magistrates also stressed that it was the duty of the Government 
servants to be polite towards all citizens and discharge their 
2 duties honestly and diligently. 
Draft for Criminal Law change^ 
The U.P, C,overnment sent to the Centre for its clearance 
a draft ordinance providing for necessary amendments in Section 
1. The Tia»s of Ind^a. New Delhi, July 30,1977 
2. J«ly 17,1977 
194 
167 of the Criminal Procedure Code to enable persona accused 
in criminal cases to surrender before courts. This was to 
overcome difficulties arising out of a High Court rulii^ that 
only those arrested by the police could be granted bail and 
not those sxirrendering voluntarily to the courts,^ 
Oyd^ys R^aay^inq Press St^ff 
1?he U«P. Government had ordered that no newspaper 
establishment shall terminate the services of any permanent 
non-journalist employee by dissraissal, discharge* retrenchment 
or otherwise without the prior consiiltation with the Labour 
Commissioner of U.P. or any officer apjxjinted by him in this 
behalf. This order prohibited suspension or reduction in rank 
oi: a permanent non journalist employee as a measure of punishment 
by any newspaper establishnient. This order which came into 
force from taeptember I3,li^77 w^s to remain ex^ective tor one 
2 year. 
The Uttar Pradesh Cabinet decided to appoint an Advisory 
Committee in each district to offer advice in respect Oi the 
The Statesfnan. New Delhi, Aug 2,1977 
2. ikiJU* Sep 19,1977 
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excercise of rights ano duties of Zila Parishad.^ The Committee 
was to have the District Magistrate as its chairman. All the 
Legislators and HeRtbers of Parlianient o£ the district« seven 
non officials including a vroman and a scheduled caste member, 
all the district level oificers and police superintendents were 
to be the members of the Committee.^ 
The U.P. Governor Chenna Reddy in a joint session of 
both the Houses o State Legislature declared the enforcement 
of the Lok Ayukta Act from July 12,1977 to ensure clean 
administration. This institution, he said "would not only 
look into the charges of corruption against high ranking public 
servants but also be able to take effective c-ction in case of 
„2 specific ptiblic complaints of injustice. 
TVrce The more Labour Courts were set up in U.P. to ensure 
disposal of industrial disputes. They were located at Ghaaiabad, 
Kanpur and Bareilly. This raised the strength of such courts 
in U.P. to 12. About 6000 Industrial disputes were pending in 
the State industrial tribunals and industrial courts.^ 
1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, Oct 2o#1977 
2. Ibid., July 13,1977 
3. Ibid., March 27,1978 
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The Uttar Pradesh Government Is&ued an Ordinance under 
which the provisions of preventive detentioxi could be used for 
causiny disruption in any of the essential services including 
the generation and supply of power. Under this Ordinance 
titled "The Uttar Pradesh Essential Services (Prevention of 
Disr»j$>tion) Ordinance 1979*, a person could be detained for a 
period of six months. The detention would be subject to a 
judicial review within two months. Besides power supply and 
generation* the services covered under the Ordinance were water 
supply, health and sanitation/ transport and vjorkshops. 
Collection of revenue, public order and conducting of elections,^ 
The U.P. Chief Minister Ram Naresh Ygaav said that his 
government was committed to fulfil all the promises made by the 
Janata Party during the elections. 
Addressing his first press conference at the Council 
House* ^adav said that in keeping with the party line the State 
Government would accord priority to tigricxilture and ensure 
that availability of irrigation facilities and power were 
1. The Hindustan Times* New Delhi* Nov 23*1979 
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Increased. Aa a first step* Vadav government had ordered that 
adequate power supply be provided to the farmers for irrigation 
of sugarcane crops.^ 
The other point of attention for the "Janata government 
would be providing a clean adtninistr^.tion to the state. Efforts 
were to be made to encourage the growth of small scale indus-
tries alongwith an increase in agricultural production. Cases 
of all political prisoners would be reviewed* inquiries would 
be made into specific cases of excesses committed during the 
emergency. The government policy to exempt all holdings 
- 2 having an area not exceeding 6.25 acres from land revenue. 
The Janata Party Supplementary Manifesto for the U.P. 
Assembly Elections promised that uneconomic holdings would be 
exew^ted from land revenue and all other direct taxes. The 
manifesto issut^d on June 8,1977 also assured refixation of 
just and reasonable irrigation jnates and land revenue on other 
holdings. It said that the rates were out on the eve of the 
last Lok bobha polls but the tarmers had not got full justice. 
It also promised adequate supply of agricultural inputs and 
1. The H;Ly^dustan Tiiqes. New Delhi, June 25,1977 
2. Ifeifl,., 
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drinking water to each village. 
The manifesto promised that the land grabbed illegally 
would be taken away and redistributed among the landless and 
needy. Efforts to take away land allotted to landless would 
be resisted and irregularities in land distribution removed. 
Arrangements would be made to ensure payiaent to cane growers 
within 15 days of supply. Snail and cottage industries would 
be set tap in villages to provide gainful employment in spare 
time.^ 
The state Assembly, on July 14,1977, paused a Bill for 
debt relief to the weaker sections. While the ^ill provided 
for complete liquids tion of debts of landless agricultural 
labour* marginal farmers and villager artisans, it envisaged 
scaling down of the debts of small farmers according to their 
paying capacity. It also provi<aed for debt relief to the 
2 rickshaw pullers, sanitation workers and urban labour. 
1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, June 0,1977 
2. Ibid., July 15,1977 
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The State government took a very serious view of the 
non-clearance of arrears of cane price by a number of sugar 
mills. Proprietors of 18 Sugar Mills were called to a meeting 
held at Lucknow under the chairmsnship of the Minister for the 
Sugar Industry and Cane JDevelopment, Chandrawati, and directed 
to pay the arrears of cane price outstanding ^gainst them by 
the end of July,1977.^ 
The Cabinet decided to give financial assistance to the 
tune of Rs. 3,50 crore as loan to 16 sugar factories under 
U.P, Government control, to meet the expenses of off season 
repair and for payment of wages to the workers during the year 
1977-78. A loan of te. 85 lakhs had already been sanctioned 
to the four uu^ar factories taken by the goveriment at that time. 
On September 15,1977 the Government had decided to give 
20 percent, subsidy to all farmers and 30 percent to new allotees 
of land on the purchase of phosphatic and potassic fertilizers. 
These fertilizers had been found to be effective in increasing 
the production of pulses, gram, peas, arhar and masoor, A sum 
of Rs, 5 crore had been earmarked for the purpose. 
1. yM-.H^R^U^tftR n m ^ ' New Delhi, July 15,1977 
2. The Times of India, New Delhi, July 18,1977 
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sfegpg u> liiq gffi^ aa, 
ft s\m of Rs, 22,42 crores had been spent till March 1977 
to raise the income level of small and marginal farmers in 187 
Development Blocks of 26 districts of littar Pradesh through 
various programmes launched under "small Farmers Development 
Agency,**^ 
The U.P, Gbvernroent had decided that provisions relating 
to entries in the land record "Khasara" and "Khatauni" regarding 
illegal possession of land of the tenants be abolished. Earlier 
in 1970, the State Government had decided that entriea regarding 
illegal possessions of land in the remarks column of Khasara 
should rot be made an experimental basis for two years. This was 
extended on an year to year basis. It was mow made a permanent 
2 feature. 
The U.p. Industrial Development Corporation had decided 
to aliot plote of land for industrial purposes at 50 percent 
reduced premium in Faizabao* Basti and Banda districts.^ 
1. The Hindustan Timafi. Mew Delhi, June 30,1978 
Xbid., Sep 24,1978 
Ijpidw May 9,1978 
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Under a programme of rural industriali3ation the U.P, 
Government proposed to set up lOO rural growth centres in 
different parts of the State. Each such centre was to cover 
about 20-25 villages* It was proposed to cover the entire 
rural area of the i>tate over a period of five years with 
thousands of small scale and cottage industries established 
in an estimated 5000 rural growth centres• During 1977-78 
60 rural growth centres were established with at least one 
in each district,^ 
Mew f.Qg ge^ i^^ t. 
The State Government* in a bid to impose partial control 
on the distribution of cenientr laid down rules and procedures 
for diatribution of cement to the public. The District Magis-
trates were instructed to follow a certain procedure in the 
distribution of cement to the public so that they may not be 
put to any inconvenience. Under this procedure# distribution 
of Cement was made only after agazatted officer had verified 
2 the stock received by the stockist. 
.wa^ ef. ajtd Sowsr 
As many as 2,54»69b private tube wells and puitipsets 
had been energised in the state. The Jitate Government had 
1. The Hindustan Tim^s. New Delhi, July 26,1977 
2. Ibid.. Aug 23,1977 
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started preliminary work on a R3. 60 crore scheme for drinking 
water facilities for which an agreement had already been signed 
with the World fenk. 
Power generation and supply in was to be augmented at a 
cost of Rs, 259 crores. Under the augmentation scheme* 40,000 
private tubewells and pumpsets were to be energised and t,000 
vill<-ges and 5,350 Harijan bastis provided with electricity. 
The U.P, Government had made an allocation of Rs. 66 
crores for the development of 8 hill districts of Garhwal and 
Kumaun during the 1978-79 financial year. The State Government 
had plans to give top priority to the construction of roads. 
In all 807 Km of existing roads repaired at a cost of Rs. 18 
crores. Rs. 9 crores were to be spent on providing drinking water 
for the sparsely populated 12oO villages. For the promotion of 
education facilities, a sum of Rs. 7.90 crores was to be spent. 
6'B many as 297 primary schools, 19 High Schools and 5 Intermediate 
Colleges were to be provincialised in 1978.^ 
In order to encourage the Cinema Industry in Uttar 
Pradesh the State Government had decided to provide incentives 
1. National Herald. Lucknow, June 1,1978 
for constructing mini cinema houses^ having a maximum seating 
capacity of 350 in cities and other places to provide entertain-
ment to a larger section of thepopulation and aliio help in showing 
art films to a maximxjm number of people.^ 
The Government had decided to remove toll tax barriers 
on the national highways passing through the State. According 
to the Minister for Local Self Government Satya Prakash Malviya 
2 action had been taken to remove k» ottlenecks in road transport. 
The sugar mill workers in the state got bonxis @ 8,33 
percent for the year 1977-78. This decision was taken at 
the state Sugar Industry tripartite conference held under the 
chainnanship of Minister for Labour and fi>.cise» Rama Shankar 
Kaushik. ^  
Modification of Sales Tax Ratep 
To encourage trade and industry in the State, the 
Government had decided to modify, with effect from March 1,1979 
1. Nationa?. Herald. Lucknow, June 1,1978 
2. Ibid.. Sep 28,1978 
3' Xbid.. Aug 2,1977 
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the rates of Sales Tax on certain commodities^ Motor vehicles 
of all kinds would be taxable at the rate of 9 percent^ soft 
drinks of all kinds at the rate of 10 percent, hosiery other 
than pure cotton at the rate of 7 percent at the point of sales 
and stationary at the rate of 4 percent.^ 
The U.P, Governnient on September 4,1977 submitted to 
the Centre schemes with a total outlay of Rs. 2,802.59 crores 
for maximum possible share out of assistance from International 
A^gencies, This included schemes for Ss. 1406.66 crores in the 
power sector, Ks« 748.43 crores for area development, Rs. 315.44 
crores for irrigation, Rs. 175.47 crores for rood development, 
Rs. 58.82 crores in the agriculture sector, Rs. 27.20 crore for 
animal husbandry, Rs. 61.80 core in the horticulture sector 
and Rs. 9.65 crore in the urban development sector. 
A Central team headed by P.K. MJlkherJee, Project 
Economist, Union Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, had 
discussion with the State Chief Secretary and other concerned 
officials about the formulation of projects for IDA assistance 
in the agriculture and allied sectors.^ 
1. The Hindustan T^mes. New Delhi, Sep 25,1978 
2. iPiS'* March 2,1979 
3. National Hera-j^ flf Lucknow, Sep 6/1977 
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The State Covernroent launched a massive programme for 
the aistribution of about Rs. 660 crores as loan to the people of 
various categories through cooperative societies. Of the amount 
to be distributed in 1978^ Rs. 360 crores were for boosting 
agricultural production and inveslyment in allied occupations and 
Rs. 300 crores for the simply of inputs and extending the network 
of cooperative marketing and consun^sr distribution agencies. 
With the coptpletion of the first phase of elections in about 
7000 panchayat level cooperative societies in the State» th© 
cooperative movement had gained new vigour.^ 
Schemes for Employment 
On June 1#1978 « a Rs. l /»80o crores employment plan 
was being implemented by the Government. Explaining the State 
employment policy eind steps taken under it, the Chief Minister 
Yadav said in a statement that this moventent for the five years 
term (of the current plan) would meet requirements of only 
4.48 million unemployed and underemployed people. Even then 
a back log of about 1,6 million people would be left to be 
2 carried torward during the next plan. 
National Herald, Lucknow, June 15,1978 
2. Jpbid., June 2,1978 
Productive en^jloyment for about three lakh people in 
15 districts of Eastern Uttar Pradesh during 1979-80 with a 
total investment of BS* 28.50 crores was envisaged under a 
plan prepared by the State Industries Department. This 
was based on the recommendations of a seminar on indusfcial 
development oi i;astern U.P./ presided over by U.P. Industries 
Minister Ram Prakash and attended by Union Minister of 
Industries George Fernandes.^ 
About 30,000 persons, according to this plan, were to 
be provided employment with an investment of Rs. 60 crores in 
the small scale sector while 120,000 persons were to be employed 
in the handicrafts sector with a total investment of Rs. 11 
cores The craftsmen would be mainly engaged in the procuction 
of woolen carpets, Benarsi Zari, wooden toys and artistic 
pottery. Similarly 90,000 persons were to be provided en^^loyment 
throuyh Khadi and Village Industries with an investment of 
Rs. 5.50 crores and 60,000 people in the handloom sector with 
an investment of Rs. six crores. It was also decided to set up 
two spinning mills in the State sector tor the benefit of the 
local weavers and to cater to their specific needs of cotton 
2 yarn. 
1. The Hindustan Times, N«w Delhi, Dec 29,1978 
2. mi* 
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The U.P. Cabinet had decided to remove the ban on 
recruitment to fill the vacant posts of teachers under th© 
U.P, Basic Shikaha Parishad. ao as to bring the student 
teachers ratio to 40 to 1 - which was necessary to maintain 
the proper standard of teaching. As a result ot this step 
500:^  more teachers were to be appointed immediately in the 
primary schools under the U.P. Basic Shiksha Parishad. 
The Government also decided that an additional teacher 
be appointed in 4,416 single teacher primary schools which 
were opened in 1973-74 and 1974-75. The number of students 
and classes had gone up in these bchools and one teacher could 
not look after the teaching in all the five classes.^ 
si. 
The ijtate Government liad decided to frame a comprehensive 
legislation incorporating all the existing orders relating to 
reservation in services of persons belonging to Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes. The quota was to be proportionate to 
the population. No condition of ejqperience in case of technical 
poses was to be laid for candidates of these communities. 
1. The Times of India, New Delhi, July 30,1977 
Special recruitment for the iacheduled Castes ana Scheduled 
Tribes v^ould be made against class I, II, and III services 
within the le^al framework,^ 
It was also decided that the services of these commu-
nities in class III and IV employees should not be terminated 
without the prior approval of concerned heads o£ department. 
Provisions would be made for associating an officer of the 
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in selection coiwnittees 
constituted by all autonomous bodies* 
The Government had decided to fix the percentage quota 
in the reservation for the backward clas;bes in direct recruitment 
to the State Services. This was to be 15% for Class I, II and 
2 
III and 10% for Class IV jobs. It was also decided to reserve 
25% of posts in Class III till the quota of 18% already reserved 
for Scheduled Castes was completed. In Class IV the quota was 
to be 30% till the percentage of the Scheduled Castes reached 
18. 
1. National Herali^f Lucknow, Dec 4,1978 
2. The Stateeroan. New Delhi, Aug 28,1977 
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Coiisequently the quota percentage for reservation for 
different Classes of services uas to be; 
CaatQBi IS/,for ^lasses I & IJ, 25% for Class III and 
3C94 for Class IV, 
Scl;iedu3,.e,_Tr;lbgsa 2% in each Class of cervices; Dependents of 
freedom fighters i 2% and 3% each in Class III -^nd IV^ incapaci-
tated military orficers, emergency commissioned oj^ficers, 
short service commission d officers anc ex soldiers ~ ©i each 
in Class I & II, 3?4 in Class H I & IV, 
backward Ciaaj^t 1S4 in Class I# II and III and IC84 in Class IV. 
It vias also decided that the dependents of political 
detenus under KISA during the period of i^mergency from June 1975 
to March 1977 would also be included in the quota reserved for 
the dependents of freedom lighters. Only those persons among 
freedom fighters# who had served a Jail sentence of six months 
or above/ were to be entitled to this privilege. These changes 
were to be impl^ented with innediate effect. 
The U.p. Cabinet on February 15,1980 decided to withdraw 
the reservation promotions in Government services for scheduled 
2S0 
Castes and Tribes and backward Classes 
Also in direct recruitment, dependents of income tax 
payers c.nd gazetted officers among Scheduled Castes« Tribes and 
backward classes would not have any special qualities and had 
to compete as general candidates. The same principle was to 
apply in admi&sion to technical education and medical courses. 
Further the minimum marks for eligibility were raised 
from 35% to 4(3?^  in the case of Scheduled Castes and Tribes and 
from 40 to 45^ for backward classes for these courses as against 
5C»» for general candidates. 
Explaining the decision* Chief Minister Benarsi Das 
said, reservation had now been put on an economic and social 
basis* He said reservation in promotions \iias "unjust and 
inequitable", against which there were a lot of complaints. 
Also a person receiving one benefit should not get another. 
1. Thfi ^mfff. New Delhi, Feb 16,1980 
Cftapter - VI 
PATTERK OF LEADERSHIP XN U.P. 
(A) fiuTfti, 
(B) m^XXm fOjLAtjLgjB, 
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(A) RwftX fretasrahto 
The introduction of Panchayati Raj institutions in the 
State has given rise to a new pattern of rural leadership in 
Uttar Pradesh. The^e leaderci are quite different from tradi-
tioral leaders and has resulted in coiiflict between the two 
types ot leaders. In the past there was confluence of social/ 
economic and political power in the s^ tne group* This tact was 
responsible for the emergence of dominant caste which ruled 
supreme over all groups in the villages* But the forces of 
change which were generated as a result ox political/ social and 
economic chc.nges have novj broken the monopoly and tend to shift 
the axis of power from the traditionally high group to the other 
aspirant lower gro\:^s.^ 
Rural leadership has undergone certain changes in 
authority and structure* which is applicable to most of the 
villageti of Uttar Pradesh. Andre Bet^ille says that the halo 
about the traditior^al leaders and caste Panchayats is gradually 
becoming dim. There are various reasons for the waning influence 
of traditional leaders. Especially with the appearance of 
1. Chhabra, HK & Jones/ W.T./ St^te Politics ip India/ 
iiurjeet Publication, Delhi, 1980, p.216. 
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Gram Sabha on the village scene, the caste Panchayats have 
almost become defunct# for the Gram Sabha enjoyed the protection 
and ptitronage ot the government, The^e days the judgement 
pronounced by the Cat>te Councils are not alv.ays accepted* 
Fines and Punishments are ignored. The power of Caste Panchayats/ 
though on the decline, has not completely disappeared. Arwjng 
the people there still lingers a tear ot heavy fines and other 
kinds of punishments. During the elections for Gram Sabha, 
some of the qualities that seem to command respect and elicit 
voteii are wealth, age* intelligence, honesty, kindness, being 
born of a good family etc. However all these qualities are 
rarely possessed by a single individual, neither are they all 
very essential hall marks of popularity. For instance a roan 
may be poor and yet respected because of his intelligence and 
honesty.^ 
But probably the nrast important feature of the new 
political order, according to Andre Beteille, "is the emergence 
of networks of interpersonal relations which remify in every 
direction. The creation of new political o portunities and new 
bases of power has provided Congenial conditions for the 
development ot elaborated network of patronage. Such networks 
1. Andre Beteille, Caste, Class and Power, Aaia Publishing 
House, Delhi, 1972, p.184 
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s«rv« to link the village with territorial units of increasing 
wider scope and they also provide inter linkage between cast*/ 
class/ pancliayat and political party."^ 
According to Andre Beteille, following has been the impact 
2 of Panchayat Raj development on rural leadership. 
(I) The village society has undergone Complete transformation. 
The traditional leadership which was based on religion^ caste 
etc. is slowly giving way to a new leadership based on secular 
and merit consideration, 
(II) With the coverage of the village India by democratic 
institutions at the village^ block and district levels the 
village now operates in another dimension. Their prestige 
in their own village may depend on the power they wield in higher 
bodies (i.e* block or district level). 
(ill) V»eaker Sections of society as well as women have been 
associated with the village adroinistration* but they have not 
been able to play an effective role. 
(Iv) Power in rural areas is getting diffused rather than 
centralized* formerly, a nuni)er of functions were discharged by 
the same person, because many persons were iX)t willing to share 
the responsibility. With the introduction of Panchayati Raj 
Institutions a new sense of responsibility has been instilled 
1. Andre Beteille, Ca^te. Class and Power. Asia Publishing 
House, Delhi, 1972, p. 185 
m j u 
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arooBSf the village people ana more an<a more are sharing the 
responsibility, 
(v) The position of the village headman, who previously u-ed to 
be the nucleus of all power and authority• has been greately 
weakened. Most of the powers formerly enjoyed by the village 
headman have been taken over by the Panchayat» However* within 
the Panchayat the Sarpanch has come to wield enormous powers. 
(vi) Nature of leadership at the village level has undergone 
complete transformation, Ins:.tead of an autocratic leadership 
there is a democratic leadership. 
(vii) The present rural leadership in India maintains a contact 
with the outside authorities/ which is so essential for getting 
the approval and assistance for the various development schemes. 
This explains for the increasing participation o^ the Panchayat 
Samiti at the Block levels which is cojmposed of representatives 
from several villages and is the chief financing agency. Even 
the State leadership is keen to have a linkage with the village 
Panchayats because of th«ir political stakes. 
lYp^ MmrftA tf^ t^ifirff in Vrffi 
The leadership in U.P. villages can be determined under 
following headsx-^ 
Traditior^^ Leaders! Their leadership is based on their 
hereditary status, position as well as wealth. They do rwt 
1. Chhabra & Jones, Op.cit,, p.210 
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Provide the requisite leadership to the community nor do 
they think in terms of the yood o£ the community# yet they 
ore respected by the rural people and their advice carries 
much weight with the local people. With democracy taking 
deeper roots in the village community the influence of this type 
of leaders is on declinef althou^jh they still excercise consi-
derable influence on the social, economic and political life 
of the village community. The best example of this traditional 
leadersiiip are the big aamindars and money lenders. 
Sectional Leaders; These leaders have coi^plete hold over a 
particular section of the community. The meii-bers Ox. tm^t 
community do not take any action contrary to the advice o£ these 
leaders. The leaders of various castes* factions as well as 
political yroups fall in this category, 
Functioral Leaders* These leaders are tlriose persons who have 
specialized in a particular field like agriculture* medicine, 
art etc. The people of village come to them for advice in their 
respective fields of specialization and hold them in great 
esteem* 
Profesaiora^ Leaderat Professional leaders are those who come to 
the villages to render certain professional services as well as 
to acquaint the village community with the new ideas and 
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scientific developments taking place elsewhere* These leaders 
do not belong to the village community emd do riot provide direct 
leadership to the village people, ^hey excercise influence 
through the acknowledged leaders of the village community. The 
Gram Sevak and the School teachers belong^ to this category of 
leaders. 
Insti.t^ t^iointajL In this category come heads of certain 
institutions like Panchayats* Cooperative Societies etc. They 
are able to play a vital role becauae they are vested with 
certain powers in their respective fields by the law. 
Accordiny to Oscar Lewis,^ following are the factors which 
influence the village Leadership»• 
^i) Caatet Caste is the most important factor which deter-
mines the rurd leadership. A person born in high caate has 
an edge over the members belonging to middle and lower caates. 
In majority of U.p. villages leaders hail from high castes. A 
person from lower or micdle castes may also get a chance to 
become a leader but he does not excercise much influence. Efforts 
made by U.P. Ctovernment to uplift the backward people have 
failed, and they have not been able to assert themselves. 
1. For detaxled study see Oscar Lewis* Village pite in Nort)ifpjrn 
IngjjU»Asia publishing House, New Delhi, 1978 
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(i.1) Land Ovncrahipt Uttar Pradesh is an agricultural State 
and seventy percent of it® population living in villages 
represents mostly zamindars as village leaders. No doubt 
during the Congress, SVD and BKD governments in Uttar Pradesh, 
due to the imposition of ceiling on land holdings and distri-
bution Oi. land to the landless farmers, the importance of 
Saroindar has declined, but decline in their accepted leadership 
h^ the village community will take years to come. 
(ii^) M^ajlthi Land and property as a source of immense 
wealth and sound financial status of a person has been a 
factor for his acceptance as a leader of village. 
(iv) Family Status; In India, the family status whiCxi is 
determined by financial soundness, wide relations and high 
connection, also helps a lot in making a person leader. In 
recent years, because of change in s>-cial set ups, change from 
agrarian to industrial and bureaucratic societies decline in 
leadership on account of family status has also been marked. 
<V) Suificient Leisurei In U.P. villages it has been noted 
that usually leaders are financially well of and hav« enought 
time to spend. Helping villagers financially (in the form of 
loan) , solving their quarrels and disputes, attending meetings 
of the Village PatK:hayat etc. All these factors force the 
villagers to accept continuation of their leadership. 
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(vi) Maturity of aaax In U,P. village*/ one factor which 
counted roost in making one a leader v/as ripen age* But now 
this trend is changing because ot youth taking part in political 
parties and active politics. 
(vii) Educatiom Education which had always been given respect 
in villages has now become less inqportant* The factor that 
counts now is capabilities of a person and his influence over 
the village. 
(viii) Go,o<^  Contacjb^t Person possessing good contacts with high 
ups outside the village and with the local people has greater 
chance o£ emerging as their leader. 
Village Politics in U.P. 
India is essentially a rural society since the very 
ancient times. The rural side of the country has played a 
dominant role in building traditions of rural administration. 
Panchayat v^ich denotes three tier structure at the districts 
block and village level is modern. It aims at making democracy 
real by bringing the activities of the millions into the 
functioning Oi- democracy. It is a system of ^rassroot democracy 
which seeks to link the individucvl family in the remotest 
village with the government. In the words of Dr Zakir Husain» 
"with the introduction of Panchayati Raj we have laid the 
foundation for the extension of democratic form of government 
and democracy to the village level." 
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The end of this process is to realise the basic objec-
tives of an enlightened political liberty, equality and welfare. 
Decentralized pattern of local self government is n&cessary 
not only for the purpose of community development but also for 
building vsp democracy from grassroots. 
(B) MUSLIM POLITICS 
Muslim in U.P., Delhi and neighbouring areas of Delhi 
had become socially, economically and educationally backward 
just after the rebellion of 1857. After the formation of the 
Congress some oi. the Muslims joined it. In the beginning of 
the 20th Century Muslims formed the Muslim League with the 
patronage of Government. Till the Non Cooperation Movement both 
the Muslim League and Congress were very close• 
In U.P./ the rupture between both occured over the 
Coalition Min.stry which led to drifting away of the two orga-
nizations and in 193 7 the Muslim League became a mass organi-
zation and more anti-Congress and communal in approach. In 
1940 the Muslim Ltague demanded a separate sovereign State 
for Muslims and as a result Pakistan was formed. Muslims in 
India, educationally and socially became most backward and 
economically ruined. Communal riots (Hindu Muslim riots) also 
spoiled Muslims a lot. 
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A convention of Muslim leaders \<as held at Lucknow in 
1964f Muslim leaders o£ all shades of opinion Joined hands 
together to solve their problems/ and an organisation came 
into existence known as Majlis-e-Mushavvarat.^ 
A consultative meeting v/as held on August 8,9,1964 at 
2 
Kadvatul Uloom, Lucknow* It was attended by seventy five 
delegates belonging to many parties and groups. This meeting 
was presided over Dr Syed Mahoood/ vetern Congress Muslim 
leader. The inaugral address v.as delivered by the rector of 
Nadwatul Uloom, Mavilena Abdul Hasan Ali Nadvi. A number of 
resolutions were passed at the meeting* The main resolution 
lirged to remove Muslim grievances. 
The main grievance was that Muslims were not recruited 
in the CID and the police- They demanded Muslim representation 
in Police department in adequate nximber. This was believed to 
be one of the effective remedies tor communal riots. The attitude 
of Muslim legialators towards communal cisturbance was most 
disappointing to the Muslims. It was decided to constitute ev 
a^Jaroate Islami, Muslim League, Jamaetul Ulema and Tamir-e-Millat 
of Hyderabad and leaders of other Muslims organizations. The 
Committee elected Dr Syed Mahmood as the President and "All 
The Slvasat, (tirdu Daily) Kanpur, July 13,1964 
2. Khan, Laigur Rehmant ^ j e gf ^.U^ft A", FffX^ l^ iffg 
from 1967-77. M.Phil I^ifasertation, Department of Political 
Science, AMU,Aliyarh, 1982, p.44. 
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India Muslim Majlis Mushavarat" was formed which, it Dbas 
expected* would bring unity among all the Muslim Paruies in 
order to boost political action at all levels* 
The Mushawarat presented a number of demands regarding 
the status of Urdu, restoration o£ the minority character of 
AMU* the Preservation of Muslim Personal Law* the revision of 
text books etc« before the Government. In U,P. the Mushawarat 
started functioning withholding a meeting at Allahabad on 
March 26,1966 and at Rampur and Moradabad on 4pril 1, and 
April 9#1966 respectively.^ 
Some ot the federating units of Mushawarat were not in 
favour o± its taking part in active politics especially in 
contesting elections. Dr Faridi* a prominent Muslim Leader of 
U.P. was of the view that opposition parties of secular outlook 
should be supported by the Mushawarat, On July 21*1966 The 
All India Mxislim Majlis Mushawarat adopted a manifesto at 
2 Delhi based on following points. 
1. Dr A.J. Faridi's Presidential address at the first annual 
conference of U.P. Muslims Majlis Mushawarat held at Rampur 
on Aug 9,10*1967. 
2. Ibid. 
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1. Reform in field of education, 
2. Change in election system i.e. introdxiction ot proportional 
system. 
3. Establislnnexit of a welfare state 
4. Safeguarding Huslini Personal I>aw 
6. Preservation of Urdu Language 
6. Formation of minority commission 
7» Preservation ot the fundamental character of any inatxtut^iAn 
8, The management of religious auqafs by the elected members/ 
elected by the Community to \i-hj.ch the Waqf belonged 
9. Social reforms including prohibition 
The fall of Congress in U.P. elections of 1967 can be 
attributed to the role of Mushawarat. In some constituencies 
Muslims damaged the prospects of Congress. The Congress, as 
against 390 seats in 1952, 286 seats in 19&7 and 249 seats in 
1962, could bag only 198 seats in 1967. The Congress government 
was installed with the support of Independent KLAs# but lasted 
only for 18 days and Charan Sinyh after defection from Gupta 
ministry, installed the S.V.I^. Government headed by him. 
C.B. Gupta, in an interview with Dr Faridi, had admitted that 
it waig mainly because of opposition of Mushawarat that the 
Congress had to step down.^ The U.P. Majlis Mxishawarat became 
very much disillusioned by the attitude and performance of U.P. 
Assembly members whowit had supported in the Fourth General 
1. Khan, Laiqur Rehman, ppfCit., p.51 
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Election of 1967. It was thus felt by Muslims that they should 
enter politics directly and send mascirovnn number of Muslims to 
the U.P. Assembly, Jamate-Ialami did not concur to this idea. 
Thus it was decided to form a new political party in U«P. and 
the Muslim Itajlis came into existence. But it was decided that 
Muslim Majlis shall be a federating unit of the Central Muslim 
Majlis-e-JAushawarat and would cooperate with it in all common 
matters reletting to the community.^ 
Dr Faridi was of the view that the problems of minorities 
scheduled castes anc backward classes were same. % called a 
convention of backward classes* scheduled caste and other 
minorities which was ht-ld at Lucknow on October 12 and 13* 1968. 
In this convention reprseentatives of Muslim Majlis, Scheduled 
Castes* Backward Classes and other minorities participated. 
The convention decided to constitute an organi2stion known as 
the Federation of Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes and other 
Minorities. A manifesto containing an eleven point proc^ramme 
was . . prepared in Vvhich main emphasis was given on reform of 
educational system, electoral reforms, establishment of welfare 
state, safeguarding of Muslim personal Law, preservation of 
mother tongue, establishment of a raiiaistry for backward classes. 
1, Dr Faridi'a Presidential address at the first annual 
conference of the Muslim Majlis, Feb 1970, p.3 
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scheduled castes ajnd other minorities/ social reforms and reli-
gious trusts.^ 
In Noveniber 1969 there was split in the Congress Party 
over the i-sue of Presidential election in which Mrs* Gandhi's 
Government fell in minority. As a result in December 1970 the 
Lok Sabha was dissolved and fresh ©lection© were to be held in 
1971. Under such circumstances, the Majlis renewed its policy 
and on invitation Jay Congreaslw) * Dr Faridi met Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi and appraised her of che grievances and problems of the 
Muslims. He also met other Congress leaders. Mrs. Gandhi and 
other leaders assured Dr Faridi that Muslim grievances and 
problems would be tiooked into and sought support for the 
Congress. Following is the text of assurances given to Muslims 
by the Congress party» 
"An Urdu University would be established at Rampur* The 
Government would give all possible facilities for Urdu to 
regain its due place which had been denied to it ao far* iichemes 
for the uplirt of the economic conditions oi Muslims would be 
drawn up# as was being done for the other weaker sections of 
th® population. Inadequate representation of Muslims in 
Central and State services/ especially in Police* would be 
made up, ^he autonomy end the minority character of Aiigarh 
Muslim University/ as defined ir. Article 30 of the Constitution, 
1-, Khaii, Laiqur Rehtnan, Op.cit. # p,56 
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would be restored. Text books which were being taught in our 
schools would be revised according to the recommendations of 
the Sayyadain Committee" «1 
After getting assurance from Congress(N), Muslim Majlis 
decided to support it wholeheartedly* Muslim Majlis candidates 
contested in t}^ constituencies of Moji;^dabad# ^npur# ^roha# 
Ghazipur and Muzaffar Nagar# but all the five were defeated 
the Congress did not contest in these constituencies. 
The overall performance of Muslim Majlis was very poor. 
Constitxiencies where Muslim Majlis contested had adequate Muslim 
population but even in those constituencies it failed to secure 
the support of the Muslims. 
2 
Constituencies Total Secured by 
votes Majlis 
polled 
Percentage of 
votes secured 
by Majlis. 
1 2 3 4 
Kanpur 2,44*185 1258 0.2 
Gha zipur 2*73,828 3*463 1.2 
Amroha 2,48,312 18,154 14.7 
Muzaffar Nagar 3,75*460 4*061 1.0 
Moradabad 2*37*937 7*880 3.4 
1. First Annual Conference* Muslim Majlis Pressidential 
Address* A. Faridi, Allahabad* May 6*1972 
2. Source! Khan* Laiqur Rahman* Oo.cit.. p.61 
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Dr Pari<ai clairoed that the greatest achievement of the Majlis 
vas that it had ix^used a sense of confidence and courage among 
the Muslim Community and had made them feel that they coiwnanded 
balancing power in the politics of the country. 
Promises made by the Congress were only not ftafilled 
but the new Amendment Act of 1972 deprived the autonomy and 
minor-ty character of A.M.U, This act of csovernment completely 
alZ'iented Muslim Majlis from Congress(R} and a number of Muslim 
volunteers including its President Dr Faridi* the ssp leader 
Raj Narain and Vishwanath Kapoor MLA were arrested. This 
agiljation was ggainst the closuie of A.M,y. and for the restora-
tion of minority character. Muslim Majlis then decided not to 
support the Conyress in the Assembly elections of 1974, and made 
an alliance with BKD and Sbp, These parties entered in an 
electoral adjustment and decided to contest the election on BKD 
tickets. BKD and S8P included the demands of Muslim Majlis in 
2 
their manifestoes* In 1974 U.P. Assembly ^lections the Muslim 
Majlis contested twenty six seats, but only three were elected 
iMasoofi Khan from Azamgarh, S..X. Faia from Ginazipur and Nanhelal 3 Kureel from Fatehpur) 
1. National Herald, Lucknow, May 10,1973 
2. Piona^r. Allahabad, May 16,1973 
Lucknow, Feb 25,1974 
gffti Humayun Kabir, .iB a .P^m^m^YlH 
Firwa Mukhopadhya, 1960. 
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In the elections to Lok Sabha in 19 77 the Muslim Majlis 
decided to support Janata Party«^ Under this alliance two 
seats were allotted to Muslim Majlis, Zulfiqarullah from 
Sultanpur and Bashir Ahmad Advocate from Fatehpur» Both were 
elected. 2i\ilfiqarullah was taken as a Minister of State by 
Janata goverranent at the Centre. 
The All India Muslim Majlio Ivorking Committee met on 
April 28,19 77 and decided that the Majlis should have an election 
agreement with Janata Party in the U.P. Assembly Elections. 
An eleven member Committee reached an agreement with the Janata 
Party. According to this agreement 10 seats were allotted to 
2 
the Majlis out of 42 5. Among the Majlis candi^tes were 
Harijans* Qureshis* and Ansaris. The main issues of Majlis were 
A.M.U., Urdu as secoi^ official language* representation of 
Muslims in services and establishment of Urdu University at 
Rampxjr. The Majlis leaders to\ared all constituencies of U.P. 
and campaigned for Janata Party. The result of this campaign 
was that out of lo Majlis candidate® 8 were elected in U.P. 
Assembly elections. 
1* Qaumi Ayra^. Lucknow, Feb 4,1977 
2. ikliSki. May 6,1977 
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Masood Khan a leader of the Majlis uas appointed a 
Minister in Janata Ministry in U.P. Out of 351 Janata Party 
MLAs the number of Muslim/iflAs was 37, Among these 37# Majlis 
MLAs numbered only 8, 
The Majlis had representation in the Central as well as 
in U«P. governments having one Minister in both* But they never 
raised voice for Muslim problems or Majlis issues. Selfish 
attitude of Muslim legislators, rivalry with Muslim League and 
death of Dr Paridi/ l&cK of leadership have contributed to the 
poor performance and rxegligible role of the Majlis. 
Chapter • VII 
ELECTIONS AND DEFECTIONS IN U.P, 
(A) 
(B) 
Uttar Pradeah has been a strongliol<3 ot the Congress 
from the very beginning* Till the Fourth General Elections 
of 1967 the Congress continued to be in undisputed control 
of the estate government# although there were factional fights 
within its ranks. After the Fourth General Elections of 1967/ 
ana the Congress split of 1569 in particular/ the State witnessed 
the formation of various coalition governments* which greatly 
contributed to the political instability in the State. It was 
only after the sweeping victory of Congress (N) in the mid term 
elections of 1971# that the Congress acquired a hold on the 
state politics and the atate once again experienced political 
stability. 
The other polii-ical parties which have excercised 
significant influence on the politics of U.P. have been the 
Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Bhartiya Kranti Dal (BKD), the SSP and 
the Communiat parties. The lot ot these political parties has 
been influencing a great deal in various elections, as shall 
be evident from the table given on the next page. 
T)FI8 SggOjySi Gepy^x - 19§.71 The Election Commission 
recognised only four parties as national parties. These parties 
were the Congress, Praja Socialist Party, the Communist Party 
and the Jana Sangh, Eleven other parties were recognised as 
State Parties. Besides, more than 30 parties or group fought 
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the election on their own or in association with one anotlter 
in different states. The Congress gained a few seats in the 
Lok Sabha but lost 300 to 400 seats in the atate Legislative 
Assemblies, Its heaviest losses in popular votes as well as in 
seats in the Assemblies were in Kerala and Uttar Pradesh. 
However the Congress still retained a clearcut majority in 
all the states except Kerala and orissa, 
A full idea about the position oi the major political 
parties in the btv^ te Assembly Election (U,P.) of 1957 can be 
had from the following tablesJ 
Total seats Congress Praja Socialist Communists Others 
Party 
430 286 44 09 91 
Source* Chhabra/ HK & 3oneS/ W.T., OP. cit.. p. 424 
The Third General Siectionsr 1962 
The Third General Elections were held in February 1962. 
By then the number of voters hod reached the figure of nearly 
21 crore which was 1.7 croret. more tiian in 1957 and 3.7 crore 
more than in 1952. 
Total Congress Swatian- Commu- PSP Jana Socia- Others Ind. 
seats tra nist Sangh list s 
430 249 IS 14 38 49 24 10 31 
2 33 
ItiiB gQVff^ ^^  Penggsfl m i 
The Fourth General Elections were held in February 1967 
which can be considered as major watershed in the political 
development of India. It completely altered the pattern of 
political power in the country. Hitherto/ the Indian iNational 
Congress exerciaed virtually unchallenged monopoly of power at 
the Centre as well as in the States, The Fourth General ii<lec-
tion ended the era of one party domination. Though ConQress 
retained power at the Centre its majority in Lok Sabha was 
drastically reduced. In eight of the seventeen states Congress 
lost its majority and non-Congress coalition governmeirts came 
into power. 
Total 
seats 
Cong-
ress 
Swatan-
tra 
Jana 
Sangh 
SSP CPI CPM PSP Others Ind. 
425 200 13 98 42 13 01 11 08 39 
Mid Term ^^lections of 1969» The Coalition Governments formed 
after Elections of 1967 could not work smoothly in all the states 
and soon defecti liS started. This created an element of uncertainty 
in the State Politics necessitating the dissolution of the 
Assembly. As a result mid-term elections were held and Congress 
was able to improve its position in Uttar Pradesh* which can be 
seen from the following tablei*-
Total Cong- Jana pap asp CPI CpM Swatan- Others Ind BKD 
seats ress Sangh tra 
425 211 49 03 33 04 1 S 3 18 98 
In 1974 mid-term Elections were held to the Assembly of 
Uttar Pradesh, in which the Congress secured a cXearcut majority 
and succeeded in forming Ministry in uttar Pradesh. The position 
of different political parties in the Assembly is indicated 
4n the following table»-
Congress (R) 
Congress(O) 
BKD 
Jana Sangh 
iaocialists 
CPI 
CPM 
^watantra 
Muslim League 
Utkal Congress 
Jana Congrttss 
Independents 
Total 
215 
10 
106 
61 
5 
16 
2 
1 
1 
424 
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Elections of 1977> 
In 1977 Mrs. Indira Gandhi announced the dissolution of 
LoJc isabha and ordered fresh elections. The newly lormed Janata 
Party (cotisisting of SLD, Jana Sangh, Congress and Socialist®) 
which contested elections in cooperation with CPD (Congress 
for Democracy) swept the polls* The Congress was wiped off 
in the States of Uttar Pradeish, Himachal Pradesh* Punjab, Haryana 
and Bihar* In the State of Wadhya Pradesh anfi Rajasthan it could 
secure only one seat each* In short the Janata sweep virtually 
put an end to the thirty years old Congress rule in iiorthern 
India. 
The Janata Party interpreted its victory at the Centre 
as a defeat of Congress and a challenge to the moral ric^ht of 
Congrei-S to continue to rule in the iiorthern states, AS most of 
these Assemblies had already completed their term of five years 
(though their term had been extended to six years under the 
42n<l amendment) the Janata Party thought it desirable to seek 
the verdict of the people. The Union Home Minister requested 
the Chief Ministers of Punjab, Hiniachal Pradetih, tiaryana/ uttar 
Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya t-radesh, Bihar* Orissa and West 
Bengal to advis« their Governors to dissolve the Legislative 
\ 
Assemblies and order tresh elections. However these Chief 
Ministers refused to comply with this request of Home Minister. 
Under the circxirastanc«s the Central government decided to invoke\ 
Article 356 without the recommendation of Governor of these ^ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
States and dissolved the Assendalles oi the above nine States. 
The position of different political parties in the U.P, Assembly 
where elections were held in June 1977 is indicated in the 
table given below* 
Resialt Janata Conyrees CPI CpM Other Indepenoents 
Declared 
423 351 46 9 1 - 16 
Source* Chhabra & Jqnes, Oj^jgi^,, p, 436 
The mid term Elections were called all of a sudden 
because nobody ever expected that the ruling Janata Party, with 
such a commanding majority in Lok Sabha would be forced to 
tender its resignation. The process started in July 1979 when 
Y,B. Chavan* the opposition leader in Lok Sabha moved a motion 
of no confidence'against Morarji Desai's Government. It may 
be n^ted that Chovan's no confidence motion merely a routine 
procedure and he could not expect the disintegration of Janata 
Party and the fall of Desai's Government as it did happen. 
Delections started trom Janata Party when 10 o£ its members 
walked out and declared to sit as a separate grov^ in the House 
Raj Narain left the Janata Party end waa formally elected as 
the leader of thia break away Group, Thereafter more members 
of Janata Party defected and ultimately Party's majority was 
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reduced to just three. On July 11,1979 Janata Party lost its 
majority and four days later Morarji r>^sai tendered his 
resignation as Prime Minister under heavy pressure from his 
party men. On 16 July the two Houses of Parliament were adjourned 
sinedie. The same day the break away group oi the Janata ^arty 
members elected Charan Singh as the leader. Soon after he also 
tendered resignation from Desai's caretaker Govt. 
The President then invited Y.B. Chavan to form an 
alternative Government. But he could not do so and reported 
his inability to the president. Thereupon the President asked 
Desai and Charan Singh to provide him with a list of their 
supportero within eighteen Hours. Both the leaders submitted 
the list of their supporters on 2 5th July; on 26th July 1979 
the President asked Charan Singh to form the Government. While 
communicating his decision he wrote to Charan Singh after 
consideration of all relevant aspects o-^  the matter. I find 
that you enjoy support of more members oi Lok Sabha than 
Morarji Desai." He also suggested to Charan Singh to seek a 
vote oi confidence of the Parliament at the earliest. This 
decision of President was strongly re£>ented by the Janata Party 
and it openly talked of launching impeachment preceodings against 
the President. 
Charan Singh formed the Government but before he could 
seek confidence vote from the house* Mra. Indira Gandhi's Party 
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made it public that it would oppose the vote of confidence in 
the House» Under the circumstances Charan Singh tendered his 
resiQn^tion without faciny the House* He also advised the 
President to dissolve the Lok Sabha, The President after due 
consultation with Mrs. Gandhi, ^agjivan Ram (Leader of Janata 
Party) and the Attorney General of India (C.K, Daphtary) decided 
to dissolve the Lok Jbabha and ordered fresh electiont 
In the General ^lectiona there were three major Groupings 
contending for superroacy-ConyressCi) led by Mrs. Gandhi, the 
Janata Party led Jagjivan Ram and hoK Dal-Congress alliance 
under Charan Singh, However, the last group could not work and 
due to mutual bickerings they fought on separate manifestos and 
Election Symbols, 
The Election of 1980 was really on agigantic scale. This 
is evident from the fact that the total Electorate during the 
election consisted ot over 360 millions, which is a half time 
the population of USA. 1049457 ballot Boxes were used and over 
430 polling stations were set up. 
In the Elections Congress(I) achieved a remarkable 
success by capturing 3bl seats and scoring two-thirds majority. 
Lok Dal emerged as the second largest Party with 41 seats. Th« 
Party position in the Lok Sabha of U.P. state is given in the 
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table belowt 
Total Congress Janata Lok CPI CPM Others Independents 
seats Party Dal 
85 51 03 29 1 - - 01 
On Pebrvaary 17,1980 President of India issued a proclamation 
dissolving 9 State Assernbliea» but gave no reasons for this action 
this action was taken under Article 356 ol the Constitution on 
the basis of the recommendation of the Central Council of Mina.sters» 
One of the main factors which weighed with the Congress(I) 
in recommending dissolution ot these 9 Assemblies to the President 
of India was that one third o the members of Rajya Sabha were 
due to retire on 2 April 1980 - it was feared that if elections 
were held on the basis of Assembliets ruled by the Janata Paity* 
the Lok Dal and other non-Congress (I) parties would stand to 
gain and it would not be able to increase its strength in the 
Upper House* 
As soon as elections to Assemblies were announced defec-
tions set in the rank of Janata Party« A number of members left 
Janata Party on the plea that the issue of membership of RSS had 
not been reasonably settled. Ultimately, even the Jana Sangh 
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dominated group in the Janata Party also left and formed the 
BJP. Within the ranks of Congress-I also there were dissensions, 
specially on the issue of giving too much representations to the 
younger elements while alloting tickets for the Assembly elec-
tions, But despite these bickerings the Cor^ressd) won a stu~ 
pendous victory. It was returned to power in eight states. 
The Party position in the U.P. Assembly (after the election of 
May 1980) is given belowi-
Cong (I) Lok 
Dal 
Janata (S) Janata 
Party 
Bhartiya 
Janata 
Party 
CPI Cong (u) Indepen-
dents 
306 59 4 4 11 4 13 17 
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(B) POLITICAL DEFECTIONS IN U»P« POLITICS 
Political defections have been one or the outstanding 
features of state politics of India since the General Elections 
of 1967. NO doubt, even before the Fourth General Elections 
there were certain cases ot defections, but their number was 
so small that they did not attract public attention and did not 
affect the fortunes of the ruling party. After the Fourth 
General Elections/ political defections assumed such dimensions 
that they not only attract the attention of the Political 
Scientists but also posed a serious threat to the stability of 
the governments in various states.^ 
In the General Elections of 1967, the Congress tailed to 
secure clearcut majority in a numbt^r of states and the opposition 
daw in it a ^rand opportunity to seize power. The numerous 
political parties ignoring their ideological differences joined 
iiands on the basis of some minimum common protjraroroes to form the 
government. A lar^e number of members of the State Legislative 
Assemblies and Councils renounced allegiance to their parent 
organizations and joined the other groups in the hope of certain 
political gains. This frequent crossing of floors and change 
of party loyality came to be known as defection in State politics. 
1. A.G.Noorani 'The Defection Game* Futility of Legislative 
Approach', Int^i^n Express, New Delhi, Aug 27,1979 
The Fourth General Elections held in Janxiary,1967 constitute 
the vatershed in the poat independence political history of India• 
In this election, o^ the 16 States of India that went to polls 
(Kerala had mid-term elections earlier and did not have general 
elections in February 1967)# the Congress party lost absolute 
majority in eight of the States. These States were Bihar, Kerala, 
Tamil Nadu, Oriasa, Punjab, Rajasthan, U,P. and West Bengal. 
With the exception of Tamil Kadu where the EMK secured a clearcut 
majority and formed the government, in all the other States the 
non-Congress parties saw an opportunity to seize power from the 
Congress.^ A new proce^ss of non-Congress parties shedding their 
loyalities and coming lorward together to share power on the 
basis of agreed minimxam common programmes set in motion. United 
Pronts were forged and coalition governments were formed in 
Kerala, Bihcir, Punjab and West Bengal, Uvtar Pradesh, Haryana and 
Madhya Pradesh. Thus for the first time majority of the Indian 
people came under the rule of non-ingress coalition ministeies 
at the State level, with the Congress opposition constantly trying 
to pool them and recover lost ground before it was late. The 
Congress with the help of defectors succeded in ousting the United 
1. Subhash C. Kashyap, T M poli^ t^ c^s .FffWgf» flffl 
State Politics in India, National Institute of Constitutional 
and Parliamentary Studies in Inoia, Delhi, 1974, p.37 
Front Governments from office in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Punjab, 
and West Bengal, This necei>sitated mid-tertn elections in all 
these States. 
The defections which took ploce in the v,ake of Fourth 
General Elections were responsible for the collapse of one 
government nearly every month* It is said that of the 3500 odd 
members of th© State Legislative Assemblies and Union Territories 
roughly about 50O members changed their patty etfilicitions. 
Some or the legislators changed their party affiliations so 
frequently that they began to be termed as Aya Ram Gaya Ram.^ 
This phenomenon of large scale defections in State politics came 
to be known by different names such as "Politics of Opportunism", 
the politics of defections", "the politics of instabliity", or 
"the politics oi transition". The seriousness ot this new 
development shall be clear if we remember that in the years bet-
ween 19 57 to 1962 there were only 299 legislators who defected 
2 from their parties. 
It may be noted that the practice of defection prevailed 
not only in those states where the Congress failed to form minis-
tries but the other states also tell prey to it. An idea about 
1. Paras Diwani, 'Aya Ram Gaya Ram* j The Politics of Defection', 
Journal of Indian Law Institute. July-Sep 1979 
2. Kashyap Subhash, ,Op,ci,t. # p,37 
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the defections in the various States between March 1967 to March 
1970 be seen belowj 
4n India ^^pm J^yp^ 
ijg M^rgh x m ^ 
Defections among party members . • • 1,642 
Defection by independents • • • 337 
Total defections ..» 2,019 
Defection among party members in 
Uttar Pradesh 294 
Defection by independent members in 
Uttar Pradesh * * • 58 
Total defection in Uttar Pradesh . *. 3 52 
The defection politics played havoc in the biggest State 
of India; Uttar Pradesh too» Though the Congress was successful 
in forming a minority government under C,b, Gupta after the 
Fourth General Elections, its existence v;as never certain. 
Congressmen/ defected alongwith followers from the Congress 
party and joined hands with the opposition. Soon after Charan 
Singh formed a co41ition government as leader of the Samyukta 
Vidhayak Dal. The defection within the United Front continued 
Unabated. While five of its members left to form the progeessive 
party* subsequently even the members of Swatantra Party and 
Communist Party of India also withdrew their s\;5)port. Ultimately 
1. Chhabra H.K., Johnes, W.T., State politics in India. Surjeet 
Publications, Delhi, li^ SO p.39 
2 4 5 
Charan Singh vas forced to t«nder his resignation on February 
17,1968 and the State was placed under Presidential rule a 
week later* 
In tlie mid-term elections of February # 1969 also no party 
could secure a clearcut majority, although the Congress emerged 
as the largest party. Once again Congress Ministry vas formed 
under C.B, Gupta and it managed to stay in office with the support 
of the Swatantra party and certain independent Legislators. This 
Congress Ministry however soon fell due to defections and counter 
defecti ns which took place in the Congress party in the wake 
of its split in November,1969. This resulted in another coalitxon 
^Iinistry under Charan Singh with the support of Congress (©^ 
Hbwever, soon differences appeared within the ranks and 
files and Congress Ministers tendered their resignation, making 
it obligatory for the Governor to recommend the imposition of 
Presidential rule in the State. After about two weeks another 
coalition Ministry under T.N, Singh of Congress(0) was formed. 
The new Ministry was supported by Jana Sangh, ssp, and Swatantra 
1. Abraham, -A.S. Preventing Party Defections; Need for a Moral 
Bench Mark» The Timtts of Indian July 17,1978 
pftrty and stayed in office for about six monthfi* when the 
Chief Minister tendered his resignation following his defeat 
in the by election.^ 
•fhe mid-term elections in U.P. resulted in a landslide 
victory for the Congress* B-'wever* defections continued in 
favour of Congress from other parties. A full fledged Congress 
Government v,as formed under Kamlapati Itipathi. After some time 
Tripathi was broxight to the Centre as a Cabinet Minister and 
Bahuguna \vas made the Chief Minister. He was followed by 
h,X), Tiwari. In the wake of 1977 electi.ns large scale delec-
tions took place. Thus the process continued duriny the Janata 
rule as well cit. xn the years after that. 
I. tiharma# Moolchandt Political tJefections and Democracy* 
New Delhi, J\aly-Sep, 1977 

„SQ,IlglUff4Qa, 
lu the ^tiite ot Uttar isTadeiah^  &itice indc^pundeisce ri^ht 
upto a.y67 General Kiectiona the Conyreti» mairitaiat.d itu stronghold 
ano ruled the atate. The llr^t con-Conyreas hovurimetit of 
various alllea polltAcal parties« i»iinea oainyukta Viahayak Dal 
vjas forracsfl ior the £irat tSine in 1S67 un^er Qiaran Siij^h*® 
Chle£ Ministership• The chan^te vva^  not aucden Imt inas the 
result o£ efforts of Opposition &t the m t i o m l and state levels* 
An alliance to oust the Cotibre&o vcas lor the firct time 
ia£ce in Kerala in 1911, Seve^r^l opposition partiea with th& 
Coiwauniat pexty pleyinfe the leacint, role forme-cl a united tront. 
That was the irist non-Corjfere£»^  Cjoverncsent in tht; coiuitry* 
When thti Cotnmunist® cawe to power in lyS>7# the ConyretJs allied 
itself tvith whe connituik^ l or^^anissations vviiich had a medieval 
outlook* liJie the ^iUalim League anc the ^rvice society 
to replace the Conmiuniat party* Thus the Ministry in Kerala 
Win disfiiolved tfit the Central &oVi:rnment in I960. After the 
dismissal of Cocsnunist Government a inio<->texn:t poll vitm held in 
Kerala in February* lyei after which coal-.tion Covermtent 
consisting of norH>Conmiuni£>t parties vas formed* 
Xn the second General iblectxons the decline ox the 
Congress party vas only @t che lt.vel of Asswnblieo, but the 
third General Llections had shown an uriexpected fall in the 
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percentage of voteti polled by the Con^resti even et the Parliament 
level* 
A£ter the Fourth General Mectior^s (1W67) the Congress 
po^-itlon In the LoJc iaabha arid the ^tc-te Abaerobllea lihowed a 
steep tall* Out of total E07 £ieat& lu Lok ^bha the Congress 
secured only 28L seats ent at state level out of total 3#£>63 
As«(embly Besitu Coiiyresa uecurea only 1*090 seats* 
In the blggeiit iitate of India* the CocgrebS could 
secure only 198 seats out of 425 seats. The opposition in 
U.P. \iwhich v«as moved into the treasury benchea on April 1*1967> 
after the lall of Congreus Goverranent* consi^^ted of eight 
parties. The Jam U-nyti had seats* i^isP-A^, Communii^t (R)'»14« 
awatantra»l2* pe>p«>li* Republican-9* <.n6 the ComimUiist (L) one 
seat oiUy* 
In the election of lv67* the linguistic grievances^ 
accounted lor certain aniount of fall in the ConyreiiJ!» vote 
including tho^e of Muslims. 
iMhile on the une hand efforts oj. the non-Conyreiis parties 
vere going on to give a straight fight to the CoiiH^ res-** on the 
other hand public opinion on the basis oi perJiozinances and 
practices ot the Congress too waii not encouraging for the 
Congress as what tiiey had observed in Kerala estate. 
By the time o£ VJ67 General Elections most o£ the 
people grev. about what they regarded ae abuse by the 
Congress party oi the constitutional provision meant for 
emeryencies* All opposition parties vere distressed and annoyed* 
Frcnn this arose a bitter feeling# and many o£ tho^e who had 
been voting £or the Congreus became its opponents. The opposi** 
tion parties ot states grew more conscious and stood solidly 
&gain<^t the Congress. They fornico various Fronts to give 
Congress a straight light in every constituency* The result 
gave the allied parties a d e a r viorkinv, majority* 
Thus the stronghold o£ Coi^re^^s in Uttar Pradesh which 
%<iti continuing since independence came to an end* No doubt 
even after 1967 General Election iniU*P. Coi^ress iisas the 
largest single party but C.B« Gi:{}ta had to form titie Governcoent 
with the &tj^port ot independent memterw* Here it can be noted 
that since in other 3 st£ te& the nonoCongre£>8 Caovernments i«ere 
formed (1967) and it seemed that there whi, a wave oi non-
Congress movement* on account of this only the C,fi* Gu^ta 
Ministry could not last long and soon it collapsed because of 
too meny defections of the n&mLers which resulted in the 
formation of iiemyukta Vidhayak Oal (&VC) with Ram Chandra 
Vikalf an independent MLA a&> its leader. Subsequently Cheran 
j>inb)w e prominent eader of Congress v^om the blow of anti 
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Congress m v e could riot spare* left the party ana joined Jaim 
Conyreati* Thlto party also merged itoelf vith the 4»VD and 
Charan Singh vas elected as Its new leader. Vhus the ground 
was clear for the formation of the firat non-»Con9reas Government 
in l/ttar Pradesh under Qiaran i»ineh» 
Following the resignation of Gu|>ta ^iinistry in 
the v^ Qke of defeat in the A&setnbly* Charen ^inyh vas invited 
to become the Chief Minister* Uov^ever* no sooner had the iaKD 
Ministry been torroed cracks started appearing. The first to 
V7it;h<^ aw from the iiVD a CPZ memi^er ^bo «.lleged that the 
party had tailed to carry out tho ninteen point provratnsne. 
The deinfcnc: ot the J^ -na iian^h t nd Kiniotera adoption 
of iriindi as tlie lan^ua^e of correspondi.nce clso caused t^nuiun 
aroonust supporters oi the oVD Ministry, pe tlcularly tho Muslims. 
These Hini&ter^ al^ o^ tried to use their pot^ition to pack their 
own p<^  rty mcmber&i in various po^xtions in the ^tate* In view 
ot frictions the t>VD was ultimately defeated on July 6^1967, 
However« t;he mVD Ministry continubc in oil ice with threat 
dlxficulty till February when it tendered its re«>jugnation« 
On Febru«vry '^4*1968 x;he President of Ii^ oia suspended the 
ii.s&&iiibly* iiut subsequently when he founo the^ t no stable Govern-
toent coulo i-e lormed uixucr the exi^tin^ circupAtances he 
dissolved the /^ssemLly on April I£.«l^ ii8« 
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The collapse oi the Government can be attributed 
to two reasons! (i) J»VD v,«® a party ot parties with diitt-rent 
iaeolo9^es« prOQrairanefc* ana priucirdea who were united vith 
one point proyremme ti^t m e ouster of Coni,re^& Government 
from the st^te. After the &VD rule in state the allied 
parties tinted their pro^ramtnes to be iiDpl^&nted# vhich vas 
rather impossible sii»:e the aim ^nd yain or acliievement of 
one party v.nt^  loan a^ainat the intercut of the other coalition 
partner. Thue i>eperate interest oi each party dorcinuted 
over the allied party interef^t* 
(ii) Personal interest of the leader«i vas alfiK> a reason 
for the break of •SVD* i^ s evicent even from Conyre^^^ rule 
on thc:^  quitting of C*&. Gupta as Chief Kin-wtcr* It nay be 
noted tti&t the election oi Mrs, ^ucheta Kriplani i.&b not 
unoppoe>ed and she had to tace a rival in Komlapati Tripathi* 
Though there vttre factions within the Conyreso ranks the 
Conyreas party coritii»i«:.d to head the Government* ^haran Singh 
once a prominent leader of Coourcsts tuo did not seem tic.ppy with 
the Conyress# i.haVs tOty resi^tting iron C^nyrefit^ he Join«;.d 
Jana Conuresst and then meryed Jana Congress with thti isVD Just 
for the sake ot power* It was not c,he people of Uttar Pradesh 
who either formed or replaced &VD Government but only and only 
the leaders shifting and quitting from party to ,arty for 
personal gain. 
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Another anjpr aeveIop«nfcnt that took place in U.P. vaa 
iifter the mi^^textn poll of is«t>9 vhere no single perty coial<S 
secure e clearcut majority* Xhe non^Cooyress coalition made 
an atten^t to loms a coalition Mlnxatry but because of the 
strony opposition of Jena isanyh enfl bap to Charan Sii^h 
becoming the Chief Miniyter coalition Mini£,try coulc not be 
formed* Ultimately on February 16,a569 the Conyre^t* Govern-
ment headed C,h, Qv^tc luith the tiupport ox Independents 
and <^ %3atantra wuu formed* 
in tho elections of iy69 thouyh the collective strength 
of the opposition iO€5inber& v.'es tnore than the strength of the Cori^ t^AV. 
Congretiij ht^ d 2ii seats « 33*699&)but the Opposition could mt 
oust Coni^ re>>u due to division in their own ranks* It 
Dot only the Oppo^-ition but whe ConL,ret»4^  too v^o divided on 
certain isaues and a£> a result Gi^ta Mnist y could not last 
long And stability v&a «jhaken due to aplit in the Conyrei>s* 
After the resignation of Kanlapati Tripethi from the 
presidentship of UPCC, under the directive ot the Alcc« the 
group irivalaries vithin Conyreus became prominent* While 
C«B, Gupta favoured Banarsi ISas for the Presidentship# Kanla-
pati favoured Bahuguna* At the interver^tion o^ ^ the Central 
leadership the crisis v^ aa tided ovc^ r for the time being* 
Hov)«ver« when the split in the Ccnyre^^s party took place 
C.B« Gupta su^pdirted Congress(O)« while Tripathi group suppor* 
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ted Conbrese(K). The tvo sections were dividt^A in svch a 
manner that none ox them couia £orn> the Minii^try* A stable 
hliABtry co«4.<3 ise po^-ible only with the su^^jort o£ EKE 
h^avisng 98 seats)* Coni^equently the iiluGt& at^rted 
^haran J^ingh* and ultiflSkateXy Chaian <Secl<£&a to 
cooperate v/lth the Trlpethi gtoMp to topple th© GuptB. Ministry* 
In the meanwhil© thu <»\3pt& ero^p secured the t»Uppoirt ot Jens 
6&n9h ihavit^g seats) and aiso tna<Se efiort^^ to win the 
support of ifiiP ihavii^ 33 seats) • 
though nedotaationa isetwt^ t^ n Charan Sinyh and KamXapati 
Tripathi contij[»jc<3 tor th& to^-trntiot. o^ the Oovcrrjnent, no 
a^rscroent couX(^ Jse reach€<S on the ii^-uc us to utio tjlioolfi head 
the Government, finally on if'ebscuary 10,lu70. Cv^ta 
tender&d hia rew/iymtion advisihg th& Governor to invite the 
oppoaition leader Charan Ult^^h to eoctp tli© Govurnsaent* One 
thin^ to be nut d here Ist renx^nutxon o£ Oupta not any 
hind support to Charan iiinyh but it vas a nsove to prevent a 
Governroei t under Kuir.lapati Tripathi. Despite C,^, Gupta*s 
resiyn&tion^ political situation in the state tooX a new turn 
after few dey» when Charan Singh broke alliance with Conyre^atO) 
and reached an o^reetnent with Con^reatilK) to torm a single 
party ^overrm&m and the Coxkjrki»&iU) wa& to extend full ai;^ort 
to Liia Ministry. The BKr Miniatry iorroed by Charan Singh 
in U«P* as an one p^^rty Government survivc.d for two months only* 
from February 17 to April 16#1970 anc tt«n it va^ a BK]> 
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Cooirfrttss (I^ ) coalition Government irotn April 17 to Octobeir l.#1970* 
The reason ior the ohort tenur« of fiKD Government in 
the sti^te vvas strainc;^ relations wliich developea laetween the 
tv.o coalition partners* The Conyre^stii-} came out with open 
ailew«^ tic)ris that the coalition Government deviating from 
the policy line approved Congress • Thia jsot liked 
by Charan &inyh and he called on them to quit the Ministry. The 
friction between th© tvo los further accentubted followins the 
dfcc-sion of BKD H F b to vote ayain^t the abolition of Privy Puraea 
in the ParliQttient. 
The tension between the partners grew so high that 
Charan i^ingh a&ked thirteen Con^rea^j (il> fiiniaterbi to re^siyn 
from his Council of Ministers* vstmn they refused to comply v.ith 
hia requcut he asJced the Governor to dismiss then* At this 
ibtaye K udaputi Tripatai withdrew his support* Xhe Governor^ 
on the advise of Attorney General esked Charan Sinyh to resign 
end sent a rccotar.<_nd^tion for the in^sition ot President's 
Rule in the £>tate* The >^tc'te was duly pluced uno^r Presicent's 
rule on October However* the jstc-te Ass^bly was not 
dissolved to enable the parties to r^ach some sort ot accord 
regardiiitf the forisution of Goverinkent. 
Here it can be noted that the ^ihort tenure of non-
Congress Govemcents i*e. SVD Government and ^ ^ Government* and 
th«lr ln«ne<Siat« collapse Id not related v.ith people in 
general in any aeptect* Ttie responsiii^ility for these chanyea 
ond aevelopments least goeu to ttU^te level leaders ev«n# 
but to ni^tiorml level party le&dere - Too m n ^ alliances 
between polit4.c«l parties ox entirely difter^jnt araS divergent 
ideoloj^iua cle&rly indic^ t^oto one i^oint pro^jrvtnme a m Uiwt wu© 
to TseiBOve Conyre4»s<R> from power* 
The resiynw-tion ot Chs.ran biuyh from avD yovernroent* 
prior tu tbiu hia defection from Coi^re .s (o^ which he seeraed 
to be an inte^r^l pt^ r^  / then furination of Ji:.na Con^re^^i* 
defection from Jana Cunyreso und joinit% Bi<X) all this is 
enough to ahem th^t Ch- r<un uii^h i^s not satisfied with any 
party. Beci^es tliis ii. I not he never loft any 
bhance to head the Government in Uttar Predei>h. v».hat X ieel 
the hei^jht of lust oi power was that on the one side C,B. Gupta 
{Con<5,ress{0) re-i^net' from Chxef Ministership on Februitry 10, 
1970 with a tnove to prevent Che.rat- a^ rit^ h to make en^ ^ alliance 
with Congress to form Governtseut in utt«ar Pradesh* 
Moreover he advised Governor Oopala Reddy to invite Charan 
iaingh to form Government since BiD had 98 Riembers in the 
Asaen^ly and also Imd the support of Opposition Front 
(opposition to Conyrei»s~R) . The Cvn^ress(R) had only 211 
nenbers in the Assembly and hii^ vln^  just 3 3 . 6 o f the total 
atrenyth of the House. Xgnoriny all such friendly and sincers 
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gestures of C.b* Gupta» Charan Slnyh mac* an alliance with 
Congress(t)^) end thus forsoed BKS Governmttnt In Uttar Pradesh 
in coalition with Conyresa(M on February 17,1970. 
At the time of Mid-term poll of the BKP %AS 
also entering into politics end had prepcired to couteat 
elections, its lit,t contained 5i Rajputs* 36 Kusilima, 17 
Banias, 46 Ahlre# 88 B^rijana, 10 5 froro backward 
commnities and 26 oth&r&>* The Cons^ress liat contained 11& 
Brahmins alone be^^ides reprc£>entative& o£ other castes* Vkm 
greatest developRKsnt in y«P* after the roid->teris poll was that 
the lony continuco dominance of Upper Castes broken* 
Another blow yiven to U*p* politics end ws a atr&n^th 
to non'Coi^resa parties i^ as rift in the Con^reus itself* 
After the 1969 polls* C.B. Gupta (Conyreas) with the support 
oi: Independents and £iwatantra formed the Ministry on February 
16,1969* i>tability could not lost lony because of the split 
in Conyress* Congress under the le&ceri»hip of 
Kamlapati Trxpathi started opposition and joined hands with 
the BKD to topple the C.B. Gupta Ministry* and i»ucceeded in 
the mission. 
The coalition Government between the Bkd and Congress(N) 
was not on the basis of any kind oi similarity iu the ideolo* 
yx&s* policies and pro^ramme&> ol the two. On the contxary it 
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on give and taJ(@ l»&iB» It sheer personality o£ 
Charan Singh only who J^ ecaaie it h«ro at thbt crucial rooment. 
All non«<;^ongres& parties and Congress ituel£ %;ere lookiri^ 
tot^rcla Charan Biriyh to reach a con^rosiisQ ^or alliance aras 
foroi a coali-tion rainifttry* <^ 1^1 partie£» were ready tor any 
terou and conditions* But it perhaps farsightedi^ss 
of Charan Singh i^o yav® preference to Conaress(iN) to form the 
Qovertiinent* One reason to foria a coalition ministry in 
alliance with Congress (ti) might h>»ve t«en that C«nyrei»@ was 
ot vU 
in power not onlyAth© Centre but alsoAmany ©tates* Any%i»y 
whatev&.r might hc^ ve been the reason the fact iu that the 
wain aim of all parties was just to COTC in pOfeer irreepectiv® 
OL their varying ideologies* I£ it was not a fact then BiCD 
couia never have come in i^ lliazK»i with Coi^reas(l«) when both 
aid not see eye to eye* Cor^reasd-i) vm& dominated by 
hitrfher Coste® (as general iia resaion was) and BKD was a party 
of workers* farmers and peasant®* 
^vmy from power tactics ii we see the achievetnents or 
failure of opposition Govemmtint then it coioes out that it 
was roaiiily due to the assertive personality of Charan iiingh 
thiit the BKD could take certain pcspular decisions. Many of 
the decisions were welcomed by people* 
The policies oi the BKD Government provided some relief 
to people in terms or their deteriorating conditions. 
23.1 
As a reli«£ to £ariners# the BKP Governineiit deciaed to 
abolish L&nd revenue on holdicig upto acre^ which VAS 
con^iderea the ^verayt^ uneconootlc holdlny* It dec Idea to 
withdraw sales tax oo tertilisaers* wlthcxawal os: restriction 
on export of Gurh# to distribute eurplue lano among landless 
IcJbourers enc to take: over the augar inou£itry» The BKP 
Cov&riJQ&nt Qiao decided to lower the ceiliny on land holdin^^s 
from 40 acree to 30 acres* 
Regarding adrainistjcation and law end order in t;he iitate 
the BKD GovcrnTOLnt took cecisions like setting up a Law 
Corotnieuion Cor judicial efticiency aiM3 elimination of corrup-
tion trom Courts! to reconstitute the regional transport 
outhoritiew v^ ith a view to eliminate corruptioni to appoint 
a coimiiiij^ ioii headed by a Hiyh Court tSudye to investigate the 
concealment and minimization of crintea end suvye^^t remedies for 
the widewpread evils in the police department; to proimilijate 
anf^  ordinance makiny the membbX^hip of union for iitudenta 
voluntary; end to promulvjate &n ordinance emppweriny the 
state Oovernmunt to detain any pcrtion so as to prevent him 
from actin^^ in any nanner prejudicial to the security of 
state or the maintenance o£ public order or oi sup].lies and 
servj.c&s esi^&ntial to the comnianity* 
Regarding law and administration Charan j>ingh v.as very 
strict against unlawful activities by Government personnel* 
1 5 9 
students* coniroon public l&nd grabbers and politicians* An 
Ordinance preventive Detent-ion v.as issued on August b,l910 
under v^ich many students %fere arrested in isappur and Lucknow 
^or unlawful activities* Besides students* 6 MPs and 11 
MLAs were also arrested. This lod the oyjposition parties 
to criticise Charan Singh ruthle^isly. 
The BKD neither believed xn capitalism nor in socialisin 
or coiniiiunismi it believed in middle Gandhian path* an economy 
based overv«helmin^ly on selt employioent v/tore e;^.ploication 
v.as reduced to luinioium it not elimir^ted altogether* It believed 
that democracy v«ws tounoed upon the ownership of: property* 
But concentration ok economic and political p0v«er should not 
be in the &ame h>-nds* 
The BKD did not believe in parliamentary form o£ 
Government* Xt ^as in fcvcKir o£ treaidential torm* Besides 
this a resolution for the abulition o£ the lievial^tive 
Courxil \Ma also passed on April lis* 1970* under ^Iciti th© 
existence ot upper House v^a declared as superflous and a 
sheer iMastage of time and money* 
&oon after the declaration of President*® rule in 
U*P* on October 2«1970* the five opposition parties* 
Congre£>s(0}, Jane banyh« iiMetantra, ^ P and BKD joined Vuinds 
to form the bcmyuKta Vidhayak Dal (aVD) « On account of its 
Strength o£ 2&0 in a ilouse o£ 426« it asked the Governor to 
Invite i»inwh QK.n)ber o£ Rajya babha) to 
form the Ministry. On October 3.8,l97o T.U. Sinc^h xms sv^rn 
in a© Chief Miiuater. 
Jtere one important thins to be nv_tea is* thou^jh at 
the time ci; torination o£ tKD Covtrnnicnt v.hen both Coxx^reshiO) 
fc.ne Congress(K) v^ ere wooing Charan iiin^ tih to ^ain his support 
in ordt.r to form Governu-ent» Charan 5it3^h# ce-pis-e C.b. Gupta's 
oblitrfStiund unc oacrifice^* choso Cur%rct.s(t«> 06, its coalition 
partner to lurro bKD (iovtrr^ment, i^ ut now on account o£ his fai-
lure to keep his ministry in po^-er i-nd atter collapse o^ his 
winiatry ncxther Cha.an tiinyh nor ConyreabtO) hcaitatcd v^hile 
comicy toyetiic?r in. ei forts to prevent Con^reas(K) from coniii^ 
to power in the state. Ini-teaci they nsace an alliance to taak® 
^VD Guvcrntn^nt* Kee ing in view the p^st experience* the fate 
of tiuch an alliance could hc.ve been easily prudoc^ted* Xt had 
to fall. And the same happened Just after five moiiths. The 
T,N. iiinyh J\m Ministry vhich %ias installed on October 18#19'K) 
collapsed on April 4*1971 vinmn Kanilapati Tripathi (Conyress) 
vMis sworn in as Chief Minister* 
The collapc^e oi T.N. Jbin^ h^ Ministry was because ot two 
reasons. Firstly the allied parties could not adjust with each 
other on various iaaues and as a result defections in i»VD 
started! the second reason was T.M. Singh's defeat in the 
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Manlmm by election in 1^71 • ^ t e r his defeat it became 
difficult 4.or the parties of alliance to tind a suitable 
leader* hiaxiY defected from avX) <>nci join«.d Coi^re^aCM) • 
Thus the Comreaai^) «»ith 222 men&^ru behind it tirged th« 
Governor to di^^solve aVD Ministry end Tripathi vas ax^orn 
in as Chief Miniotei i^ jhotie Kini»try lasted till elec-
tions* end then tohUvuna £'r>^ni the ta&me p£»rt.y (Cuixg-
rees-N) took over a@ Chief Minister on Merch I>0l914>, 
The drema oi alliance9/coalition 90vernn)ent«) v nd 
defections from one party to another lested from 1967 to 
19/4 in the first ph»a@ of (soveminent. Xt appealrb that 
the people were tired of the political ^ams end i;^ot confirmed 
tliiit apart from Centre* in U.P. too it only the Conyresaii^i) 
vfhich could give the &t^te a stable Governuent. Thiij streo^'-
thened the position of Conv^ress* vjitne^oed by i.he 1974 
elections in v.hich in a House of 42b Con^re&s(li} secured 213 
seats as Aye inat 211 out of in 1969* HuL other parties 
•ja:ept ij-rm vmcm alrao^t drouned* The reason why this 
time opposition pareieb did not come toyether vi> b tliet tlie 
leaders of opposition parties had perhaps realised and were 
cwnvxrxsed t.hat joint ventures ifould not worH any loore* 
After Bahu^una* Tivmri took over as Chief Minister 
of Utt«ir Pradech £^ nd the Congress in U.p* remained in power 
throuyhout the emergency phase (197&-77) . 
26 2. 
the emergency period (197&-77) in India as tK^l as in 
the state of uttar Precesh geve such a Ie&;>on to the people 
in just IV months that^they never had in 2.b yo&rti span* The 
Allahabad Ju^einent will go down as a landtnark in Indian 
history, it <jave a aharp turn to Indian Politics setting a 
new freasied pace to events end inxtiatiny en entirely new 
t;.tylc of Government in the country with different norms and 
values* 
The election petition filud by Raj £^rain against 
Krs. Indira Gandhi re^ ^^ ulted (on June XZ^A^ilh) in her 
diseniranchiuentent for sxss y.«rs« '^he judyeroent prcw^tly gran-
ted fan absolute atoy for 20 jaays. irfie was held v^ilty ot 
corrupt practice- under Section 123(7) oi the ivepresentation 
of People act under two countst obtaining assistance o£ 
c^overnment Ouficials for constructing rustrutns and supplying 
power for loudspeaker^ at the meetings^addressed by Mrs. 
Gandhi in Kae lareli on February I and February 25#1971 ^nd 
obtaining and procuring the assistance of Yashpal Kapoor (a 
gazetted officer* Officer cm i»pecial Duty in the Prime 
MinJuster'ii secretariat) durijj^ the period from January 7*1^71 
to January 24,l97x in furtherence of Mrs. Ganchi's election 
prospects. 
As a re&»ult emergency was declared in the country by 
the President of India Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad on the ni^ht of 
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JuiMi 2&'-26#l975. The actions during emergency period even 
in Uttbr Pra<3e8h« the Prime Hin^ster'a home atate« talked a 
cifferent XanyuftQe. Besideti family planning excesaeo* th* 
pec^le mere angry over the HXwiA and DXR arre8ti>. Kven in the 
villages now people listened to bi>C for true news* 
One can critlci&e the einergency period to any length* 
Apart irom its destructive and evil aspects one c&nnot deny 
that it brought certain thin^& good also £or thm stater 
efi^iciei^y in Oov(:rninc;nt otticeu* pron^t service^ # halt to 
corr\|.ption of any kind in any sphere # arid consciousnew>a even 
amony the villa|iers» 
The iy?7 election resultc gave a violent shake to the 
Kaleidoscf^c of Zucian politico. • RtaUt Jana danghis* Janaatis* 
14u£>liiD Leaguers# Old Conyress men* liLD, and i*ocialiiits« all 
came under the cc^ nroon whiplash of Mrs* Gandhi*^ authoritarian 
oppression* The^ tahare-d jail cells and suffered together for 
nineteen months* and came to know and understand each other 
from close quarterly i had plenty of tine to ciscuss disp<-i>sio-
nately each others ideologies and politics* 
So that when they were all released in <jianuary and 
and 
February 1977# they came out/decided to bury the past and 
turn a new leaf and work as a team* on a single front* Xn 
the "supreme common cause of banishing dictatcxrship once for 
all** and restoring democracy in th^ country* 
2 6 4 
The forcmtion of Janata Governnient at the Centre and 
state Xevele was ao very tmich i^ anic a«, that on SVD Gcvernment 
(tvtice) in Uttar Pradesh* It vms olbvioua that the ceraentine 
factor® to different political parties except the CPI 
not a Goromon i^teoXogy or principles but rather a comnton 
programme that too one onXy# juat reonoval ot Congre^isd*) rule 
i.rom cenUTt—nd £roaa states* 
iioon Janata Party m.t the sasae fate as taVD hod Biet in 
U*!". Thu&» cracks had ^meryed* Zt v^ as not politics this 
tiro© but natiot:al politics \<;here Charan ainyh played exactly 
the same role as he had played in u«p» durinj non'-Conyress 
rule in the state* 
It was Raj tieirain's criticism iwith full bacKiny of 
Charan Singh) of the party pret»xdent Chandra t>hekhar because 
of which Horarji I)esai asked both Raj %rain and Charan iiii^h 
to resign from the Union Cabinet, ^ot only both ot then 
resigned but the whole lot of Charan ^^inyh supporters resigned 
from the party* At tht:^  i»t&te level* in U*F* 200 meniders of 
Janata Party submitted a memorandum demai^diny removal of 
Chief Minister* Ram iiaresh Yadav* 
It was Charan ^inyh who managed to bring Itaaarsi l^ as 
as Chit^f Minister of Uttar Pradesh* who continued till the 
Assembly was dissolved and 1980 electioiis held* In the 
•lection of 1980 the Conyresa(I) swept the poll and captured 
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306 seats In a Houa« o£ 42& as ayain^^t oray 46 in 1^77* 
Tha Janata wea almost wiped out ecstcuriny only 4 aeats* Its 
brea)«aviay yroup bhartiya Janata Part^ secured 11 seata 
Janata only 4 as a<^ ainfit 3£>1 aeate in the Hou^e o£ 42£> in tha 
ye&r 1911* Thus once a^ain Conyresad) Government in th« 
tit^&te w^s £ormt.a under the Chief Minister ship of Vishw&nath 
Pratap ^ingh. 
The Janata UcTvernment at the Centre as well a a in 
took decisiontj with an aim to ^ive naximuBi relief and freedc»D 
to the people. To all the victinit. ot emergency not only 
relief t^faa ^ iven but atern action ayain^t guilty was taken* 
ftore courts were opened to expedite the jud-cial process. 
C-om ensation to those who lost their jobs durii^^ otnergency was 
given and they were reiiiutated. 
r)ecxaion to open more schools* to recruit tnore 
tec.thers# to increase aalarias of teachers« technical staff 
and Medical st^sf etc. were taKan. xt was not only salaried 
class but fartnars and peasantry was also rewarded in di~ferent 
forma. To farroersi relief was yiven resarcinft fertilisers 
irrigation* po%i«rcut in taxes etc. To snail industries also 
cheaper l<und was to be yiven aa decided by the Qoverntnent* 
considerable amount was spent for the development ot Hill 
areas. A grant of HS.660 crores was approved to be distributed 
as loans* Rs* 17«800 crores employment plan tor U#P. was 
-2.66 
approved* (cs* 2a crore«' job plan only ^or £«otern U»P* 
promised* under which 30*000 people v^ ere to wet tts^loyni&nt* 
On the tMsla o^ - the above auelysis it can toe concluded 
that since independence there vas no rei&.rlsable develc^ment 
in U*P. till 1967. It was only after the ^lections of 1S67 
that £3ioine uort oi lii.e came into U.p* Politic.^* In other 
vordc it was the beginning of non-Coi^ress tnoveoJc-nt that 
brouyht a change in the otherwise slow momcntufii of affaire in 
the atate. A rcrrarkable chanj,e could be observed* apecJally 
in the pO£»t-£inergency period* It look&d ac i^ . the excesses c£ 
tnfc-rgeucy and the resultant trauroa had the greatest impact on 
the people end politics of U*!** The reaction «as unprecedented* 
For people vho hfctve been looking for%fard to a chac^e in 
Goverimi^nt* opportunity came their imy in the 1977 Elections 
and no do\ibt full advantSi^e has been taken ot the rare oppor-
tunity* A non-Coi:^re&a wive of ouch proportions end intensity 
y»B never eiqperienced in the poat-independence politics of 
U.P. The reat is history. 
But this is only one side Oi; tho turbulent period* 
otherwise known &s the J&.n&ta phase which has been diurussed 
in the main body oc this dissertation* More surprise were 
to come* The political situation took so mary turns in ll*P* 
during tht. Janata phase that it calls for an esctremely sharp 
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QMinory to recall and recount all the hRppenln^s and 
•pi&odes (clnaptere ZV & V) . 
I£ the Janata victory brought jubilation and relief to 
the people o£ U«p» unfortunately it for a very short 
period* The developneints thct took place during the Janata 
phase Kere o£ such nature t-h^ t the people as v#ell as leaders 
started to have second thoughts on the vhole political aysteo) 
exiatii^ at that time. The Janata phase was cliarocterieted 
by uncertainty, absence o£ consensus^ inbtability* disunity 
and thcreioro became rooi-t notorious tor inaction, pettyfogging, 
peraoHi-l rxvalricfa end political skullouygery • The reader 
roay refer to the relevant chapters in this dissertation ior 
it detailed account oi the political iiituation in U.p* during 
this roost disturbing phase of politics in the state* 
Public tneoiory tnay be proverbially ohort, but this is 
more oiten not true* '^'he people o£. U.P* have ^one through 
tnany non«-Con^re^i» Governments like i»VD and BKDt but it was 
Janata Goverriinent which gave them a jolt and isade them sit up 
and opened the doors for a vlgifcrous thought procei»s and 
retrospection* 
There is too much evidence to shcm that the people of 
U*P* alongwith others who had to bear the Janata brunt have 
ultimately reconcil&d to the fact that they had had enough 
ie.0 
o£ the aw* BKD and Sonata ana th&t it was tltm to go ]t>ack 
to their oriyiiKtl moorings • They have alvtays been ruled by 
the Corgrcss when they mnted to have a change« they had itf 
but tli^ y Lelt that it %»8 a change for the worse* The people 
cannot be bXameo lor this* Xt \mh the perforimnce* rather 
non-performance oi the vi rious noi^ngress Governmenta that 
put the people off. They ^aw through the politicians i^ a»)e# 
ano decide<i that there is nothir% like the yood old Conyre&s* 
the onl^ party \,.hich could ^xve them a tnodicuro of stability« 
and continuity. And no it the Conwrei»>^ a^ain in 1980. 
Lo uany ux^ L^kiS xn Xnuia# u.P. had a con^catively 
peaceful tic©. Politically opcakii*j# tht- u^ate hi-d been 
more fortunate in thtj -cn4ie th^t it not notorious for 
political de-cctions as v;ae the case with iwryana and i>ihar. 
But th_ tact cannot be ^uniefi that nothir^y rentrkable happened 
in the premier su.te of Xndia which ^ave top class 
leaderlike Jawaharlal. £^hru c.nd Indxra Gandhi to the country. 
The political i^ituatior^ in u.p. as is evident from the 
present study* has more often than not been guided* directed* 
and controlled by the central leadership. The centre in its 
own intere^it had never allowed any man oi independent views to 
continue as Chief Minister iti U.P. lor a reasonable period to 
enable him to give a good performance* A good ano astute 
politician poses a threat to the central leaderj:ihip whose 
self in^sed iiqportance stands questionc^c. fiuch state level 
Xeadtars ere either replaced or called to the Centre and provided 
a berth In the ynlon Council o£ Minister a* A case In point 
Is c.hiut o£ Vli&hvfanath Pratap j>lnyh. % cll counts would 
have given a better administration to U.P« than ^rlp&t Hlsra 
had he been allovted to continue* 
ivnocht^ r lactor th:it ha3 to be taken care o£ l8> that 
w o a ^tate to admlalwtcred from LucKnow* Zt 
^oe^ wltnout Laying thst it tieecs to be clvl£ed and reor^anlseed 
Into tv^ lur admliJilx^tratlve convenience* '^"he iiai<edlate 
n(.ed Ifii eradication ot corruption in adminlatr^-tlon* The 
people tthoul<2 learn to nur&e only honu&t pwlltlciant. with 
cooHitRteut and inteyrlty. A nujor surgical or^ e^ratlon the 
Ins.aai-te NEED- An entirely new approach le CSLIICC xor* 
iotal cverhBullng oi the political situation and actiululiitratlon 
Is the need oc the moment* The people oi thia yn.at state 
can look .orwara to better times i but only it they i>how more 
eoiaturlty . nd give evidence o£ political awarenei>s of the 
appropriate kind* 
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